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World War II: Battle of the Bulge - Ardennes Counter-Offensive Documents and History
World War II: Battle of the Bulge - Ardennes Counter-Offensive Documents and History
6,715 pages of documents, maps, newspaper coverage, after action reports, official histories, oral history interviews and military academic studies covering the Ardennes Offensive/Counter Offensive, also known as the Battle of the Bulge.
On December 16, 1944, Allied Forces in Europe were taken by surprise when the Germans launched an attack in the Ardennes region, pushing into France, Luxembourg, and Belgium. The offensive came six months after D-Day and the successful invasion of Normandy, on a day when the weather did not permit the use of airplanes. The resulting “bulge” in the front line gave the battle the name by which it is best known. The Battle of the Bulge was the bloodiest the United States would fight in World War II, with 19,000 American soldiers dead by the time the Allies had fought back the Germans and regained their lost ground.
KEY HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS
512 pages of key historical documents. Includes:
Cable between British Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery and General Eisenhower, at the beginning of the battle, giving Montgomery temporary command of the US First Army and the US Ninth Army, which held up the German advance to the north of the Bulge.
General Eisenhower's diary entry a week after the battle began summarizing events up to December 24.
A letter from General Eisenhower to Bernard Montgomery regarding Montgomery's Outline Plan of Operations
Eisenhower's December 31, 1944 diary entry summarizing German action to date.
War Department Daily Operational Summaries from 1 January 1945 to 1 February 1945.
A July 26, 1945 interview with German Generaloberst Alfred Jodl.
An August 12, 1945 interview of German Lieutenant Colonel Otto Skorzeny, commanding officer for Operation "Greif."
Twelfth Army Situation Maps
50 maps showing 12th Army troop positions beginning on December 15, 1944 to February 1, 1945. Each quadrangle sheet shows the position of the 12th Army Group and adjacent Allied Forces and of the German units for each day. Significant battles can be identified by the concentrations of unit symbols on the maps. These maps were used by the commanders of the United States forces in their evaluation of the campaign and for planning strategy.
An intelligence failure before the Battle of the Bulge can be evidenced in the maps. The Ardennes Forest area was devoid of Axis units opposing the U.S. forces on the December 15, 1944 map. This map is clear evidence of Allied intelligence's failure to identify Axis units before the Battle of the Bulge. Also, as the Battle of the Bulge developed and Allied intelligence improved, many previously unidentified Axis units start appearing on the situation maps.
AMERICAN NEWSPAPER COVERAGE
162 pages of newspaper articles from around the United States on the Battle of the Bulge, dating from December 17, 1944 to February 5, 1945.
After Action Reports
Notes on Bastogne Operation, 3rd U.S. Army, by General George S. Patton - January 16, 1945
84th Infantry Division in the Battle of the Ardennes, December 1944 - January 1945. - Abstract: The battle of the Ardennes was historic. The lessons of experience and accomplishments (as well as an opportunity for future forces to learn) are documented by the 84th Infantry Division, this is a preservation of that history. Sections detailing the Battle of the Bulge include the big picture, life in the Ardennes, the turning point, the capture of Laroche, from Les Tailles to Dinez, Beho to Gouvy to Ourthe, and a conclusion.
Report of Allied Air Force Operations from 17th to 27th December 1944
743rd Tank Battalion, S3 Journal History
82D Airborne Division, Belgium - The Story of the Bulge - Dec 1944 - Feb 1945
75th Infantry Division in Combat: The Battle in the Ardennes, 23 Dec 1944-27 Jan 1945; the Colmar Pocket Battle, 30 Jan 1945-9 Feb 1945; The Battle for the Ruhr, 31 Mar 1945-15 Apr 1945
OFFICIAL HISTORY
Ardennes-Alsace (2019) - Ardennes-Alsace 16 December 1944–25 January 1945 by Roger Cirillo.
