Civil War Modern Military Academic Histories, Studies & Reports - Download

Civil War: Modern Military Academic Histories, Studies & Reports.

12,569 pages of reports, studies, staff rides, monographs, strategy research projects, theses and dissertations. Research of strategic, tactical, medical, leadership, political and social aspects of the American Civil War. Produced at various research institutions and America’s leading military colleges and universities including U.S. Naval War College, U.S. Army War College, Air University, Marine Corps War College and National Defense University.

Many authors were field officers with combat experience form the Korean War to Afghanistan and Iraq, often active duty in the military with ranks in the range of Lieutenant Colonel.

Works include:

Tactically Sound, Strategically Inept: Union and Confederate Missteps in Neutral Kentucky, 1861 (2018)

Abstract: In May 1861, Kentucky declared neutrality in the burgeoning US Civil War. Both the Union and Confederacy vied for the state’s loyalty. By August 1861, the Union appeared to have the upper hand. However, the Union’s gains were nearly erased when Union General John C. Fremont declared all slaves in Missouri free on August 30, 1861. The state threatened to tilt toward the Confederacy when Confederate General Leonidas Polk ordered troops to occupy Columbus, Kentucky. With its neutrality overtly violated by Polk, Kentucky declared its loyalty to the Union on September 18, 1861


Fighting for Information in Large-Scale Combat Operations: Cavalry in the American Civil War (2018)

Abstract : With the October 2017 publication of Field Manual 3-0, Operations, the US Army declares that large-scale combat operations is its most significant readiness requirement. This monograph seeks to answer how the ability to fight for information in reconnaissance and security operations shapes the outcomes of campaigns in large-scale combat operations. It researches cavalry operations in the American Civil War for insight. Historical analysis illustrates that how efficiently cavalry forces supported their armies in the conduct of reconnaissance and security operations determined the degree of success or failure of Civil War campaigns. The monograph draws sources from The Official Records of the War of Rebellion and secondary source materials, including authors who participated in the Civil War


The Bureau of Military Intelligence in the Chancellorsville Campaign (2017)

This paper highlights the history of early Civil War intelligence efforts in the east and west, and the organization of General Hooker’s secret service after he took command of the Army of the Potomac. The Battle of Chancellorsville served as the bureau’s first test in supporting the Union war effort, and this project studies the information collected by the staff section from mid-February to early May 1863. The analysis of the measures of effectiveness from this period indicates the Bureau of Military Information proved its worth to the Union army. The lessons learned from this staff section were not reinstated until the United States Army established a professional Military Intelligence Corps decades after the Civil War.


Managing the Civil-Military Relationship: A Study Of Lincoln’s Management of The Army of the Potomac Within the Context of Mission Command (2017)

This study endeavors to provide a historical case study of President Lincoln and his leadership of the commanding generals of the Army of the Potomac in order to extrapolate a successful methodology applicable to today’s civil-military relationship.


Leadership Principles Leveraged from Key Civil War Battles (2017)

Abstract: The purpose of this research is to answer the question: How can the strategic leadership lessons learned from three Civil War battles help today’s acquisition leaders be more effective? This research analyzes the leadership of North and South Army commanders during three Civil War battles of Antietam, Fredericksburg, and Gettysburg. The Army commanders analyzed are Ambrose Burnside, Robert E. Lee, George Meade, and George McClellan. Specifically, this analysis begins with what is learned from each commander and battle, and further addresses the comparison of each battle’s, strategic objectives, mission planning, terrain, troops available, time, leaders and their traits, critical strategic leadership decisions, rationale, consequences, and implications. The objective after conducting this analysis and comparison is to create a set of lessons learned from each Civil War battle and leader for use by today’s acquisition leaders, and how the conclusions of this research can be used by present day strategic and acquisition leaders.


The Successes and Failures of Military Occupation in Atlanta, Georgia, 1865-1871 (2017)

Abstract : From its initial occupation following the conclusion of the Civil War in May 1865 to the cessation of military rule in early 1871, the U.S. Army operated within a complex environment as it restored the city of Atlanta, Georgia. The U.S. Army dealt with the changing policies in Washington as the executive and legislative branches competed over the direction of Reconstruction, a massive reduction in force, and mission creep, as it facilitated a volatile transition from a slave-based economy to a wage-based one. This paper examines reports from regiments operating within Atlanta during Reconstruction, newspaper editorials, and previous scholarship to conceptualize the environment the U.S. Army operated within as well as how it directly and indirectly contributed to the restoration of Atlanta.


Coercion and Reconciliation: Post-Conflict Resolution After the American Civil War (2016)

This monograph suggests generalized conclusions about the efficacy of military coercion and reconciliation as concepts used to resolve conflict. To accomplish this, it analyzes the differences in US government and military methods and outcomes achieved in two states, Tennessee and Virginia, following the American Civil War. The findings show that occupation forces in Tennessee lacked military coercive potential, which led to political domination by one party and subsequent oppression of the population, ultimately leading to violence and instability. In contrast, the federally imposed military government in Virginia retained coercive potential for a sufficient period of time for political discourse to occur without socio-political oppression, leading to relative stability and transition back to civil government, although later, the civil government adopted repressive policies. The conclusion is that during post-conflict resolution, having a moderate coercive body to maintain security, while allowing for political reconciliation and equilibrium to develop organically, leads to lower overall levels of violence and instability.


Intelligence Collection within The Army of Northern Virginia during the American Civil War (2016)

Abstract : During the American Civil War, human intelligence (HUMINT) came in from all directions, but without established processes to properly vet it, it was not fully embraced by senior leaders and correspondingly was never utilized to its full potential. The Confederacy in general and General Robert E. Lee in particular, did not find intelligence collection and analysis at large a worthwhile endeavor. That is not say he did not use it at all. In fact, Gen Lee frequently used his cavalry to scout out enemy positions because he considered this type of intelligence necessary for battle.


United States Army Counter Partisan Operations in Northern Virginia During the American Civil War (2016)

Abstract : The American Civil War was similar to other wars in America's history in that both sides employed irregular warfare during operations. Confederate partisan units utilized irregular warfare to interdict Union Army operations in northern Virginia and the Shenandoah Valley for the duration of the conflict. These partisan units were hybrid organizations that conducted independent raids, small skirmishes, and reconnaissance in support of the larger Confederate Army. Union Army operations to counter these partisan units achieved differing levels of success throughout the war. However, the Union Army developed and employed unique counter partisan organizations during 1864 with increased success. This thesis examines the 43rd Virginia Cavalry and the 1st Virginia Partisan Rangers of the Confederate Army, and the Union Army's response to counter the irregular partisan units. The thesis adds specific emphasis on the Union Army's development and employment of hybrid independent scout organizations. Enhanced capabilities, specifically in the domains of leadership, personnel, training, and material, enabled these independent scouts to employ irregular warfare in countering Confederate partisan operations. Examination of these counter partisan units demonstrates the importance of understanding an adversary's capabilities, tactics, and other aspects of the operational environment.


Civil War Logistics: Effects of Logistics on the Pea Ridge Campaign (2015)

This study examines the logistical system that supported the Federal Army of the Southwest in the American Civil War during the Pea Ridge Campaign of January-March 1862, under the command of Brigadier General Samuel R. Curtis. The Pea Ridge Campaign was carried out along the U.S. frontier of southwestern Missouri and northwestern Arkansas, a sparsely populated region with little economic infrastructure. The forces operating in the region did not have the benefit of railroads or navigable bodies of water.


Mission Command: The Historical Roots of Mission Command in the US Army (2015)

Abstract: This study analyzes the U.S. Army’s historical examples of mission command in using three distinctly different American general officers from three separate periods of American military history. Mission command existed in the American army prior to the Prussian army of the mid to late nineteenth century and the US Army’s formal adoption of mission command in the 1980. Analysis of the military careers of Generals Zachary Taylor, Ulysses S. Grant, and John J. Pershing shows these military commanders successfully displayed a mission command style of command.


