Yom Kippur War (October 1973 Arab-Israeli War) CIA Files and State Department Documentary History

Yom Kippur War (October 1973 Arab-Israeli War) CIA Files and State Department Documentary History

This collection contains a total of 4,622 pages.

On October 6, 1973, that year the day of Yom Kippur and the 10th day of the Islamic holy month of Ramadan, a group of Arab nations lead by Egypt and Syria, launched an offensive against Israel.

The Yom Kippur War has also been called as the Ramadan War, the October War, the 1973 Arab–Israeli War, and the Fourth Arab–Israeli War.

During the Six-Day War of 1967, Israel captured control of the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, roughly half of Syria's Golan Heights, and the territories of the West Bank which had been held by Jordan since 1948. Israel crippled the entirety of the Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian militaries.

In October of 1973, the Egyptians attempted to seize a portion of the eastern bank of the Suez Canal, hoping to leverage this gain to negotiate the return of the rest of the Israeli-occupied Sinai Peninsula.  The Syrians launched a coordinated attack on the Golan Heights and made gains into Israeli-held territory. 

After three days of heavy fighting, despite initial Israeli setbacks, the Israeli military launched a four-day-long counter-offensive deep into Syria, and, within a week, Israeli artillery began to shell the outskirts of the Syrian capital of Damascus. Israel repelled Egyptian forces and made their way as close as 60 miles from Cairo. 

The 1973 Arab-Israeli War was a watershed for U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East. It forced the Nixon administration to account for that Arab frustration over Israel’s control of territories it gained in 1967. The war thus paved the way for Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s “shuttle diplomacy” and ultimately, the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty of 1979.

This collection contains:

CIA Files

3,343 pages of CIA files related to the Yom Kippur War. The files in hindsight show that Egypt and Syria were ramping up preparation for war. The majority opinion among United States Intelligence Community was that the Arab nations would find it existentially unwise to attack Israel after the results of the Six-Day War of 1967.

 This collection includes a copy of, "President Nixon and the Role of Intelligence in The 1973 Arab-Israeli War," a 2013 59-page book created by the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence, and the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum. This booklet was prepared as a guide to a January 30, 2013, symposium held in connection with the declassification of many of the CIA files found in this collection. It includes three essays concerning the CIA, the war, and the CIA's analysis of intelligence concerning matters related to the war. The three titles of the essays are Intelligence and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, William E. Colby as Director of Central Intelligence 1973-1976, and CIA’s Middle East Task Force and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.

Highlights from the CIA files in this collection includes:

A 31-page December 1, 1972, memo titled, "Israeli Thinking on a Peace Settlement with the Arabs." It found that, "Most Israelis, however, do not believe 1) that the Arabs are ready or really willing to make formal peace with Israel and 2) that even if willing, the Arab states would be able to swallow Israel’s considerable requirements for what Tel Aviv calls a ‘real peace.’”

An April 18, 1973, memo on the region titled, "Israeli Raid on Lebanon: USSR Sees Terror As Hampering Peaceful Mideast Settlement and PRC Charges ‘Superpowers’ Aid Israeli with Weapons, Manpower," It states, “Our current assessment of the Egyptian-Israeli military situation remains that we do not believe that an outbreak of fighting along the Suez Canal imminent. For some time, Sadat has followed a two-track approach of talking tough as a tactic to buttress his negotiating position and to keep up his image in the Arab world, while at the same time remaining prepared to search for a negotiated settlement. He may have begun to take his own talk more seriously, but we do not think he is at the point of decision on a military move against Israel.” 

A May 13, 1973, CIA Intelligence Report, titled "Views (Redacted) on the Probability that Egyptian President Sadat Seriously is Considering Launching Hostilities against Israel." It states, “Knowledgeable Egyptian observers, contrary to views expressed for some time in the past that Egyptian President Sadat was bluffing in his threats to launch an offensive against Israel, now believe that Sadat is serious and that to consider that he is bluffing is unrealistic and naïve. This change in opinion is based on positive indications throughout the country that Sadat is making an all-out effort to complete all preparations both in the military and civilian efforts to reach the “appropriate” level of military preparedness.”

A May 26, 1973, President’s Briefing covering Israeli Reaction to F-4s sales to Saudi Arabia. It reports, "Foreign Minister Eban… has informed the State Department that Israel is ‘all out’ against these sales… We can anticipate that the Israelis will argue that we will seem to be yielding to Arab oil pressures and will thereby encourage Arab feeling that such pressure offers an alternative to negotiating with Israel; that pending Israeli arms requests must be dealt with immediately; and that Israeli willingness to cooperate with the Administration on most-favored-nation treatment for the Soviet Union might be reconsidered."

An August 24, 1973, 18-page Intelligence Memorandum, covering the demographic aspects of the Arab-Israeli dispute. It states, "Since the 1967 war a new problem has arisen, i.e., the demographic threat posed by Arabs living inside the cease-fire lines. The threat stems from Israel’s control of about 1.5 million Arabs, those in occupied territories and in pre-war Israel itself, and from the almost inexorable intertwining of the two areas. In the future, the Arab population is apt to grow more rapidly than the Jewish population… In absence of a peace settlement with the Arabs, a kind of territorial imperative operates in Tel Aviv. This being so, Jewish control inside the cease-fire lines will come to depend more and more on either denying the Arabs political rights or goading them into leaving."

"The Arab-Israeli Handbook," A 184-page September 1973 Interagency Intelligence Memorandum. Sections include I. Political Situation and Developments, II. Military Situation, III. Advanced Weapons Development, Supplement: I. Military Aid from Communist Countries, II. Transportation and Production, III. The Soviet Mediterranean Squadron. Includes 7 tables and 16 maps. Glossary: Performance of Selected Arab and Israeli Military Equipment. 