Bastogne: the story of the first eight days in which the 101st Airborne Division was closed within the ring of German forces. (2010) - Abstract: Bastogne offers unique insights, capturing the immediate impressions of the soldiers who fought in this harsh winter engagement. The author penetrates the "fog of war" with a coherent narrative that clearly captures the strategy, tactics, and leadership of the battle. This action strangled the German logistical flow to their forward assault divisions, disrupting their offensive tempo and slowing their advance. What emerges is a vivid case study of how decisive leadership and incidents of individual heroism can contribute to overcoming enemy forces and weather.
Battle of St. Vith A Concept in Defensive Tactics (1974) - A descriptive account of the military operation in St. Vith by the general in command, Bruce C. Clark. Includes personal correspondence concerning the account. A published edition of this account is in the 1974 Armor periodical titled "The battle for St. Vith: armor in the defense and delay".
The Ardennes Battle of the Bulge - The Ardennes Battle of The Bulge by Hugh M. Cole. Abstract: This is the story of how the Germans planned and executed their offensive. It is the story of how the high command, American and British, reacted to defeat the German plan once the reality of a German offensive was accepted. But most of all it is the story of the American fighting man and the manner in which he fought a myriad of small defensive battles until the torrent of the German attack was slowed and diverted, its force dissipated and finally spent. It is the story of squads, platoons, companies, and even conglomerate scratch groups that fought with courage, with fortitude, with sheer obstinacy, often without information or communications or the knowledge of the whereabouts of friends. In less than a fortnight the enemy was stopped, and the Americans were preparing to resume the offensive. While Bastogne has become the symbol of this obstinate, gallant, and successful defense, this work appropriately emphasizes the crucial significance of early American success in containing the attack by holding firmly on its northern and southern shoulders and by upsetting the enemy timetable at St. Vith and a dozen lesser known but important and decisive battlefields.
U.S. Army Battlebook - The Battle of the Bulge - A U.S. Army staff ride guide covering World War II & Battle of the Bulge Chronologies, World War II Allied Conferences, Allied Command Architecture & Order of Battle, The US Army in December 1944, Biographical Sketches – Senior Allied Commanders, German Command Architecture & Order of Battle, The German Army in December 1944, Biographical Sketches – Senior German Commanders, Comparative Military Officers’ Ranks, Equipment, The Defense of Bastogne, Casualties Medical Statistics & Battle Losses, Suggestions for Further Reading, Glossary and Code Names.
Weather Effects During the Battle of the Bulge and the Normandy Invasion (1982) - A general description of the terrain of the Ardennes-Eifel area is given, and weather-related decisions concerning the final attack date and the buildup of the German offensive push are noted. Surface meteorological charts for 16 and 23 December 1944 are presented and show that a modified cold maritime polar air mass was over the Ardennes-Eiiel area when the Battle of the Bulge began.
Victory TD, Northern France--Ardennes--Rhineland--Central Europe (1945) - History of the 628th Tank Destroyer Battalion in training and combat, prepared by and for the men who saw action with the battalion in France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Holland and Germany
ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPTS
1,241 pages of transcripts of five oral history interviews conducted by the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library. Interviews of:
General William Hood Simpson, a senior United States Army officer who served with distinction in both World War I and World War II. He is most notable, however, for being the Commanding General of the U.S. Ninth Army in Western Europe on the Western Front during the final stages of World War II.
Thomas J. Betts, Brigadier General; Intelligence Officer, SHAEF, 1944-May 1945; Director of Intelligence, U.S. Group
Lieutenant General John William Leonard, Commander of the 9th Armored Division
Elwood Richard Quesada, a United States Air Force Lt. Gene
Colonel Raymond Hoffman
Book
Dark December: The Full Account of the Battle of the Bulge - Dark December, by Robert E. Merriam, former chief of the Ardennes section of the U.S. Army Historical Division, published in 1947, is a thorough and engrossing examination of the Battle of the Bulge by a historian who had the opportunity to prepare notes as the battle was occurring and consult classified American as well as German records. Notably, the book contains unique and critical information, including details gleaned from interviews conducted by the author with commanding officers on both sides, some of which are the only reports gathered from these sources.