Guerrilla War in Little Dixie: Understanding Conflict Escalation in Missouri during the American Civil War (2014)

Abstract : The state of Missouri never seceded from the United States, yet the state witnessed more violence and bloodshed than almost any other state in the Union. The violence in Missouri looked little like the larger war. It devolved from conventional operations for territorial control to criminality motivated by personal grievances. The conflict deteriorated quickly; in sixteen short months the war in Missouri was completely disconnected from the larger Confederate movement, leaving United States soldiers behind to impose law and order to pacify a tense populous. Tactically, these troops often failed, enforcing ill-conceived policies with ill-disciplined actions. Strategically, however, any threat of Missouri joining the rebellion had dissipated by late 1862. This study examines this escalation of violence in a region of Missouri known as Little Dixie, the agricultural nexus of the state and the area in which many believed to most resemble the south.


The Second Tennessee Cavalry in the American Civil War (2014)

Abstract : This thesis examines the history of the Second (Ashby's) Tennessee Cavalry Regiment during the American Civil War. The goal is to determine how the Second Tennessee Cavalry contributed to the Confederate war effort. This study will analyze the operations the unit conducted, the tactical tasks it executed, and the outcomes of the regiment's actions. This analysis will be used to determine if the regiment was effective at executing its assigned missions and if it aided Confederate commanders in achieving desired effects on the battlefield


An Aversion to Risk; A Warning from the Past (2014)

Abstract : When U.S. forces departed Iraq on 15 December 2011 to return to the U.S., they did so much as General George B. McClellan had left the Peninsula to return to Washington, D.C. on 20 August 1862. The U.S. had lost a great deal of blood and treasure with little to show for its expenditure. This thesis addresses several aspects of the 1862 Peninsula Campaign and the 2003 Iraq invasion as well as the contemporary doctrine concerning risk. There were many contributing factors to the Anny of the Potomac culminating in 1862 and U.S. failures in Iraq in 2003. A major contributing factor was reluctance for leaders at the strategic, operational, and tactical level to take risk. During the execution of these campaigns’ leaders focused on what might be lost instead of what could be gained. The 1862 Peninsular Campaign illuminate problems still with us despite 150 years of vast changes in the conduct of war . I contend that culmination in 1862, and culmination during the post 9/11 campaigns, resulted from inadequate responses to risk aversion by the government and military leaders, when faced with uncertainty.


The Transformation of the Army of the Potomac Staff from 1862 to 1864 (2014)

Abstract: This monograph examines the significant impact of the staff on commanders as operational artists, how commanders utilize their staffs, leverage staff products and analysis, and support their planning to achieve their strategic objectives. Three qualitative case studies explore the composition and capabilities of the Army of the Potomac during three distinct periods during the American Civil War and assess staff effectiveness, its impact on the commander’s decision making process, and activities during combat operations


Diplomats at War: A Critical Analysis of American and Confederate Diplomacy, 1861-1862 (2014)

The aim of this study is to examine the effectiveness of the application of the diplomatic instrument of power by the United States and Confederate States from the winter of 1861 to the fall of 1862. Specific events this study evaluates during that time period include the Trent Affair, the Blockade, the Second Battle of Bull Run, and Battle of Antietam.


Lee as Critical Thinker: The Example of the Gettysburg Campaign (2012)

Abstract: This paper is an historical analysis of General Robert E. Lee's critical thinking during the Gettysburg Campaign. A military critical thinking model will be presented that will be used to analyze Robert E. Lee's ability in commanding his Army in the Civil War from the Seven Days Battle up through the Gettysburg campaign. A chronological review of Lee's career from his time as a cadet at West Point to his appointment as Commander of the Army of Northern Virginia will demonstrate his ability and aptitude to think critically. The argument is made and defended that General Lee made characteristic critical thinking errors in his decision making at the operational and tactical levels of war that led directly to the Confederate defeat at Gettysburg. The conclusion is drawn that several human and military factors, notably poor health, overconfidence, lack of intelligence, and partial blindness to his opponent, caused General Lee to continue an ill-advised tactically offensive battle against an enemy in excellent defensive position (while other viable options were available) that resulted in a tactical and strategic defeat from which the Confederacy never recovered.


Architect of Union Victory? Montgomery Meigs, Jomini. and Union Success in the American Civil War (2012)

Abstract: Although Brigadier General Montgomery C. Meigs, who served as the Quartermaster General of the Union Army, was commissioned as an engineer with no formal logistics training, his pre-Civil War assignments, innate Intelligence and integrity, as well as an iron will all contributed to his ability to succeed in arguably one of the toughest assignments in the military at that time. The analysis will begin with an overview of the pre-civil war career of Brigadier General/Montgomery C. Meigs.


The American History of PTSD Civil War - Vietnam (2011)

Thesis: To understand the nature of the problem we face today it is important to understand the extensive existence of PTSD throughout the history of America.


Intelligence in the Army of the Potomac: 1861-1863 (2011)

Abstract: This paper examines the intelligence capabilities in the Army of the Potomac under the command of General McClellan in 1861 and ends in 1863 while the army is under the command of General Meade. Several innovations in intelligence took place during this time period most notably under McClelland and Hooker. McClellan developed the army's first professional spy network under the leadership of Alan Pinkerton. General Hooker took this a step further and organized the army's first all source analysis organization in the form of the Bureau of Military Information (BMI).


The First Battle of Fredericksburg: Lessons of Strategic and Operational Command and Control (2011)

Abstract: The period November 1862 through the first Battle of Fredericksburg witnessed a notable shift in the Army of the Potomac's leadership during the Civil War. President Lincoln relieved Major General McClellan for inaction following the Antietam Campaign and replaced him with Major General Burnside. This transition proved to be of interest to the modern military leaders because it displayed a textbook example of how strateg_ic guidance from the National level has a direct impact upon the operational and tactical outcomes of campaigns and battles. Major General Burnside was unsure of his abilities and lacked the necessary strategic guidance from the President and Major General Halleck (General-in-Chief). These facts, coupled with two insubordinate Grand Division commanders and the inability to effectively design an operation, led to poorly communicated operational plans, which resulted in thousands of casualties on the field on December 13, 1862.


The Vicksburg Campaign: A Case Study on the Leadership Actions of General U. S. Grant and How They Led to the Fall of Vicksburg (2010)

Abstract: The Vicksburg Campaign commenced in the fall of 1862. Major General Ulysses S. Grant was tasked with the seemingly impossible goal of capturing the well defended city of Vicksburg, Mississippi. The odds were tremendously stacked against Grant. He did not have enough troops to follow the general military guideline of a 3 to 1 ratio when attacking an enemy in the defense, nor did the Vicksburg fortress provide favorable terrain for the attacker. He did not have superiority of numbers compared to other Union generals that fought against Confederate forces. Finally, he was fighting in a vast wilderness, where the people supported the enemy. Despite the odds against Grant to capture Vicksburg, he was successful by utilizing maneuver warfare, adhering to policy, maintaining unity of effort and exploiting logistics.


The Tullahoma Campaign, The Beginning of the End for the Confederacy (2002)

Abstract: The Tullahoma Campaign of 1863 is often overlooked and overshadowed by the simultaneous events of Gettysburg and Vicksburg. The results of the campaign fought by Union General William S. Rosecrans and Confederate General Braxton Bragg were strategically more significant than Gettysburg and tactically equivalent to Vicksburg. For the North, Rosecrans and his Army of the Cumberland conducted a campaign of light attacks and aggressive maneuvers that drove the Confederate Army of Tennessee completely out of the state of Tennessee.


