Vietnam War: Nuclear Weapons Plans Dept of Defense, White House, CIA Files

Vietnam War: Nuclear Weapon Use Options and considerations Department of Defense, White House, CIA Files, and White House Secret Audio Recordings

2,156 pages of Department of Defense, White House, National Security Council, CIA files, Nixon and Johnson secret White House audio recordings that address the nuclear question faced during the Vietnam War. Some material in this collection was not declassified until 2016.


OPERATION VULTURE

The first plans by the United States for possible use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam dates back to 1954. When the Eisenhower Administration developed a conceptual plan called Operation Vulture to rescue French forces during the Battle of Dien Bien Phu.  The plan included the option to use up to three small atomic weapons on the Viet Minh positions. Eisenhower scuttled the plans because he did not Want to escalate U.S. involvement in the war, and he anticipated disapproval from Congress.

This collection includes 35 pages excerpted from the Pentagon Papers concerning the history of Operation Vulture and 3 pages from Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954 Volume XIII, Part 1 Indochina.


CIA FILES

54 pages of  CIA files related to the consideration of the use of nuclear weapons in Southeast Asia

Includes:

A CIA Board of National Estimates Memorandum of Conversation, February 1, 1966, in which CIA director McCone asks the Board of National Estimates to research the repercussions of U.S. use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam. The board would in 45 days report that, “in the field of international affairs [there is] probably no more universal opinion than that which holds the use of nuclear weapons to be abhorrent.” 

A twelve-page Central Intelligence Agency, Office of National Estimates report dated March 18, 1966 titled, "Use of Nuclear Weapons in the Vietnam War."  This report is in response to the request mentioned above.  "Use of nuclear weapons by the US in the Vietnam War would be one of the most important events of modern history," is the first line of the report. Other comments from the report, “widespread and fundamental. revulsion that [it] had broken the 20-year taboo on the use of nuclear weapons,” and "wave of fear and anger.”

 A January 10, 1968 page report, "The Enemy Threat to Khe Sanh."  It was the negative outlook of this battle that lead Westmoreland to hatch OPLAN Fracture Jaw.

 
TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

 A 60-page report commissioned by the Department of Defense and completed in March 1967.  The only known systematic study of the role of tactical nuclear weapons in the war,  conducted by four civilian scientists consulting for the U.S. government as part of the JASONs,  a group of some forty young scientists who met each summer since 1959 to consider defense-related problems for the Pentagon.

The purpose of this study was to evaluate the military consequences of a U.S. decision to use tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) in Southeast Asia, under the assumption that the war remains theater-limited and that no strategic exchange occurs. The study is divided into two main parts. (1) possible targets for U.S. TNW, and effects of nuclear bombardment on the ground war if the use of TNW remains unilateral; and (2) possibility and effectiveness of enemy retaliation with nuclear weapons supplied by the Soviet Union or China. The report provides its conclusions regarding unilateral use of tactical nuclear weapons, the vulnerability of U.S. forces to enemy tactical nuclear weapons, the use of tactical nuclear weapons by insurgents elsewhere and political consequences.

Topics and Sub-topics in the report include:

ADVANTAGES OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR ATTAINMENT OF U.S. MILITARY OBJECTIVES: Catalog of Targets for U.S. Use of Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Troop Concentrations, Headquarters and Communication Centers, Supply Lines, Airfields and SAMS Sites, Mountain Passes and Trails. Characteristics and Effects of TNW on These Targets: Prompt Effects, Delayed Effects, Duration of Fallout Patterns in Maintaining Interdiction of Supply Routes, Continuous-Front Barriers. Examination and Criticism of Relevant War Games. Scenarios for Use of TNW in Escalation of Current Operations in the Vietnam War: Use of TNW Against VC Bases in South Vietnam, Use Against Chinese Troops Moving Through Passes, Use for Long-Term Interdiction of Supply Routes.


THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST U.S. FORCES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: The U.S. Order of Battle in Vietnam. Means of Delivering TNW. The Effect of Nuclear Attacks on U.S. Forces. Countermeasures. Weapons Requirements Against U.S. Forces in SVN. 