“If other veterans of the Army’s historical division can maintain Mr. Merriam’s high standard of stimulating, critical and painstaking work, we will be fortunate. Dark December can be heartily recommended to anyone faintly interested in the war.”—New York Times
“The book explodes a number of myths which have been winning their improper way into general belief.” —Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Booklist
“Dark December occupies a distinguished place among war books. Every paragraph is based upon evidence, not flimsy wartime rumors. Technical enough for the professional, accurate enough for the historian (in fact, it is history of the best), it is lucid and understandable for the general reader.” — New York Herald Tribune
MILITARY ACADEMIC STUDIES
2,588 pages of military academic studies and research reports from the U.S. Army War College, Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, Combat Studies Institute, The US Army Concepts Analysis Agency, The Armored School and others.
Includes:
The Battle of Kasserine Pass Defeat is a Matter of Scale (2016)
Abstract: The Battle of Kasserine Pass is marked by history as an embarrassing defeat of Ameri can soldiers during their first major action against Germany in World War II; some historians even go so far as to anticipate defeat in the first battles of all major Ameri can wars. Martin Blumenson wrote much of the published history of the battle. He blames inexperience, inferior equipment, and poor doctrine for the defeat at Kasserine Pass. Blumenson' s characterization of the battle is incorrect. The battle of Kasserine Pass is similar to the battle of St. Vith when viewed at the same scale. Kasserine Pass and St. Vith should be classified in the same manner. The declassification of the ULTRA program occurred after much of the written history was published. The lack of data from the ULTRA intercepts requires further study to det ermine the effect of maintaining the ULTRA secret on the recorded history of World War II.
The Battle of the Bulge: Intelligence Lessons for the Army After Next (1999)
Abstract: Some argue that military intelligence can no longer be a doctrinally based organization. Technological changes occur so fast that "technology will drive and doctrine will spin, our intelligence operations." This paper examines Third Army intelligence operations, primarily from September through December 1944, leading up to the Battle of the Bulge, for lessons learned. The paper identifies ten historic lessons that provide the basis for some of our intelligence doctrine today and that can serve as cornerstones for intelligence doctrine and operations in the Army After Next. It then argues that technology should not drive intelligence operations. Rather, well-trained intelligence professionals, who have studied history and understand doctrine and the intelligence battlefield operating system, will deliver intelligence that commanders can use.
General George S. Patton Jr. Master of Operational Battle Command. What Lasting Battle Command Lessons Can We Learn from Him (1997)
Abstract: This monograph discusses General George S. Patton, Jr. and Operational Battle Command. Six primary elements --- Leadership, Decision Making, Information Assimilation, Visualization, Conceptualization, and Communication make up the dynamics of Battle Command. General Patton mastered the application of these dynamics. This monograph defines and provides examples of the dynamics of Battle Command as used by General Patton while he commanded the Third Army. The monograph first discusses Command and Control of Third Army, as well as General Patton's relationship with his primary staff. The monograph then defines and provides examples of each of the dynamics of Battle Command using General Patton and his staff as the example.
German Special Operations in the 1944 Ardennes Offensive (1994)
Abstract: This study is a historical analysis of the German special operations conducted in support of their overall Ardennes offensive. It focuses on the two major special operations of the German offensive, Operations "Greif" and "Stoesser." Operation Greif was the German attempt to infiltrate a commando unit behind American lines disguised as American soldiers. Operation Stoesser, the last German airborne operation of the war, was designed to secure key cross-roads behind American lines. These special operations failed because of faulty planning, inadequate preparation, and a lack of coordination between the special and conventional forces. These problems, exacerbated by a lack of preparation time, resulted in a pair of ad-hoc units that were unable to accomplish their primary missions, although the operations were characterized by boldness, initiative, and improvisation. This study also examines the strategic setting, planning, preparations, and conduct of these operations, as well as their impact on the overall campaign. This study also examines the key lessons-learned that can be derived from both operations. Lastly, the study explores the implications of these lessons for the U.S. military of today.
Anti-Armor Defense Data Study (A2D2), Vol III-US Anti-Tank Defense At Belgium Dom Butgenbach (1990)
Abstract: The objective of the effort was to collect historical data on at least five actions where the US was in defense of enemy armor. The data will be used in a joint US/UK analysis of the degradation in anti-armor defense effectiveness under combat actions. Thirteen combat actions were described in detail from the engagement at Dom Butgenbach, Belgium in December 1944. The combat actions are presented in both narrative form and in data tables with all identified data displayed.