Abraham Lincoln and Jefferson Davis: A Comparison of Civil War Commanders in Chief (1995)

Abstract: This is a study of the effectiveness of Abraham Lincoln and Jefferson Davis as Commanders in Chief during the Civil War. It begins by comparing their backgrounds prior to assuming the Presidency; then comparing their military strategies and command structures. The final area of comparison is their involvement in the first military draft in American history. Davis had extensive government and military experience but exhibited personality traits early on that later hampered his performance as a war-time Commander in Chief. Lincoln had very little experience but excelled at dealing with people. Lincoln tried several staff arrangements before finally appointing Grant as General in Chief. Davis changed his structure very little throughout the war. Although he appointed Lee as General in Chief in the first year, he lost his services by placing him in command of a field army. Both faced strong challenges from a powerful governor over the draft. Davis first tried to win over the governor, then appealed directly to the people. Lincoln publicly kept distant from the draft and worked behind the scenes.


Antietam and Gettysburg: Tactical Success in an Operational Void (1994)

Abstract : The Battles of Antietam and Gettysburg are widely recognized as tactical victories for the Union's Army of the Potomac. Following both battles, however, the respective commanding generals, General McClellan and General Meade, were sharply criticized for having failed to vigorously pursue General Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia in order to deliver a decisive blow. Both Union commanders offered a list of extenuating circumstances, such as battle fatigue, large casualties and lack of supplies, which precluded a premature pursuit of General Lee.


A Critical Analysis of Robert E. Lee's Campaign Plan for a Second Northern Invasion (2010)

Abstract: Prior to invading Pennsylvania, General Robert E. Lee identified the North's center of gravity as the will of the northern populace to continue the war in an effort to preserve the Union. However, if he could not affect the North's ability to make war, then he would have to devise a plan to affect the North's will to perpetuate the Civil War. Influenced by his earlier victories, Lee overestimated his capabilities, the abilities of his commanders to discern commander's intent and underestimated their need for guidance on strategic end state. Lee's hopes that his audacious actions could produce a profound effect on the will of the northern populace to maintain the Union and sway the Federal government and military to capitulate was based on assumption wrought with flaws. A combination of mistakes prior to and during his march north led to the Confederate General's failure to link what he wanted to achieve tactically and operationally, to how he saw victory for the Confederacy strategically in a second Northern campaign.


Robert E. Lee as Operational Artist During the American Civil War (2010)

Abstract: General Robert E. Lee is one of the most recognized leaders of the American Civil War. He led the Army of Northern Virginia during the pivotal months that separated the summers of 1862 and 1863. During this period the Confederacy achieved major tactical victories at Second Manassas and Chancellorsville that had strategic impacts. Both of these engagements occurred in the South where Lee enjoyed the advantages of knowledge of the terrain, interior lines of communication and popular support of the people. However, it was also during this time period that Lee and the leaders of the Confederacy chose to forfeit these advantages and purse offensive campaigns that carried the Army of Northern Virginia north for engagements at Antietam and Gettysburg. Both of these engagements, seen by many as tactical defeats, significantly strained the South's logistics capabilities, had negative impacts on troop morale, and were counter to the strategic aims of the Confederacy. They were examples of operational art executed poorly.


Jefferson Davis and the Failure of Confederate Military Strategy, 1861-1865 (2010)

Abstract: Jefferson Davis initially favored a strategy of defense suggestive of General 'George Washington during the American Revolution. However, by dispersing his forces in an attempt to defend the whole Confederacy he negated this strategic model.


Staff Ride Handbook for the Overland Campaign, Virginia, 4 May to 15 June 1864: A Study in Operational-Level Command (2009)

The original handbook, prepared by Dr. Curtis S. King, Dr. William Glenn Robertson, and LTC Steven E. Clay (US Army, Retired), analyzed Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant’s 1864 Overland Campaign from the crossing of the Rapidan River on 4 May to the initiation of the crossing of the James River on 15 June. This new edition carries the story across the James and encompasses the initial assaults on Petersburg as well. Unlike many of CSI’s previous handbooks, this handbook focuses on the operational level of war.


Chasing the Gray Ghost: Blazer’s Independent Union Scouts & The Shenandoah Valley Guerilla War of 1864 (2008)

The aim of this paper is to deconstruct and analyze the Blazer's Scouts' 1864 counterguerrilla campaign to draw out successful techniques and best practices, common throughout effective counter-guerilla warfare, which are relevant today.


Countering Irregular Activity in Civil War Arkansas -- A Case Study (2007)

Abstract : Civil War Arkansas endured many forms of irregular or guerilla warfare, including activity that approached insurgency. It was a complex arena that resembles the present day, and it illustrates much of contemporary counterinsurgency doctrine. Arkansas was a Southern state with a significant Unionist population and this divide fueled and shaped much of the conflict. Arkansas was unique in that its Confederate commander, seeking to make up for conventional weakness, initiated guerilla warfare directed at Union forces. In response, Union commanders who were merely ordered to protect lines of communication responded with punitive actions against individuals and communities who did little to reduce the guerilla activity, thus alienating the local population. As the war progressed, the guerilla bands shifted from military targets, becoming progressively more terrorist, criminal, and once a Unionist state government was installed, insurgent. The Union Army's role also changed as the main war moved on from the Mississippi basin and Arkansas became an early field for Lincoln's plan to reincorporate rebel states. The Union's emphasis thus shifted to extending Federal authority, and its organization and tactics evolved into a successful combination of locally raised troops, intelligence-led operations, isolation of the guerillas, and political reconciliation.


The Union’s Naval War in Louisiana, 1861-1863 (2006)

Abstract: This thesis studies the influences that shaped Union naval strategy in order to provide a strategic context for analyzing the development of naval operations in Louisiana from the implementation of the blockade to the opening of the Mississippi River. The result is a historical case study of the relationship between naval strategy and operations in a joint environment.


Staff Ride Handbook for the Battle of Shiloh, 6-7 April 1862 (2004)

A valuable study that examines the key considerations in planning and executing the campaign and battle. Modern tacticians and operational planners will find themes that still resonate. Gudmens demonstrates that leaders in Blue and Gray, in facing the daunting tasks of this, the bloodiest battle to this point on the continent, rose to the challenge. They were able to meet this challenge through planning, discipline, ingenuity, leadership, and persistence—themes worthy of reflection by today’s leaders.


McClellan and Grant: The Importance Of Personal Trust For Effective Command At The Operational Level Of War (2004)

Abstract: This research papers analyzes the role of personal trust in command relationships between the operational commander and their superiors. In order to analyze their effectiveness, the author uses Dr. Milan Vego’s traits of an operational leader as the standard. The paper will focus on the operations of Major General George B. McClelland and Major General Ulysses S. Grant. This paper will examine the relationship between President Abraham Lincoln and Major General George B. McClellan (USA) during the Peninsula and Maryland Campaigns as an example of the failure to maintain personal trust between the operational commander and their superiors. In addition, the paper will look at the relationship between Major General Ulysses S. Grant during his campaigns in the West and the establishment and maintenance of personal trust in his relationship with President Abraham Lincoln as an example of personal trust. The paper will then show the relevancy of personal trust to the operational commanders today.


Staff Ride Handbook for the Battle of Perryville, 8 October 1862 (2005)

It includes information concerning the nature of Civil War armies, the 1862 Kentucky campaign, maps, and more specialized material detailing the Armies of the Ohio and the Mississippi. A variety of instructional information helps readers to understand the flow of the battle; its participants; and related doctrinal, materiel, command, and organizational issues. The heart of the guide is chapter 3, which outlines a recommended route through the park based on the sequence of actual battle events.


Role of the Southern Baptist Chaplains and Missionaries in the Civil War (2003)

The purpose of this thesis is to look at the events leading up to the Civil War and the conflict itself from the viewpoint of the Southern Baptist denomination. Specifically, the thesis focuses on the reasons for the creation of the Southern Baptist Convention, as well as examines how the denomination supported the war effort.