An October 4, 1973, "Combined Watch Report of the United States Intelligence Board," states, "We continue to believe that an outbreak of major Arab-Israeli hostilities remains unlikely for the immediate future, although the risk of localized fighting has increased slightly as the result of the buildup of Syrian forces in the vicinity of the Golan Heights. Egyptian exercise activity under way since late September may also contribute to the possibility of incidents.”

A cable to Dr. Henry A. Kissinger at the White House, from Ambassador Helms in Tehran, dated October 7, 1973 saying, “Prime Minister Hoveyda, at Shah’s instruction, summoned me at 2315 local to read me cable to Shah from President Sadat… Cable requests Shah to inform President Nixon that Egypt until now… has been ready to accept peace under certain conditions… Sadat wants President Nixon to know that if Israel will evacuate all the territories occupied since June 5, 1967, Egypt will be ready to negotiate sincerely to place these territories under the control of the United Nations, or under the control of the four big powers, or under some other international control to be agreed. As for Sharm Al Sheikh, Egypt is prepared to accept international supervision of freedom of navigation through Gulf of Aqaba after Israeli withdrawal… Since Sadat offer set forth above struck me as somewhat improbable, I asked Hoveyda and his bilingual assistant to translate the cable for me three times.”

On October 10, 1973, a DCI Congressional Briefing titled, "Highlights of the Middle East Situation," stated, “The Egyptians have established their force firmly on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal, forcing an Israeli admission that their ground forces have been unable to push them back. In the Golan Heights, despite heavy fighting, the Israelis have been unable to push the Syrians back beyond the 1967 cease-fire line, and they admit that they have not broken the Syrian army. The ground is still contested however, and no clear-cut advantage is evident for either side.”

"Soviet Nuclear Weapons in Egypt?," was the title of an October 30, 1973, memo that stated, “Confirmation of Scud-associated equipment at two different locations in Egypt adds seriousness to the evidence that Moscow introduced nuclear weapons into the Middle East. The Scud equipment…includes a transporter-erector-launcher unique to the Scud missile in an area near the Tura caves some 10 miles south of Cairo, and two resupply vehicles at Cairo international airport, one of which is carrying a probably canvas-covered missile.”

National Intelligence Estimate 1-73 dated November 23, 1973 titled, "Using Oil as a Weapon: Implications and Prospects for the Arab Oil Producing States," stated in its 26 pages, “The Arabs have finally used oil as a political weapon, declaring an embargo against the US (and a few others) and instituting major production cuts to drive their point home… Total production has been cut 25 percent, and the Arab producers threaten to go on cutting five percent a month until Israel withdraws from all territory captured in 1967 and the rights of the Palestinians are restored. Until then; friendly countries may buy Arab oil at the pre-October quantities; unfriendly countries get no Arab oil; neutral countries will have to divide up what is left.”

The Agency's deliberated findings from a review of its performance related to the conflict can first be seen in the December 1973, "The Performance of the Intelligence Community before the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973: A Preliminary Post-Mortem Report," December 1973. The report gives the findings, "There was an intelligence failure in the weeks preceding the outbreak of war in the Middle East on 6 October. Those elements of the Intelligence Community responsible for the production of finished intelligence did not perceive the growing possibility of an Arab attack and thus did not warn of its imminence. The information provided by those parts of the Community responsible for intelligence collection was sufficient to prompt such a warning. Such information (derived from both human and technical sources) was not conclusive but was plentiful, ominous, and often accurate."

Later in the September 1975 intelligence report, "The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: Overview and Analysis of the Conflict." The failed strategy of the Arab states is addressed. "The Arabs had different goals and, consequently, different strategies. The Syrians wanted to liberate the Golan Heights and attempted to do so in one stroke. The Egyptians’ main goal was to achieve a political effect, and they therefore planned for a limited offensive. The Israelis, because of overconfidence and because they failed to recognize that their occupation of the Suez Canal’s east bank deprived them of advance warning of an Egyptian attack, did not react to mounting evidence of Arab intentions."

 
Department of State Diplomatic Document Transcripts

The 1,279-page Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume 25 (XXV) Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973. Produced by the Department of State's Office of the Historian Bureau of Public Affairs in July of 2011. It is the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government related to the Arab-Israeli Crisis and War of 1973.

This volume documents U.S. policymaking toward the Arab-Israeli dispute between January and December 1973, i.e., the months before, during, and immediately after the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973. The volume provides extensive transcripts of documentation of the high-level contacts between Washington and officials of the belligerent countries, the United Nations, and the Soviet Union.

The editors of this volume sought to present documentation that explains and illuminates the major foreign policy decisions taken by the administration of Richard M. Nixon toward the Arab-Israeli dispute in the months preceding, during, and immediately following the October 1973 War. Documentation in this volume includes memoranda; records of discussions both within the U.S. policy-making community, as well as with foreign officials; cables to and from U.S. diplomatic posts; and papers that set forth policy issues and options, and which show decisions or actions taken. The emphasis is on the process by which U.S. policy developed, and the major repercussions of its implementation rather than the details of policy execution.

The first third of this volume, covering January to October 1973, documents the Nixon administration’s efforts to break a diplomatic and military impasse while seeking to prevent simmering tensions from instigating renewed hostilities. The core of this volume is U.S. diplomacy during the course of the October 1973 War itself, the outbreak of which, following the attack by Egyptian and Syrian forces on Israeli positions in the Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights on October 6, 1973.