German Deception in the Ardennes Study Project Lessons for the Senior Leader (1989)
Since the declassification of World War II intelligence sources, such as Ultra, the concept of deception has come under careful study. The purpose of this paper is to review the Allied reaction to the German deception efforts prior to the Ardennes counteroffensive to determine if there are lessons for the senior leader. Dr. Michael Handel's deception Ways and Means and the Attitude and Environment are reviewed against the situation to determine what, if anything, the future would be senior leader should consider about deception as part of his professional development.
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield and Predictive Intelligence (1986)
Abstract: This monograph examines the ability of Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) to provide predictive intelligence. IJB Is the foundation of tactical intelligence and plays a major role In tactical planning prior to the battle. There is a strong expectation that IFB will provide the basis to predict enemy courses of action. Current intelligence doctrine supports the proposition that IPB can determine the most probable enemy course of action. The question this study seeks to answer Is whether or 'not IPB does provide the to predict enemy courses of action.
Field Artillery Support for 3 Corps Attack 18-26 December 1944 (1985)
This study is an historical analysis of the employment of the field artillery during the III Corps attack to relieve the American soldiers surrounded at BASTOGNE. The doctrine and training of the field artillery units is examined. This examination is used to evaluate the employment techniques used by III Corps artillery. The development and maturation process of the III Corps artillery is traced from its first combat experience at Metz through its employment during the initial stages of the Battle of the Bulge. This study discusses the pre-war training, doctrine of the period, L. and development and use of the Field Artillery Group. Actions taken by III Corps prior to and during the attack are analyzed to review their employment techniques and compliance with the doctrine of the period.
Battle of the Vosges Mountains - Defense, Winter (1984)
Abstract: During the first ten days of January 1945, a final German offensive struck XV Corps of the Seventh U.S. Army in the Vosges Mountains, south of Third Army in Lorraine. The 44th Infantry Division was defending east of Sarreguemines and was initially forced back on its right (71st Infantry Regiment sector). Initial counterattacks in battalion strength failed, and the corps commander committed CCL, 2d Free French Armored Division, to restore the front. CCL retook the town of Gros-Rederching, but then apparently fired on 44th Division troops by mistake and was unable to prevent German infantry from infiltrating back into the town. Thereafter, the 44th Division commander "castled" his forces, relieving and thinking out forces on his left and center to concentrate two reinforced regiments on his right flank. These regiments made limited counterattacks on 6 January and later, spoiling renewed German attacks.
Also included are:
The Failure of German Logistics During the Ardennes Offensive of 1944 (2000)
The Battle of the Ardennes Ana1ysis of Strategic Leadership and Decisions (1999)
The Battle of the Bulge Intelligence Lessons for the Army After Next (1999)
The Operational Art as Practiced by General George Patton, Jr. During the Battle of the Bulge (1994)
Operational Performance of the U.S. 28th Infantry Division, September to December 1944 (1994)
Jomini, Ardennes, Lines of Operation, Decisive Points, Campaign planning, theater operations Battle of the Bulge, Operational Maneuver (1988)
Operational Art in the 1944 Ardennes Campaign (1987)
101st Airborne Division’s Defense of Bastogne (1986)
The 1111th Engineer Group in the Bulge The Role of Engineers in Airland Battle (1985)
The Lucky Seventh in the Bulge A Case Master's Thesis Study for the Airland Battle (1985)
The Battle of St. Vith, Defense and Withdrawal by Encircled Force (1984)
The Ardennes The Battle of the Bulge Winter Defense and Counterattack, 16 December 1944 - 3 January 1945 (1984)
The Battle of St. Vith, Belgium, 17-23 December 1944; an Historical Example of Armor in the Defense (1969)
Operations of the 423D Infantry (106th Infantry Div) in the Vicinity of Schonberg during the Battle of the Ardennes, 16-19 December 1944 (Ardennes-Alsace Campaign) (Personal Experience of a Battalion Operations Officer) (1950)
Battle of Hatten Rittershoffen 14th Armored Division, 12-20 January 1945 (1950)
Armor at Bastogne (1949)
10th US Armored Division in the Saar-Moselle Triangle (1949)
6,715 pages of documents, maps, newspaper coverage, after action reports, official histories, oral history interviews and military academic studies covering the Ardennes Offensive/Counter Offensive, also known as the Battle of the Bulge.
