CIA Establishment 1947 to 1953 - CIA's Secret Internal Histories - Download

CIA Establishment 1947 to 1953 - CIA's Secret Internal Histories

This collection is composed of two completed formerly secret internal historical studies concerning the establishment of the CIA, 1947 to 1953, Arthur B. Darling's "The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government, to 1950,"(1953) and "General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intelligence October 1950 - February 1953" (1971), by Ludwell L. Montague.

The combined 3,329 pages of finished studies cover:

The creation of the Advisory Committee, the establishment of the Department of the Air Force, General Bedell Smith's career with the Department of the Army, the Boston Scientific Advisory Panel, Sir Winston Churchill, the Psychological Strategy Board, General William J. Donovan, Allen Welsh Dulles, the Eberstadt Committee (a.k.a. Hoover Task Force), General Dwight D. Eisenhower, James Forrestal, the Global Survey Group, Rear Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter, the Intelligence Advisory Board (IAB), the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff (ICAPS), William Harding Jackson, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), Sherman Kent, General John Magruder, General George C. Marshall, the Board of National Estimates, the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council (NSC), the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), the Office of Intelligence Coordination (OIC), the Office of Intelligence Research (OIR), the Office of National Estimates (ONE), the Office of Operations (OO), the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), the Office of Research Reports (ORR), the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB), James Reber, Raymond Sontag, Admiral Sidney W. Souers, Admiral Leslie Stevenson, President Harry S. Truman, General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Frank Wisner, Walter Reid Wolf, Major General Edwin K. Wright, and Major General Willard Wyman.

Both histories give much attention to the conflict between departmental intelligence agencies. Each history gives a distinct point of view of the early years of the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency.


THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY: AN INSTRUMENT OF GOVERNMENT, TO 1950 BY ARTHUR B. DARLING

2,259 pages of internal CIA history in ten sections, plus an index, and an abridged summary of the entire study completed in 1953.

In his preface to this work Arthur Darling wrote:

“Two things run through this historical study. The theory of central intelligence has a developed with the growth as an instrument of government. The themes are so interrelated that they are not to be treated separately. When attention is a upon developing theory, the issue is that of individual versus collective responsibility, the rivalry between the Director of Central Intelligence and the chiefs of the Department of services he can't do that his board of advisors. They were his counselors with respect to many affairs in the central organization and in particular the production of national estimates.

When considered from position of the growing instrument of government, the question is whether the institution should continue as a cooperative interdepartmental activity should become an independent agency, authorized by law as determined by Congress rather than subject to direction as recommended to the President by his secretaries. They were caught between the interest of their Departments and their collective authority over central intelligence organization, first in the National Intelligence Authority and then as the National Security Council.

Thucydides found his task a laborious one. Eyewitnesses of the same occurrences, he said, gave different accounts as they remembered or were interested in the actions of one side or the other. Throughout this study the purpose has been to retain historical perspective, however contemporary the crisis or heated the conflict of interests. The records of the National Security Council were open for this investigation. References in a footnote show the significant documents and interviews which have been gathered in a permanent historical collection for the director of central intelligence.”


In 1988 the History Staff of the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency added a note to Darling's history:

"The reader should be aware that Arthur B. Darling's history, "The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government, to
1950," has a definite and sometimes controversial point of view. Darling blames the State Department, the FBI, and what he terms the
Military Establishment, especially the heads of the military intelligence services, for much of the hardship which the early CIA (and its predecessor, the Central Intelligence Group) endured. He also heavily criticizes the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report of 1949, which held the Director of Central Intelligence responsible for a major and ongoing failure in intelligence coordination. Reportedly, Allen Dulles (chairman of the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report) did not concur with Darling's conclusions and, when Dulles became Director of Central Intelligence, restricted access to the history."



GENERAL WALTER BEDELL SMITH AS DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE OCTOBER 1950 - FEBRUARY 1953

Dr. Montague completed this 764-page, five-volume history, which was originally classified Secret, in December 1971 for the History Staff of the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence.

Montague wrote that, "this history will demonstrate, it was General Smith who finally established the Central Intelligence Agency in the role that had been intended for it by the President in 1946 and the Congress in 1947."

Montague view of Smith's role in the establishment is made clear. According to Montague, "It took a man of Smith's prestige, character, and ability to restore order and to create, for the first time, a really effective United States Intelligence Community. Thus, the history of US Intelligence is clearly divisible into two distinct eras, before Smith and after Smith."

In a forward added to the study in 1990, CIA Chief Historian J. Kenneth McDonald, wrote:

"Like the first CIA history released under this program, Arthur B. Darling's 'The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government, to 1950," this history has a distinct point of view . Indeed, Montague's opening chapters take issue with the Darling history’s generally favorable view of the first three Directors of Central Intelligence, who preceded General Smith. Where Darling found the State Department, FBI and heads of the military intelligence services principally responsible for the hardships that the CIA and its predecessor, the Central Intelligence Group, endured from 1946 to 1950, Montague holds the first Directors of Central Intelligence answerable for these problems and the interdepartmental dissension that produced them...

The interpretive differences between Darling and Montague involve more than their assessments of the contributions of General Smith's three predecessors. Also, at stake was the reputation of its successor, Allen Dulles, whose 1949 report--known informally as the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report--had heavily criticized Rear Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter, Director of Central Intelligence from May 1947 to October 1950, for a major ongoing failure in intelligence coordination. Darling defended Hillenkoetter's record against these charges, and Montague tells us that Dulles disapproved of Darling's history and as Director restricted access to it. (Darling's work was nevertheless published in CIA's classified internal journal, Studies in Intelligence, in the late 1960s, and declassified and released to the public in November 1989.)"