Women of Valor in the American Civil War (1999)

The role of women in the Civil War has often been overlooked in history. Women’s roles prior to the Civil War were primarily confined to the home and family. Other women chose a more direct involvement in the war. These women, including daughters of the regiment, vivangieres, militia members, spies, saboteurs, soldiers, nurses and doctors, proved that women could be aggressive, resourceful and patriotic. While little has been written about their contributions, in recent years more research has brought their stories to the forefront. By selecting a representative sampling of women in each category, a better understanding of women’s changing roles was revealed.


An Analysis of Medical Ethic Practice by Union and Confederate Medical Departments During the American Civil War (2011)

Abstract: Union and Confederate .medical departments were limited to the knowledge of medicine at that time and while they generally delivered ethical medical care to white soldiers during the Civil War, the care delivered to African-American troops was substandard in comparison.


Staff Ride Handbook for the Overland Campaign, Virginia, 4 May to 15 June 1864: A Study in Operational-Level Command (2006)

This handbook, prepared by Dr. Curtis S. King, Dr. William Glenn Robertson, and LTC Steven E. Clay, analyzes Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant’s 1864 Overland Campaign from the crossing of the Rapidan River on 4 May to the initiation of the crossing of the James River on 15 June.


Commander’s Intent of Major General Joseph Hooker during the Chancellorsville Campaign (2001)

Abstract: Did “Fighting Joe” Hooker of the army of the Potomac lose his nerve during the Chancellorsville Campaign of 1863? Perhaps history has failed to recognize major general joseph hooker’s true commander’s intent for this campaign. Hooker’s intent was simple: maneuver forces to lee’s flank and rear in order to force a withdrawal of confederate troops from Fredericksburg. Hooker had no intention of engaging in a “risky confrontation” with General Robert E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia.


Major General James Scott Negley and His Division at Chickamauga: A Historical Analysis (2001)

Abstract: This thesis is a historical analysis of Major General James Negley and his division during the Battle of Chickamauga. An examination of Negley, his actions, his major subordinate commanders, and the regiments of the division was conducted to provide a base with which to evaluate the principals during the Chickamauga Campaign of 1863. On 19 September, the division fought well as, and served to arrest a Confederate penetration of the Federal lines. The division was piecemealed into the fight on 20 September by brigade, and regiments. Negley ended up commanding fifty Federal artillery pieces on Snodgrass Hill and withdrew them to support the Union collapse upon Chattanooga. Negley was relieved after the battle and charged with removing the artillery prematurely. He was acquitted of all charges during a subsequent court of inquiry; however, he never received another command. The relief of Negley tarnished an otherwise solid performance by the division during the two-day battle. This study analyzes Negley and his division during the Battle of Chickamauga and draws conclusions using the battle command competencies as a framework: seeing the enemy.


The Blame Game: Federal Intelligence Operations During the Chickamauga Campaign (2000)

This thesis examines intelligence operations conducted by Major General Rosecrans Army of the Cumberland during the initial phases of the Chickamauga Campaign (11 August -16 September 1863). The thesis methodology is a detailed analysis of all intelligence reports received by the headquarters and a detailed examination of all outgoing correspondence from the headquarters intended to identify the analytical process used and the impact of intelligence on Rosecrans’ decision making during the campaign. The record shows that contrary to popular historical opinion there was significant intelligence available indicating the probable Confederate course of actor General Rosecrans and his staff actively discounted information that did not conform to their preconceived expectation or template of the enemy with tragic results for the Army of the Cumberland.


The 14th Regiment, Connecticut Volunteers, Infantry (2000)

Abstract: The 14th Regiment, Connecticut Volunteers, Infantry was in the greatest number of battles, captured the most enemy flags, and suffered the highest number of combat casualties of any Connecticut regiment in the Civil War. On August 23, 1862, the regiment was mustered into federal service, and one month later, received its baptism of fire. On September 17,1862, at Bloody Lane during the battle at Antietam, the 14th Regiment's soldiers and officers, "although under fire for the first time, behaved with great gallantry" despite their limited training. The 14th Regiment participated in thirty-four combat operations and served with distinction in the major battles of the 2nd Corps, Army of the Potomac. The 14th Regiment fought at Antietam, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, Bristow Station, Morton's Ford, the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, Cold Harbor, the siege at Petersburg, Reams Station, and the surrender of General Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia at Appomattox Court House.


Grant’s Emergence as a Strategic Leader July, 1863, to March, 1864 (1999)

Abstract: This paper was years in the making and sprang from two questions. The first has to do with the relationship between Grant and Lincoln and how it developed. I have long thought that the teaming of Abraham Lincoln and Ulysses S. Grant was one of the keys to success in the American Civil War. Until this year I had not spent any time researching and thinking about how that relationship happened. The second question had to do with how Grant became the great strategic thinker that he was at the end of the war. Did he have a solid grasp of strategy as a brigadier general? I had a feeling that he developed his strategic skills but, again, had not been able to devote any serious study to it.


Admiral David Glasgow Farragut: A Study of the Criteria Used to Select the Commander of the West Gulf Blockading Squadron (1999)

Abstract: This study examines the life and career of Admiral David G. Farragut. Specifically, this paper addresses the primary question: Why was Farragut chosen to command the West Gulf Blockading Squadron? This study seeks to establish the criteria used in Farragut’s selection. This thesis breaks down the criteria into three areas. First, the study examines significant events in Farragut's career leading up to his selection. Second, this study analyzes Farragut's loyalty to the Union and its effect on his selection. Last, Farragut’s political and family connections are examined to determine their effect on his selection. Research shows that career performance and seniority, loyalty to country, and political connections were all factors in Farragut's appointment to command. By analyzing these factors and the selection process, this study contributes to the knowledge and understanding of how commanders were appointed during the Civil War.


President Lincoln: The Reluctant Emancipator (1998)

Abstract : In July 1862, President Lincoln presented a draft of the Emancipation Proclamation to his Cabinet. With their general approval he waited patiently for a Union victory so he could proclaim emancipation after a momentous event. General McClellan's victory' at Antietam in September 1862 provided the opportunity and the President used the occasion to issue the proclamation. He further stated it would go into effect in approximately one hundred days unless the states then in rebellion peacefully returned to the Union. The effects were far reaching. As Union armies surged into the interior of the Confederacy, slaves fled their masters and deprived the South of essential farm workers, potential soldiers and military laborers. Additionally, the proclamation virtually ensured that Great Britain would never recognize the Confederate States of America. While these two benefits are most certainly true, the preceding facts fail to show that there was a political battle to initiate emancipation prior to President Lincoln's cabinet meeting in July 1862.


To Move Swiftly and to Strike Vigorously The Operational Art and Jackson's Valley Campaign of 1862 (1996)

Abstract: A discussion of Gen. Thomas J. Jackson's campaign in the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia during the War Between the States. Particularly focusing on Jackson's actions at the operational level of war and their contribution to the overall national strategic goal of the Confederate States of America during the Federal invasion of Virginia of 1862.


Ulysses S. Grant, The Architect of Victory in the U.S. Civil War (1993)

The purpose of this study was to explore Grant's development as a military leader by researching his personal correspondence


Thomas Jonathan 'Stonewall' Jackson Fought by the Old Testament, Lived by the New (1992)

Abstract : Lieutenant General Thomas Jonathan 'Stonewall' Jackson was a superb professional soldier who was a profoundly and, some say, a fanatically religious 'leader with a precise regard for discipline and army regulations.' My purpose has been to research, study, and analyze the influence of Christian faith and a fervent religious belief on the personal ambition, eccentricities, and leadership style of General Jackson.


Tactical Intelligence in the Army of the Potomac During the Overland Campaign (1992)

Abstract: This study examines how Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant and the Army of the Potomac used tactical intelligence during the Overland Campaign. Although Grant did not achieve his operational objective to defeat General Robert E. Lee in the field, tactical intelligence allowed him to continue the operational maneuver of the Army of the Potomac, which later contributed to the eventual defeat of Lee in April of 1865. The examination of tactical intelligence in the Army of the Potomac covers the period of 4 May to 12 June 1864. It encompasses campaign planning and preparation, as well as the battles of the Wilderness, Spotsylvania Court House, North Anna River, and Cold Harbor.