On December 16, 1944, Allied Forces in Europe were taken by surprise when the Germans launched an attack in the Ardennes region, pushing into France, Luxembourg, and Belgium. The offensive came six months after D-Day and the successful invasion of Normandy, on a day when the weather did not permit the use of airplanes. The resulting “bulge” in the front line gave the battle the name by which it is best known. The Battle of the Bulge was the bloodiest the United States would fight in World War II, with 19,000 American soldiers dead by the time the Allies had fought back the Germans and regained their lost ground.
KEY HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS
512 pages of key historical documents. Includes:
Cable between British Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery and General Eisenhower, at the beginning of the battle, giving Montgomery temporary command of the US First Army and the US Ninth Army, which held up the German advance to the north of the Bulge.
General Eisenhower's diary entry a week after the battle began summarizing events up to December 24.
A letter from General Eisenhower to Bernard Montgomery regarding Montgomery's Outline Plan of Operations
Eisenhower's December 31, 1944 diary entry summarizing German action to date.
War Department Daily Operational Summaries from 1 January 1945 to 1 February 1945.
A July 26, 1945 interview with German Generaloberst Alfred Jodl.
An August 12, 1945 interview of German Lieutenant Colonel Otto Skorzeny, commanding officer for Operation "Greif."
Twelfth Army Situation Maps
50 maps showing 12th Army troop positions beginning on December 15, 1944 to February 1, 1945. Each quadrangle sheet shows the position of the 12th Army Group and adjacent Allied Forces and of the German units for each day. Significant battles can be identified by the concentrations of unit symbols on the maps. These maps were used by the commanders of the United States forces in their evaluation of the campaign and for planning strategy.
An intelligence failure before the Battle of the Bulge can be evidenced in the maps. The Ardennes Forest area was devoid of Axis units opposing the U.S. forces on the December 15, 1944 map. This map is clear evidence of Allied intelligence's failure to identify Axis units before the Battle of the Bulge. Also, as the Battle of the Bulge developed and Allied intelligence improved, many previously unidentified Axis units start appearing on the situation maps.
AMERICAN NEWSPAPER COVERAGE
162 pages of newspaper articles from around the United States on the Battle of the Bulge, dating from December 17, 1944 to February 5, 1945.
After Action Reports
Notes on Bastogne Operation, 3rd U.S. Army, by General George S. Patton - January 16, 1945
84th Infantry Division in the Battle of the Ardennes, December 1944 - January 1945. - Abstract: The battle of the Ardennes was historic. The lessons of experience and accomplishments (as well as an opportunity for future forces to learn) are documented by the 84th Infantry Division, this is a preservation of that history. Sections detailing the Battle of the Bulge include the big picture, life in the Ardennes, the turning point, the capture of Laroche, from Les Tailles to Dinez, Beho to Gouvy to Ourthe, and a conclusion.
Report of Allied Air Force Operations from 17th to 27th December 1944
743rd Tank Battalion, S3 Journal History
82D Airborne Division, Belgium - The Story of the Bulge - Dec 1944 - Feb 1945
75th Infantry Division in Combat: The Battle in the Ardennes, 23 Dec 1944-27 Jan 1945; the Colmar Pocket Battle, 30 Jan 1945-9 Feb 1945; The Battle for the Ruhr, 31 Mar 1945-15 Apr 1945
OFFICIAL HISTORY
Ardennes-Alsace (2019) - Ardennes-Alsace 16 December 1944–25 January 1945 by Roger Cirillo.