EFFECTIVENESS OF TNW IN THE HANDS OF INSURGENTS IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD 

POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES: Escalation. Long-Range Consequences.


MCNAMARA PAPERS. STRATEGIC RETALIATORY FORCES. SUBJECT: THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

 147 pages of draft reports, dating from October 1965 to January 15, 1969, from Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to President Lyndon Johnson, concerning theater nuclear forces. A continuing review of theater nuclear and related chemical and biological forces. Covering nuclear strategy concerning Europe, Asia, the Soviet Union threat, and the China threat.

Included in one of the memoranda to President Johnson is the role of nuclear weapons in Asia. In the drafts can be found discussion of conditions under which nuclear weapons would be used in Asia. Includes comments on under what circumstance the use of Chinese conventional forces in Vietnam might warrant the use of nuclear weapons. One passage on this topic begins with, "In the event that a major Chinese Communist aggression in Southeast Asia indicates that the U.S. might have to face a decision to use nuclear weapons, it is clear that the decision could be taken more deliberately than a similar decision against the Soviet Union in Europe."

Other topics in the drafts include: The Threat to Korea. The Role of Theater Nuclear Weapons in Europe. Nuclear Defense against a Conventional Invasion in the Center Region with Effects Limited to NATO Territory. Nuclear Defense Against Invasion in the Center Region Using Discrete Fire. Mix of Theater Nuclear Forces. The Short Tactical Nuclear Battle. Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADMs). ADMs are nuclear charges designed to delay an advancing army by placing obstacles in its path. The Tactical Nuclear Campaign. The Extended Tactical Nuclear War. Chemical and Biological Warfare Forces. Incapacitating Chemicals (Including Riot Control Agents). The General Nuclear War Problem.

 
OPLAN FRACTURE JAW - LYNDON B. JOHNSON WHITE HOUSE FILES 

122 pages of Lyndon B. Johnson White House files covering OPLAN Fracture Jaw. Fracture Jaw was a top-secret U.S. military contingency plan in which General William C. Westmoreland sought to ensure that nuclear weapons would be available for use in the Vietnam War.

“OPLAN Fracture Jaw has been approved by me,” General Westmoreland wrote to Adm. Ulysses S. Grant Sharp Jr., the American commander in the Pacific, on Feb. 10, 1968. Later the same day as Westmoreland had told the American commander in the Pacific that he approved the operation, President Johnson’s national security adviser, Walt W. Rostow, alerted President Johnson in a February 10, 1968 memorandum. Despite Westmoreland's moves towards activating the plan, the project was abandoned in when it was discovered by the White House. Two days later, Admiral Sharp sent out the order to “discontinue all planning for Fracture Jaw.” Sharp ordered that all the planning material, “including messages and correspondence relating thereto, under positive security.” They remained top secret until 2016. In 2018 they were discovered by author and historian Michael Beschloss while working on his book, "Presidents of War."

 
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MAY 8, 1972 MEETING MEMORANDUM

 A 22-page memo. In a conversation largely concerning North Vietnam's 1972 Spring Offensive, Nixon briefly discussed nuclear weapons, he said, "Obviously, we are not going to use nuclear weapons." however he did address the use of a nuclear threat against North Vietnam.

 
DUCK HOOK - NIXON WHITE HOUSE FILES 

89 pages of files related to "Duck Hook" plans. National Security Council Files dating from September 29, to October 2, 1974.

When President Richard Nixon took office in January of 1969, a high priority was seeking an end to the Vietnam War in a way that was favorable to the United States. National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger produced a strategy, combining diplomacy and the threat of greater strategic bombing. Henry Kissinger set-up a special NSC staff planning committee referred to as the "September Group," also known as the "contingency group," to evaluate the secret plans prepared by members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington and military planners in Saigon. The military planners expanded Kissinger's strategy into "Duck Hook". 

Duck Hook (code-named "Pruning Knife" by the military) was the White House code-name of an operation President Nixon was given to consider unleashing against North Vietnam, if North Vietnam did not yield to Washington's terms at the Paris peace negotiations. Some historians believe Duck Hook called for the possible nuclear bombing of military and economic targets in and around Hanoi, the mining of Haiphong and other ports, air strikes against North Vietnam's northeast line of communications as well as passes and bridges at the Chinese border, and air and ground attacks on other targets throughout Vietnam.