Staff Ride Handbook for the Battle of Chickamauga, 18-20 September 1863 (1992)

The Staff Ride Handbook for the Battle of Chickamauga, 18-20 September 1863, provides a systematic approach to the analysis of this great Civil War battle. Part I describes the organization of the Federal and Confederate Armies, detailing their weapons, tactics, and logistical, engineer, communications, and medical support. In part II, the Chickamauga campaign is discussed, placing the Battle in historical perspective and illustrating how the battle fits into the overall context of the Chickamauga campaign. Part III furnishes a suggested route to follow in order to get a firsthand, concrete view of how the battle developed. By following this route, various phases of the battle can be discussed, and significant points made concerning the evolving battle. Also, in part III are various vignettes by participants in the battle that describe the fight and offer insights into the emotional disposition of the combatants. Part IV furnishes current information on the Chickamauga site, sources of assistance, and logistical data for conducting a Staff Ride. In addition, appendixes give order of battle information for the two armies, meteorological data, and a list of Medal of Honor recipients in the battle. A bibliography is also provided.


The Silent Killer Grant's Logistical Requirements 1864-1865 (1992)

Abstract : This monograph examines Grant's campaign of 1864-1865 from a logistics perspective. It answers the following questions: (1). Did logistical systems change for the emerging operational level of war? (2). Did Civil War field logistics form today's concepts at the operational level? (3). Were logistics planning factors derived from Napoleon? It concludes with a discussion of how Grant's systems impacted on 1992 logistics systems. The monograph examines the history and formulation of operational requirements for the logistician. Discussed in detail is the necessity for theater base support, visibility and distribution, and the requirement for logistical planning factors. The conclusion is that each of these elements allows the commander to phase his operations, reduce risks and complete a campaign without creating operational pauses or logistical culmination. Finally, the paper compares 1864 principles with principles utilized during Desert Shield/Desert Storm.


Sherman's 1864-65 Campaigns: Strategic Analysis And Lessons for Today (1994)

Abstract: This research paper examines the strategy, planning, and execution of the 1864-65 campaigns of Union General William T. Sherman. The purpose is two-fold: first, to gain a better understanding of the strategy and campaigns of one of the founders of the operational art in the industrial age; second, to determine what lessons modern theater campaign planners may learn from Sherman’s generalship. The paper focuses on how Sherman integrated grand strategy, logistics, and the operational art to conduct three of the most successful campaigns of the American Civil War.


The Different Mask of Lee's Command: April 1861-June 1862: The Preparation of a Commander (1991)

This study of General Robert E. Lee focuses on his first year with the Confederacy. It asserts that his experiences during this period prepared him extremely well for his command of the Army of Northern Virginia, which he assumed on 1 June 1862


Strategic-Operational Command and Control In The American Civil War (1992)

Abstract: The American Civil War introduced the operational level of war and with its introduction came one of the greatest challenges ever confronted by military commanders--operational command and control. In that regard, the objective of this monograph is to determine by what means high level Civil War commanders, here defined as army or army group equivalent, dealt with that challenge.


Naval Support To Grant's Campaign Of 1864-65 By Design Or By Coincidence? (1992)

Abstract: By 1863, the Civil War was basically a stalemate between the two belligerents. Though the Union forces had achieved some success in conducting joint expeditions that resulted in securing the Mississippi River and the majority of the Southern ports, the major land armies of the Union were generally ineffective. In March 1864, General Ulysses S. Grant was named General-in-Chief of the Union army; he designed a campaign for future operations that called for synchronized operations by the Union armies supported by the Union navy. This monograph examines the naval support to Grant's campaign to determine whether or not the provided support was by design or just coincidence.


General Sherman's Application of Mass and Maneuver During the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain. (1996)

Abstract : The battle of Kennesaw Mountain was a critical event of the Atlanta Campaign for both the Union Army and the Confederate Army. General Sherman's poor application of the principles of Maneuver and Mass resulted in the Union forces loss of the battle and the senseless slaughter of several thousand of his own men. In May of 1864, northern opinion had significantly soured against the war and most people simply wanted the war to end.


PRESERVING VICTORY: The American Civil War, The United States Army, and the Ku Klux Kian (1996)

Abstract: This monograph examines the insurgency conducted by the Southern States during the last part of the American Civil War and the early period of Reconstruction, specifically from the time period of Sherman’s march to March 1867. The paper proposes that the development of the Southern insurgency is a good example of what future insurgencies might be like.

This monograph contains six sections: introduction, insurgency theory, US military insurgency/counterinsurgency doctrine, a description of the Southern insurgency, analysis, and conclusion. The theory' section primarily examines the works of Crane Brinton and Eric Hoffer to provide a basis for examining insurgency. These works are particularly relevant since they were written before the US Army focused on Mao’s “people’s war” insurgencies.


Factors Affecting Joint, Cooperation during the Civil War (1991)

This study is a historical analysis of selected joint Army-Navy operations conducted along the East Coast during the American Civil War. It begins with a description of the ante-bellum conditions of the Army and Navy and the organizational structure of the War and Navy Departments. Three joint operations are analyzed; the Fort Sumter Relief Expedition of 1861, the Port Royal Expedition of 1862, and the Charleston Campaign of 1863.


Winfield Scott Hancock: A Study in Leadership (1990)

The purpose of this study is to identify and analyze the leadership competencies of Major General Winfield Scott Hancock, the most consistently successful corps-level commander of the Civil War. Over the course of his 44 years in uniform, General Hancock participated in the Mexican War, Civil War, and Indian Wars. He was the candidate of the Democratic Party in the 1880 Presidential election.


A Leadership Analysis: Lieutenant General James Longstreet During the American Civil War (1995)

This thesis is a chronological analysis of Longstreet during the thirteen major campaigns in which he participated: First Manassas, Williamsburg, Seven Pines, the Seven Days, Second Manassas, Antietam, Fredericksburg, Suffolk, Gettysburg, Chickamauga, Knoxville, the Wilderness, and Petersburg. The primary thesis question is: Was Longstreet's leadership during the war satisfactory when analyzed in the context of the nine leadership competencies of FM 22-100? The nine leadership competencies are the result of a 1976 study group consisting of Army leaders ranking from Corporal to General. The nine competencies are: supervision, soldier/team development, technical and tactical proficiency, use of available systems, professional ethics, planning, decision making, teaching and counseling, and communications. After a discussion of each campaign an analysis of Longstreet's leadership is conducted using the leadership competencies as analytical criteria. A leadership profile of Longstreet evolves as he gains experience during the war and is assigned to positions of increased responsibility.


Artillery Employment at the Battle of Gettysburg (1989)

Abstract : This thesis analyzes how Union artillery forces were employed during the Battle of Gettysburg, 1-3 July 1863. It examines the significance of the Union artillery's contribution to the Federal victory and explores all aspects of the tactical employment of the Union artillery on the first and last days of the battle. A brief description of the evolution of artillery organization in the Army of the Potomac prior to the battle is included. This is followed by the chronological presentation of the tactical employment of artillery during the battle. First its employment in the meeting engagement on 1 July is examined, followed by a study of its use on the decisive third day when Union forces fought a set piece defensive battle. Conclusions include: 1) the Army of the Potomac's corps artillery brigades and army artillery reserve proved to be responsive and efficient organizations in fulfilling their fire support mission and, when coupled with the skillful use of artillery and aggressive leadership by the army's Chief-of-Artillery, Brigadier General Henry Hunt, were crucial to the successful employment of the Union artillery forces. The author concludes that the Union artillery under the command of Gen. Hunt had a decided and positive influence on the Federal victory by successfully employing its corps artillery brigades and army artillery reserve as part of a combined arms force. Keywords: Artillery units; Military tactics; Battles history.