Bastogne: the story of the first eight days in which the 101st Airborne Division was closed within the ring of German forces. (2010) - Abstract: Bastogne offers unique insights, capturing the immediate impressions of the soldiers who fought in this harsh winter engagement. The author penetrates the "fog of war" with a coherent narrative that clearly captures the strategy, tactics, and leadership of the battle. This action strangled the German logistical flow to their forward assault divisions, disrupting their offensive tempo and slowing their advance. What emerges is a vivid case study of how decisive leadership and incidents of individual heroism can contribute to overcoming enemy forces and weather.
Battle of St. Vith A Concept in Defensive Tactics (1974) - A descriptive account of the military operation in St. Vith by the general in command, Bruce C. Clark. Includes personal correspondence concerning the account. A published edition of this account is in the 1974 Armor periodical titled "The battle for St. Vith: armor in the defense and delay".
The Ardennes Battle of the Bulge - The Ardennes Battle of The Bulge by Hugh M. Cole. Abstract: This is the story of how the Germans planned and executed their offensive. It is the story of how the high command, American and British, reacted to defeat the German plan once the reality of a German offensive was accepted. But most of all it is the story of the American fighting man and the manner in which he fought a myriad of small defensive battles until the torrent of the German attack was slowed and diverted, its force dissipated and finally spent. It is the story of squads, platoons, companies, and even conglomerate scratch groups that fought with courage, with fortitude, with sheer obstinacy, often without information or communications or the knowledge of the whereabouts of friends. In less than a fortnight the enemy was stopped, and the Americans were preparing to resume the offensive. While Bastogne has become the symbol of this obstinate, gallant, and successful defense, this work appropriately emphasizes the crucial significance of early American success in containing the attack by holding firmly on its northern and southern shoulders and by upsetting the enemy timetable at St. Vith and a dozen lesser known but important and decisive battlefields.
U.S. Army Battlebook - The Battle of the Bulge - A U.S. Army staff ride guide covering World War II & Battle of the Bulge Chronologies, World War II Allied Conferences, Allied Command Architecture & Order of Battle, The US Army in December 1944, Biographical Sketches – Senior Allied Commanders, German Command Architecture & Order of Battle, The German Army in December 1944, Biographical Sketches – Senior German Commanders, Comparative Military Officers’ Ranks, Equipment, The Defense of Bastogne, Casualties Medical Statistics & Battle Losses, Suggestions for Further Reading, Glossary and Code Names.
Weather Effects During the Battle of the Bulge and the Normandy Invasion (1982) - A general description of the terrain of the Ardennes-Eifel area is given, and weather-related decisions concerning the final attack date and the buildup of the German offensive push are noted. Surface meteorological charts for 16 and 23 December 1944 are presented and show that a modified cold maritime polar air mass was over the Ardennes-Eiiel area when the Battle of the Bulge began.
Victory TD, Northern France--Ardennes--Rhineland--Central Europe (1945) - History of the 628th Tank Destroyer Battalion in training and combat, prepared by and for the men who saw action with the battalion in France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Holland and Germany
ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPTS
1,241 pages of transcripts of five oral history interviews conducted by the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library. Interviews of:
General William Hood Simpson, a senior United States Army officer who served with distinction in both World War I and World War II. He is most notable, however, for being the Commanding General of the U.S. Ninth Army in Western Europe on the Western Front during the final stages of World War II.
Thomas J. Betts, Brigadier General; Intelligence Officer, SHAEF, 1944-May 1945; Director of Intelligence, U.S. Group
Lieutenant General John William Leonard, Commander of the 9th Armored Division
Elwood Richard Quesada, a United States Air Force Lt. Gene
Colonel Raymond Hoffman
Book
Dark December: The Full Account of the Battle of the Bulge - Dark December, by Robert E. Merriam, former chief of the Ardennes section of the U.S. Army Historical Division, published in 1947, is a thorough and engrossing examination of the Battle of the Bulge by a historian who had the opportunity to prepare notes as the battle was occurring and consult classified American as well as German records. Notably, the book contains unique and critical information, including details gleaned from interviews conducted by the author with commanding officers on both sides, some of which are the only reports gathered from these sources.
