General Curtis LeMay Personnel Files - Defense Department Reports & Monographs

General Curtis LeMay Personnel Files - Defense Department Reports & Monographs

This collection includes 5,186 pages of material. 

Curtis Emerson LeMay (1906-1990) was a General in the U.S. Air Force. General LeMay directed the bombing of Japan in World War II. He commanded the 305th Operations Group from October 1942 until September 1943, and the 3rd Air Division in the European theatre of World War II until August 1944, when he was transferred to the China Burma India Theater. He was then placed in command of strategic bombing operations against Japan.

LeMay commanded B-29 Superfortress combat operations against Japan, including massive incendiary attacks on 67 Japanese cities. This included the firebombing of Tokyo, known as "Operation Meetinghouse" air raid on the night of March 9–10, 1945, which proved to be the single most destructive bombing raid of the war. His command covered the 509 Composite Group which executed the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. He implemented Operation Starvation, a crippling minelaying campaign in Japan's internal waterways.

After the war he built the Strategic Air Command (SAC) during the Cold War and served as Air Force Chief of Staff from 1961 to 1965. He retired from the Air Force in 1965. He briefly returned to public life in 1968 when he was the vice-presidential candidate on the far-right American Independent party ticket with George C. Wallace running on a segregationist platform. The Wallace-LeMay AIP ticket received 13.5% of the popular vote.

This collection contains:

Official Military Personnel File of Curtis E. Lemay

4,198 pages of Curtis Lemay's Official Military Personnel File. The files include records from the following folders: Service Documents (December 1927-October 1990); Field File/Jacket or Record Book (September 28, 1928-October 12, 1929); Correspondence (December 1927-May 1965); Awards, Decorations, and Commendations (September 1930-January 1965); Efficiency/Fitness Reports (July 1923-August 1952); Medical Records (June 1927-February 1980); Other Original Documents (n.d.); Photographs and Negatives (n.d.); Oversized Documents (n.d.)
 

Department of Defense Reports and Monographs

General Curtis E. Lemay on Leadership and Command (2010)

A thesis by Major Paul K Carlton, III. 

Abstract: This study takes key events from General Curtis LeMay’s life and puts them into a context to learn leadership and command. LeMay is widely regarded as the best operational-level commander the U.S. Air Force has produced. General LeMay’s life provides ample opportunity to glean insight to better understand leadership and command. The paper gives a brief biography of LeMay’s life, then discusses leadership and command from an academic perspective, providing the context to understand the next two chapters that focus on LeMay’s actions. LeMay on Command presents his key challenges in Europe and the Pacific in changing the tactics used in both to generate greater bombing effectiveness and efficiency. Following these examples, this paper discusses his decision to change the way maintenance was conducted and then how LeMay changed Strategic Air Command to a resolute and capable organization, capable of providing the nation’s nuclear deterrence. LeMay on Leadership focuses on his development of Lead Crews, target folders, and his debrief. It then discusses how he addressed quality of life issues within SAC to help his people cope with the stress placed on them. Finally, the paper addresses his unsuccessful election bid for Vice-President and what he was attempting to accomplish by his involvement. The paper concludes with lessons gleaned from the vignettes presented and application for current and future military officers.

 
Embracing the Bomb: Ethics, Morality, and Nuclear Deterrence in the U.S. Air Force, 1945-1955 (1998)

A thesis by United States Air Force Lieutenant Bret J. Cillessen.

Abstract: This paper addresses how leading U.S. Air Force officers viewed nuclear weapons in ethical terms. Specifically, at a time when no one else had to, how and why did professional Air Force officers come to accept planning for, threatening, and training to take millions upon millions of human lives, many of them civilian, with nuclear weapons? The work draws extensively from the manuscript collections and printed primary sources of Air Force generals to show that these men ardently believed they were traveling the road of higher morality.


Rise of the Fighter Generals: The Problem of Air Force Leadership 1945–1982 (1998)

Abstract: Numerous studies have focused on American airpower, particularly since it became a dominant force in modern warfare. Yet only a handful of these studies have offered a critical evaluation of air leadership, and even fewer have shown a concern for the institutional dynamics that shape air leadership. Therefore, at least one study needs to ask, "Who are the air leaders and where have they come from?" This analysis focuses on the career specialty of Air Force general officers who served between 1953 and 1973. It indicates the clear dominance by rated or flying officers (mainly pilots and a few navigators) within Air Force leadership. 

 
Strategic Air Warfare: An Interview with Generals Curtis E. LeMay, Leon W. Johnson, David A. Burchinal, and Jack J. Catton (1988) 

A history produced by the Office of Air Force History United States Air Force.

Abstract: The purpose of the interview was to have the air commanders meet in an informal setting and discuss the development of strategic air employment as a form of warfare. The hope was that in the course of the discussion these men, who had served together for many years and undergone common experiences, might stimulate each other to remember facts and events that have otherwise gone unrecorded, and to flesh out the record with fuller explanations of motives and the reasoning behind great occurrences. The result was beyond our expectations, for almost immediately the four generals began interviewing each other, reminiscing at times, exchanging ideas, questioning circumstances, and recalling motives and objectives clear at the time of decision but clouded over by the passage of time.

 
Curtis E. LeMay: A Great Warrior (1984)

A student report by Major Ian E. Robinson.

Abstract: Review, analysis, and comparison of Curtis E. LeMay’s strategy in Europe and the Pacific in the context of the ACSC strategy process model, will provide insight into the evolution of strategy and the actual process by which it is derived.