Meade's Pursuit of Lee - The Virginia Campaigns Individual Study of the Summer of 1863 (1988)

Major General George Meade took command o' the Army of the Potomac on June 28, 1863. Three days later his army defeated the Army of Northern Virginia commanded by General Robert E. Lee. Meade pursued Lee for the remainder of the summer and failed to bring him to battle and defeat him. He allowed Lee to escape at Williamsport and failed to defeat him at Manassas Gap.


Stonewall Jackson's Shenandoah Valley Campaign: A Study of the Principles of War (1984)

Abstract : Stonewall Jackson's Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1862 is described. The campaign is then analyzed using the principles of war defined by AFM 1-1 as a framework for analysis. Examples of effective and ineffective application of the principles of war by Union and Confederate commanders are given.


Brigadier General Henry A. Wise, C.S.A. and the Western Virginia Campaign of 1861 (1980)

Abstract : This thesis examines Brigadier General Henry A. Wise's involvement in the Western Virginia Campaign of 1861. This Confederate defeat resulted in the Federal occupation of a large, strategically important section of the Confederacy in the first year of the Civil War. The author presents the reasons for this capitulation and, against the backdrop of Wise's political career, evaluates the General's performance as a military commander. This paper discusses the personal conflict which ensued between Henry Wise and John B. Floyd in the Kanawha Valley as a reason for the Confederate failure in western Virginia. The author presents the results of this capitulation to demonstrate how Wise, a popular ex-Governor of Virginia, significantly affected the course of the Civil War.


The Military Strategies of the American Civil War (1974)

This study Identifies the major aspects of the military strategies of the Union and Confederacy In the American Civil War, to Include the motivations of .the principals who originated and implemented them, the applicable effects of national and International politics, and the influencing social and geographic factors. Evolution of the strategies has been traced from the secessions and formation of the Confederate States of America through the Fort Sumter crisis and the subsequent war.


Naval Strategy During the American Civil War (1999)

This paper examines effectiveness of naval strategies of both the Union and Confederacy during the American Civil War. In addition, some of the technological innovations are examined, paying particular attention to their impact to the war and to the future of military affairs.


The Tredegar and Logistical Support in the American Civil War (1989)

An examination of a Richmond Virginia ironmaker during the period of the American Civil War. Major emphasis is to look at the logistics involved in supply of war materials, especially heavy iron works and the production of cannon. Examines the complexities of the iron industry in the South, and the crucial role of industry in the conduct of war. Also briefly looks at the direct battlefield influence of civilian industry and draws a comparison with modern day industry and war production potential.


Balloons of the Civil War (1994)

This historical study investigates the military effectiveness and combat power of Civil War balloons. The categories inherent to military effectiveness include timeliness, accuracy, usefulness, operational considerations, and logistics.


Unconventional Warfare in the American Civil War (1990)

Abstract: Considering the history of unconventional warfare in the United States, and specifically, during the Civil War, it begs the question: Did the Confederacy’s strategy to engage in unconventional warfare significantly contribute to its conventional strategy?


Evolution of Entrenchments during the American Civil War: A Vision for World War 1 Leaders (1991)

Abstract : The American Civil War ushered in a new era in land warfare. In this war, mass armies first experienced the widespread impact of industrial technology. The response of the Civil War soldier and field commanders to the technology of the Industrial Revolution shaped tactical and strategic organization into new forms. If it was, in fact, the first of the great modern wars, it stands before us an evolutionary monument. The devastating increase of fire power, brought on by the introduction and standardization of the muzzle loading rifle musket and the rifled artillery, doomed the open frontal assault and ushered in the entrenched battlefield. This study will attempt to illustrate the evolution of entrenchments during the Civil War Campaigns of Fredericksburg and The Wilderness. Tactical lessons learned from these campaigns would have visionary application to the battlefields of World War I. In conclusion, we will show the disregard for these lessons learned by the leaders of the World War.


Dragoon or Cavalryman, Major General John Buford in the American Civil War (1994)

Abstract : This study investigates the American Civil War role and contributions of Major General John Buford. Buford, a 1848 graduate of the United States Military Academy, began his Army career on America's frontier with the First United States Dragoons. With the outbreak of the Civil War, Buford was selected to command a cavalry brigade in John Pope's Army of Virginia, and participated in the Second Manassas Campaign. Buford went on to make significant contributions to the Union efforts in the Eastern Theater; however, history has generally portrayed Buford as a one-dimensional character based on his stand along McPherson and Seminary Ridges on the first day of the Battle of Gettysburg.


Appropriate treatment of head injuries by surgeons during the Civil War (2004)

Abstract: Surgeons during the Civil War have been classified by soldiers from that time period as incompetent butchers. However, evidence of head injury cases from the battles of Antietam, Gettysburg, The Wilderness, and Petersburg, evidence suggests that most surgeons were competent and followed the medical standards of practice of the 1860s. The civilian method of practicing medicine was similar to that of the military, although military surgeons found that procedures such as trephining met with more fatalities than their civilian counterparts.


The Effects of Railroads on the Emergence of Operational Art During The American Civil War, 1861–1865 (2013)

This monograph examines how both sides in the Civil War utilized railroads, how this affected the emergence of operational art, and how the proper management of the railroads supported the demands that the Army placed upon them.


The Effects Of Southern Railroads On Interior Lines During The Civil War (1992)

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to study the effects of the Southern railroad system on interior lines during the Civil War and determine whether or not the South enjoyed the advantage of interior lines. The use of railroads during this conflict placed an enormous physical strain upon the limited industrial resources of the Confederacy, and a great strain upon the intellectual agility of the Confederate High Command. Based upon the evidence studied, and the time-space comparisons of both Northern and Southern railway operations, several conclusions can be drawn: the South entered the war with a rail system that was unable to meet the demands of modern war; the Confederate leadership understood the importance of the railroad and its importance to strategic operations early in the war, but were unwilling to adopt a course of action that best utilized their scarce assets; Southern railroad speeds decreased dramatically by 1863 due to the inability of Southern railroads owners to perform needed maintenance on their railroad equipment.


Virginia Military Institute and its Involvement Throughout The American Civil War (2001)

Abstract: The Corps of Cadets at the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) participated in only one battle during the American Civil War. This paper seeks to determine what factors influenced the decision to employ VMI Cadets in battle or to restrict their employment.


Major General Philip H. Sheridan and the Employment of His Division During The Battle Of Chickamauga (2001)

This thesis is a historical analysis of Major General Philip H. Sheridan and his division during the Battle of Chickamauga. Sheridan led an experienced division onto the battlefield on 19 September 1863 after completing a march of over one hundred miles over mountainous terrain the previous seventeen days.


The Origins of Operational Intelligence (1989)

This monograph examines the topic of operational intelligence from the standpoint of its historical development in support of operational level commanders. It focuses on two periods of military history and attempts to answer the question: what elements of operational intelligence developed during the Napoleonic wars and the American Civil War?


Great Warriors of The American Civil War Ulysses S. Grant - William T. Sherman (1984)

Presents a comparison of strategy used by Ulysses S. Grant and William T. Sherman during significant campaigns of the American Civil War. ,Traces the evolution of, and influences on, each general’s strategy in terms of the Air Command and Staff College Strategy Process Model. Contains a biographical sketch of Grant and Sherman.


Civil War Explosive Ordnance (1960)

Abstract: The purpose of this pamphlet is to provide an Identification text for Explosive Ordnance Disposal use in the field. No attempt has been made to outline inerting, rendering safe, or disposal procedures in this publication. Only the more common types of Civil War explosive ordnance are covered. It should be noted that, since standardization at the time of the Civil War was not as we know It today, It Is quite common to find ordnance with slight modifications from type to type.