“If other veterans of the Army’s historical division can maintain Mr. Merriam’s high standard of stimulating, critical and painstaking work, we will be fortunate. Dark December can be heartily recommended to anyone faintly interested in the war.”—New York Times
“The book explodes a number of myths which have been winning their improper way into general belief.” —Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Booklist
“Dark December occupies a distinguished place among war books. Every paragraph is based upon evidence, not flimsy wartime rumors. Technical enough for the professional, accurate enough for the historian (in fact, it is history of the best), it is lucid and understandable for the general reader.” — New York Herald Tribune
MILITARY ACADEMIC STUDIES
2,588 pages of military academic studies and research reports from the U.S. Army War College, Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, Combat Studies Institute, The US Army Concepts Analysis Agency, The Armored School and others.
Includes:
The Battle of Kasserine Pass Defeat is a Matter of Scale (2016)
Abstract: The Battle of Kasserine Pass is marked by history as an embarrassing defeat of Ameri can soldiers during their first major action against Germany in World War II; some historians even go so far as to anticipate defeat in the first battles of all major Ameri can wars. Martin Blumenson wrote much of the published history of the battle. He blames inexperience, inferior equipment, and poor doctrine for the defeat at Kasserine Pass. Blumenson' s characterization of the battle is incorrect. The battle of Kasserine Pass is similar to the battle of St. Vith when viewed at the same scale. Kasserine Pass and St. Vith should be classified in the same manner. The declassification of the ULTRA program occurred after much of the written history was published. The lack of data from the ULTRA intercepts requires further study to det ermine the effect of maintaining the ULTRA secret on the recorded history of World War II.
The Battle of the Bulge: Intelligence Lessons for the Army After Next (1999)
Abstract: Some argue that military intelligence can no longer be a doctrinally based organization. Technological changes occur so fast that "technology will drive and doctrine will spin, our intelligence operations." This paper examines Third Army intelligence operations, primarily from September through December 1944, leading up to the Battle of the Bulge, for lessons learned. The paper identifies ten historic lessons that provide the basis for some of our intelligence doctrine today and that can serve as cornerstones for intelligence doctrine and operations in the Army After Next. It then argues that technology should not drive intelligence operations. Rather, well-trained intelligence professionals, who have studied history and understand doctrine and the intelligence battlefield operating system, will deliver intelligence that commanders can use.
General George S. Patton Jr. Master of Operational Battle Command. What Lasting Battle Command Lessons Can We Learn from Him (1997)
Abstract: This monograph discusses General George S. Patton, Jr. and Operational Battle Command. Six primary elements --- Leadership, Decision Making, Information Assimilation, Visualization, Conceptualization, and Communication make up the dynamics of Battle Command. General Patton mastered the application of these dynamics. This monograph defines and provides examples of the dynamics of Battle Command as used by General Patton while he commanded the Third Army. The monograph first discusses Command and Control of Third Army, as well as General Patton's relationship with his primary staff. The monograph then defines and provides examples of each of the dynamics of Battle Command using General Patton and his staff as the example.
German Special Operations in the 1944 Ardennes Offensive (1994)
Abstract: This study is a historical analysis of the German special operations conducted in support of their overall Ardennes offensive. It focuses on the two major special operations of the German offensive, Operations "Greif" and "Stoesser." Operation Greif was the German attempt to infiltrate a commando unit behind American lines disguised as American soldiers. Operation Stoesser, the last German airborne operation of the war, was designed to secure key cross-roads behind American lines. These special operations failed because of faulty planning, inadequate preparation, and a lack of coordination between the special and conventional forces. These problems, exacerbated by a lack of preparation time, resulted in a pair of ad-hoc units that were unable to accomplish their primary missions, although the operations were characterized by boldness, initiative, and improvisation. This study also examines the strategic setting, planning, preparations, and conduct of these operations, as well as their impact on the overall campaign. This study also examines the key lessons-learned that can be derived from both operations. Lastly, the study explores the implications of these lessons for the U.S. military of today.
Anti-Armor Defense Data Study (A2D2), Vol III-US Anti-Tank Defense At Belgium Dom Butgenbach (1990)
Abstract: The objective of the effort was to collect historical data on at least five actions where the US was in defense of enemy armor. The data will be used in a joint US/UK analysis of the degradation in anti-armor defense effectiveness under combat actions. Thirteen combat actions were described in detail from the engagement at Dom Butgenbach, Belgium in December 1944. The combat actions are presented in both narrative form and in data tables with all identified data displayed.
German Deception in the Ardennes Study Project Lessons for the Senior Leader (1989)
Since the declassification of World War II intelligence sources, such as Ultra, the concept of deception has come under careful study. The purpose of this paper is to review the Allied reaction to the German deception efforts prior to the Ardennes counteroffensive to determine if there are lessons for the senior leader. Dr. Michael Handel's deception Ways and Means and the Attitude and Environment are reviewed against the situation to determine what, if anything, the future would be senior leader should consider about deception as part of his professional development.
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield and Predictive Intelligence (1986)
Abstract: This monograph examines the ability of Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) to provide predictive intelligence. IJB Is the foundation of tactical intelligence and plays a major role In tactical planning prior to the battle. There is a strong expectation that IFB will provide the basis to predict enemy courses of action. Current intelligence doctrine supports the proposition that IPB can determine the most probable enemy course of action. The question this study seeks to answer Is whether or 'not IPB does provide the to predict enemy courses of action.
Field Artillery Support for 3 Corps Attack 18-26 December 1944 (1985)
This study is an historical analysis of the employment of the field artillery during the III Corps attack to relieve the American soldiers surrounded at BASTOGNE. The doctrine and training of the field artillery units is examined. This examination is used to evaluate the employment techniques used by III Corps artillery. The development and maturation process of the III Corps artillery is traced from its first combat experience at Metz through its employment during the initial stages of the Battle of the Bulge. This study discusses the pre-war training, doctrine of the period, L. and development and use of the Field Artillery Group. Actions taken by III Corps prior to and during the attack are analyzed to review their employment techniques and compliance with the doctrine of the period.
Battle of the Vosges Mountains - Defense, Winter (1984)
Abstract: During the first ten days of January 1945, a final German offensive struck XV Corps of the Seventh U.S. Army in the Vosges Mountains, south of Third Army in Lorraine. The 44th Infantry Division was defending east of Sarreguemines and was initially forced back on its right (71st Infantry Regiment sector). Initial counterattacks in battalion strength failed, and the corps commander committed CCL, 2d Free French Armored Division, to restore the front. CCL retook the town of Gros-Rederching, but then apparently fired on 44th Division troops by mistake and was unable to prevent German infantry from infiltrating back into the town. Thereafter, the 44th Division commander "castled" his forces, relieving and thinking out forces on his left and center to concentrate two reinforced regiments on his right flank. These regiments made limited counterattacks on 6 January and later, spoiling renewed German attacks.
Also included are:
The Failure of German Logistics During the Ardennes Offensive of 1944 (2000)
The Battle of the Ardennes Ana1ysis of Strategic Leadership and Decisions (1999)
The Battle of the Bulge Intelligence Lessons for the Army After Next (1999)
The Operational Art as Practiced by General George Patton, Jr. During the Battle of the Bulge (1994)
Operational Performance of the U.S. 28th Infantry Division, September to December 1944 (1994)
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Operational Art in the 1944 Ardennes Campaign (1987)
101st Airborne Division’s Defense of Bastogne (1986)
The 1111th Engineer Group in the Bulge The Role of Engineers in Airland Battle (1985)
The Lucky Seventh in the Bulge A Case Master's Thesis Study for the Airland Battle (1985)
The Battle of St. Vith, Defense and Withdrawal by Encircled Force (1984)
The Ardennes The Battle of the Bulge Winter Defense and Counterattack, 16 December 1944 - 3 January 1945 (1984)
The Battle of St. Vith, Belgium, 17-23 December 1944; an Historical Example of Armor in the Defense (1969)
Operations of the 423D Infantry (106th Infantry Div) in the Vicinity of Schonberg during the Battle of the Ardennes, 16-19 December 1944 (Ardennes-Alsace Campaign) (Personal Experience of a Battalion Operations Officer) (1950)
Battle of Hatten Rittershoffen 14th Armored Division, 12-20 January 1945 (1950)
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10th US Armored Division in the Saar-Moselle Triangle (1949)
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