The Logistics of Mobilizing And Supplying the Union Army During the Initial Stages Of The American Civil War (1997)

Abstract: This thesis studies the logistics involved in mobilizing and supplying the Union Army at the onset of the Civil War. The main elements discussed are the sources, procedures, and items needed for the mobilization and supply effort.


Union Joint Operations in North Carolina During the Civil War (1999)

Abstract: During the Civil War some of the earliest examples of joint operations in American Military history were undertaken. Except for General Scott’s landing at Veracruz during the War with Mexico, joint undertakings in the form of amphibious operations were rare. Army and navy commanders had little experience dealing with the problems associated with the ideas of jointness. Doctrinal guidance was unavailable, and commanders worked together often with mixed results. In eastern North Carolina, the Union attempted several joint operations during the course of the war. Attacks were crudely planned and executed by modern standards.


Joint Operations in the American Civil War (1993)

Examines two major joint operations in the Civil War--the Henry-Donelson campaign and the Fort Fisher operations--to determine whether any conclusions may be drawn from them as to such operations in their infancy.


Joint Operations in the American Civil War; Blessings and Blunders (2012)

Abstract: This paper analyzes joint operations of General Grant's victory during the Vicksburg Campaign and General Banks' loss during the Red River Campaign. Specifically, the paper focuses on the Union's military commanders' unity, or lack of effort, during their respective campaigns, which significantly influenced the outcome of both battles.


"Men, Salt, Cattle And Battle’s The Civil War in Florida (November 1860 - July 1865) (1992)

Chronological account of Civil War in Florida, with emphasis on military operations (Union and Confederate), civil military relations, strategy, and operations, with an overview and summary at the beginning. Many newly created maps and charts from the information contained in the war of the rebellion and other primary source material.


Guerrilla Operations in the Civil War: Assessing Compound Warfare During Price's Raid (2004)

Abstract : One of the most significant areas of guerrilla warfare during the American Civil War occurred along the Missouri-Kansas border. Many of these guerrilla forces had been active during the Bleeding Kansas period and continued their activities into the Civil War supporting the Confederacy. The guerrillas attacked Federal forces and disrupted their lines of communications, raided settlements in Kansas, and attempted to support Confederate conventional forces operating in the area. In 1864, Major General Sterling Price led a raid into Missouri in a final attempt to bring the state into the Confederacy. This thesis explores the nature of guerrilla warfare in the Missouri-Kansas border area and explains how Price and the guerrillas failed to employ the elements of Compound Warfare to bring Missouri into the Confederacy.


Railroad Generalship: Foundations of Civil War Strategy (1997)

From the Forward by Jerry D. Morelock Colonel, Field Artillery Director, Combat Studies Institute, "According to an old saying, “amateurs study tactics: professionals study-logistics.” Any serious student of the military profession will know that logistics constantly shape military affairs and sometimes even dictate strategy and tactics. This excellent monograph by Dr. Christopher Gabel shows that the appearance of the steam-powered railroad had enormous implications for military logistics, and thus for strategy, in the American Civil War. Not surprisingly, the side that proved superior in “railroad generalship,” or the utilization of the railroads for military-purposes, was also the side that won the war."


Wall Of Fire -- The Rifle And Civil War Infantry Tactics (1990)

This thesis examines the effect the rifle had on infantry tactics during the Civil War. It traces the transition from smooothbore to rifle and the development of the Minie ball. The range and accuracy of various weapons are discussed, and several tables illustrate the increased capabilities of the rifle. Tactics to exploit the new weapon are examined, primarily those of William Hardee.


Joint Operations and the Vicksburg Campaign (1993)

This study investigates why Joint operations between army and navy forces on the Mississippi and other western rivers were effective. It examines the development of a joint doctrine at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Joint riverine warfare on the western rivers was a new experience for the U.S. military.


The Battle of Cedar Mountain: A Battlefield Terrain Study (1985)

In this study, using records and reports written by commanders and participants actually involved in the battle, the authors examine a minor Civil War battle fought near Cedar Mountain, Virginia in the late summer of 1862. Confederate forces led by then Major General Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson engage a Union force in a minor, but bloody skirmish that results in a temporary delay of a planned Confederate invasion of Maryland. Command decisions and leadership styles of the key participants are a prominent feature of the study. Should the reader decide to visit the battlefield and walk the ground, the study includes directions to the battlefield and to various points of interest on the field.


Lincoln On Strategy (1995)

Abstract: This paper examines evidence that the best strategist of the Civil War was Union President Abraham Lincoln, the least experienced in war matters of any of the primary military or civilian leaders of the war. Evidence that Lincoln deserves the best strategist title is presented by reviewing (1) Lincoln's background and evidence he thought like great military strategists of the past, (2) the strategy "performance" of his contemporaries in the Civil War and, (3) how the implementation of Lincoln's strategy finally resulted in Union victory.


Nationalism as a Contributing Factor in The American Civil War (2000)

This research paper seeks to determine the degree that nationalism played as a contributing factor in the American Civil War


Bushwackers and Terrorists Combatant Status Policy in the Civil War and Global War on Terror (2006)

This paper outlines the changing nature of Union policy during the Civil War as Union commanders struggled to suppress an insurgency on the border; how the ambiguity resulting from unclear combatant status policy led to atrocities against insurgents and especially civilians; demonstrate the US government’s subsequent history of leadership in international Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) development; review the legal reasoning behind the decisions made regarding GWOT combatant status; and lay out a moral argument for the way forward.


The Evolution of Field Artillery Organization and Employment During the American Civil War (1993)

Abstract: This study examines six battles - First Bull Run, Malvern Hill, Antietam, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, and Gettysburg to ascertain how lessons Learned were incorporated by each side to improve their artillery structure. The reliance on mobility, integration of short- and long-range artillery, and the development of the fire support plan for various battles are also examined in this study. Both sides used lessons learned from each battle to improve various aspects of their artillery structure. An analysis of the six battles reveals that the more stable leadership of the Confederate army allowed Lee to introduce battalion sized artillery organization one year before the Union army.


The Making of General John B. Hood: A Study of Command (1993)

Abstract: A lesser known campaign, General John B. Hood's invasion of Tennessee during the winter of 1864, may have been the most important one of the war. Hood's record as a tactician was brilliant. For this he received command of the Army of Tennessee as it grappled with Sherman at the gates of Atlanta. After the fall of the city, the Confederacy's options for prolonging the war to exhaust Northern resolve were limited.


Buford at Gettysburg (1992)

Abstract: During the Civil War Battle of Gettysburg in July 1863, then Brigadier General John Buford commanded the First Cavalry Division, Cavalry Corps, Army of the Potomac, U.S.A. He is generally credited with determining the importance of, and holding the ground near Gettysburg for the coming battle. This study examines the controversies surrounding Buford's actions and discusses whether the controversies have overshadowed the importance of the lessons to be learned from the events.


The Mine Run Campaign-An Operational Analysis of Major General George G. Meade (1990)

After the Gettysburg Campaign of the American Civil War in late July 1863, the Union Army of the Potomac, commanded by Major General George G. Meade, pursued the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, commanded by General Robert E. Lee, south into Central Virginia. There followed a series of maneuvers and engagements as the two commanders jockeyed for position. The Mine Run Campaign constitutes one of these episodes and was conducted during the period 20 October 1863 to 2 December 1863. Little study has been devoted to this rather obscure campaign because of its relatively inconclusive results.


The American Home Front: Revolutionary War, Civil War, World War I, World War II (1983)

This National Defense University military history seeks to broaden the perspective of those who are interested in understanding the effects of the wartime mobilization of American society. Through a comparative analysis of the economic, political, and social results of America's four principal wars. This study reveals the major issues faced by each wartime administration and sketches the consequences of the mobilization policies adopted.


Historical Simulation and the American Civil War (1991)

Abstract : This thesis examines the validity of using miniature wargaming to study the American Civil War. The analysis specifically examines the miniature wargame rules, STARS*N*BARS III. The goal is to determine whether Civil War combat can be accurately simulated with miniature wargaming. The study first examines the simulation's rule mechanics to determine their historical soundness. Infantry, cavalry, and artillery combat are each examined in three sections: unit organization, maneuver, and firepower. Each section is subdivided into three areas for analysis: First, an overview of how the section is simulated; Second, an historical overview of the section; and, finally, a determination of historical accuracy. The rules are then applied in simulating two historical Civil War battles. The battle of New Market is gamed as a controlled reenactment the results of which are compared against the actual battle. The battle of Cedar Mountain is executed as a free-flowing wargame to evaluate historicity. The overall conclusion of the study is that, although not exact, acceptable accuracy can be achieved in simulating Civil War combat. Wargaming can be used to study history. In historical simulations, gaming and history complement each other in building a more complete understanding of the period's warfare.


RISK — The Operational Edge in the Peninsula Campaign of 1862. (1988)

This study analyzes the impact of risk taking and risk avoidance by the opposing operational commanders in the Peninsula Campaign of the American Civil War. General McClellan’s superior force lost this campaign primarily as a result of his risk-avoidance, while General Lee accepted risk and won. The purpose of this study is to determine what factors influenced risk taking by these two generals, and how that Knowledge can aid contemporary operational commanders and their leaders.


Jackson and McClellan: A Study in Leadership and Doctrine (1988)

Abstract: Central to the waging of war at the tactical level is the interplay between leadership and doctrine. Within a doctrinal-context, the Army must develop leaders capable of winning the next war. This study examines the balance between leadership and doctrine and identifies the characteristics that distinguish the great leader from the also-ran. The vehicle for this examination is a comparison of two American Civil War generals, Stonewall Jackson and George McClellan. Purporting to support the same doctrine, the two men achieved remarkably dissimilar results on the battlefield. This analysis demonstrates that the reasons for that difference lay primarily in the realm of leadership rather than in the implementation of doctrine, and identifies the leadership principles key to success at the tactical level of war.


Battlefield Terrain Study: Burnside's Attack Against the Confederate Right at Antietam (1985)

Abstract : The study project is a historical terrain walk of that portion of the Antietam Battlefield over the Union Ninth Corps, commanded by Major General Ambrose Burnside, attacked the right flank of the Confederate force commanded by General Robert E. Lee. The terrain study guides the reader to nine key vantage points on the battlefield. At these vantages points (stops) the reader is provided with excerpts from official reports, regimental histories, diaries, letters and manuscripts from participants in the battle. These first-hand accounts from officers and soldiers from both sides give the reader a vivid description of actions as they occurred throughout the day which are best viewed from each of the vantage points. At the conclusion of the study the author analyzes the battle in accordance with the principles of war and provides his insights as to the relevance of the lessons learned from this phase of the battle to modern war.


An Historical Analysis of the Principles Employed by Frederick the Great and Joseph E. Johnston in the Conduct of War at the Operational Level (1985)

Abstract : To derive these principles selected campaigns of each are examined. For Frederick these are the first three years of the Seven Years War; for Johnston they are the Peninsula Campaign and the Atlanta Campaign of the American Civil War. Having derived the principles employed by each, a comparison of their principles is made. The focus of this comparison is on the different manner in which each approached the conduct of warfare at the operational level. The major contributing factor to this difference is their relative positions within the governments of their respective nations


Camp Chase, Columbus, Ohio 1861-1865: A study of the Union's treatment of Confederate prisoners of war. (1978)

Camp Chase, four miles southeast of Columbus, Ohio, began in May 1861 as a mustering center for units entering Union service during the American Civil War. By June 1861 it picked up additional responsibilities of housing Confederate prisoners captured by Ohio units during the earliest military actions of the war. It eventually expanded to hold 9,423 prisoners in January, 1865, which made it one of the larger Union prison camps. This study examines food, clothing, medical care and prisoner mortality.


Rosecrans' Staff at Chickamauga: The Significance Of Major General William S. Rosecrans' Staff on the Outcome of the Chickamauga Campaign (1977)

Abstract: This study is an analysis of the roles, responsibilities, and functions of General Rosecrans' staff prior to and during the Chickamauga campaign, using lessons learned in comparison to current Army doctrine on command and control. Primary sources for staff information on the Army of the Cumberland are the Official Records and actual telegrams from the staffs during this period.


The Atlanta Campaign: Principle of the Objective Revisited (1975)

Abstract : The purpose of this study is to analyze Union offensive operations during the Atlanta Campaign of the American Civil War with respect to the principle of the objective. This highly successful campaign split the Confederacy. The problem in this study was to determine whether Sherman applied the principle of the objective prior to and subsequent to the capture of Atlanta.


Lost Order and Lost Opportunity Antietam In Retrospect (1972)

Abstract: The basic problem is to determine the impact of the loss of Lee's Special Order 191 on the outcome of the Antietam Campaign in September 1862. Research was conducted to determine the actual disposition and vulnerability of Lee's army on the day the order was lost and delivered to General McClellan. Special attention was given to a determination of what the Union commander actually knew OP that same day, and on the condition and disposition of his forces for future action.


Shiloh: A Case Study in Surprise (1970)

Abstract: The official records, letters, books, and memoirs of Union and Confederate participants were investigated to gain an understanding of the battle. The methodology adopted was a chronological approach which examined pertinent events, circumstances, and errors relating to the battle. Through this means the investigation revealed the degree of surprise achieved by the Confederate attack and disclosed those elements which made surprise possible.


Drenched in Dirt and Drowned in Abominations: Insects and the Civil War

This paper is part of the following report: Proceedings of the DOD Symposium on Evolution of Military Medical Entomology



Other Works include:

Intelligence Collection Within the Army of Northern Virginia During The American Civil War (2016)

Leadership in the Shenandoah Valley and North Africa: Historical Studies in Mission Command (2013)

Anesthesia Advances During the Civil War (2004)

Topographical Intelligence and the American Civil War (1978)

General McClellan and the Politicians Revisited (2012)

Norwich University: Citizen Soldiers in the Civil War (2002)

Commanding in Chief, Strategic Leader Relationships in the Civil War (2012)

Architect of Union Victory? Montgomery Meigs, Jomini. and Union Success in the American Civil War (2012)

A Terrain Study of the Gettysburg Battlefield (1986)

Lee and the Operational Art: The Right Place, The Right Time (1992)

The Dismissal of General McClellan: Why Did Lincoln Delay (1994)

General Johnston's Plan for the Battle of Seven Pines, Why It Failed and the Principles of War Violated (1930)

Opportunities Gained and Lost: J. E. B. Stuarts Cavalry Operations in the Seven Days Campaign (1994)

John Pope – Failure at Second Battle of Bull Run (2002)

The Seven Days Campaign and Friction: Lee and Clausewitz Discuss Success and Failure on the Chickahominy (1997)

Congressional Oversight Rum Amok: Ball’s Bluff and the Ruination of Charles Stone (1993)

Uncharted Waters: Expeditionary Operations and the Naval Component of Union Military Strategy April 1861 to April 1862 (2008)

Burnside’s Bridge and Lessons Learned for Program Management (2011)

A Failure in Strategic Command: Jefferson Davis, J.E. Johnston and the Western Theater (1988)

Major General William S. Rosecrans and the Transformation of the Staff of the Army of the Cumberland: A Case Study (2002)

The 13th Regiment, Tennessee Volunteer Calvary: Transition from Irregular to Conventional Operations (2009)

Leadership in the Shenandoah Valley and North Africa: Historical Studies in Mission Command (2013)

Major General William S. Rosecrans and the Transformation of the Staff of the Army of the Cumberland: A Case Study (2002)

Logistics for the Gettysburg Campaign Refocusing an Army in War (2010)

Fort Fisher: Amphibious Victory in the American Civil War (2006)

Joint Operations in the Civil War (1995)