Documents include a September 29, 1969 memorandum from Henry Kissinger aides Roger Morris and Anthony Lake to Captain Rembrandt Robinson of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council's military liaison unit in the White House. Robinson had earlier prepared the Duck Hook plans for attacks on North Vietnam. Lake and Morris criticized the plan saying it should "make it clear that" the September Group believed the President should be prepared to accept two operational concepts: Duck Hook "must be brutal and sustainable" and "self-contained." Regarding the latter requirement, the president would need to decide in advance "the fateful question of how far we will go. He cannot, for example, confront the issue of using tactical nuclear weapons in the midst of the exercise. He must be prepared to play out whatever string necessary in this case." The memo goes on to say that the plan should state, "clearly and fully all the implications of the action, should the President decide to do it."

 An attachment to an October 2, 1969 memo from Henry Kissinger to Nixon asked, "Should we be prepared to use nuclear weapons?" The memo warned that "Since we cannot confidently predict the exact point at which Hanoi could be likely to respond positively, we must be prepared to play out whatever string necessary." Kissinger's memo also stated that "To achieve its full effect on Hanoi's thinking, the action must be brutal." ["the action must be brutal" is underlined for emphasis in original document]

 The earlier memo from the two Kissinger's aides, Roger Morris and Anthony Lake, stated that the President must be prepared "to decide beforehand, the fateful question of how far we will go. He cannot, for example, confront the issue of using tactical nuclear weapons in the midst of the exercise. He must be prepared to play out whatever string necessary in this case." The identical wording in the Kissinger memo makes some historians believe that Kissinger was referring to the nuclear question when he called for playing out "whatever string necessary." 

Files include the outlining of the types of targets in North Vietnam that would be targeted. The outlining of the military concept involving a number of air and naval actions, grouped into intense phases of short duration. "These actions would be markedly different from the previous air and naval operations against NVN," says a report indented for the president.

Included in the files is a draft of an eighteen-page address to be made by President Nixon to the American people on the day Duck Hook was to begin. While no mention of the use of tactical nuclear weapons is made in this draft of the speech, the speech points to a course of action over a short period time, meant to cause a great shock to the North. Wording in the speech points to at least near extreme action. This never used speech is believed by some to be a pre-announcement to the American public of the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Vietnam.

 A passage in the speech states, "This warning was privately confirmed to Hanoi's chief negotiator in Paris at the beginning of August. He was informed that if no major progress toward a settlement of the war had been made by the first of November, we would be compelled to take measures of the greatest consequence. "But tonight - - after months of the most thorough study and deliberation - - I must report to you that Hanoi has indeed made a tragic miscalculation of our will and purpose. They have not heeded our clear warnings. They have refused to credit the word of the United States."  Later in the speech, the wording turns to finality, "That decision had to be my responsibility. It is our common responsibility - - yours and mine - - to demonstrate our unflinching resolve to end this war.”

Topics included in these files: Conceptual Plan of Military Operations. Assessment of Military Actions: Conduct Major Air Strikes Against NVN Counter-Air Capability, Mining NVN Ports, Interdiction of the Northeast Rail Line and Air Strikes Against Other Key Targets, Breaching of the Levee System in the Red River Delta. NVN Actions and U.S. Courses of Action: Hanoi's Estimate of U.S. Intentions, Hanoi's Ability to Continue to Receive Outside Economic Aid, Hanoi's Estimate of Internal Political Conditions, Political Objectives to be Gained from Military Operations. Soviet Actions and U.S. Courses of Action. Chinese Communist Actions and U.S. Courses of Action. Integrated Diplomatic and Military Scenarios.

Four days after the Kissinger memo, on October 6, 1969, Nixon decided against Duck Hook.  

The reasons for this are believed to be: there were reservations about Duck Hook's potential effectiveness; public support for the war continued to decline; there were signs of political slippage; and Defense Secretary Melvin Laird and Secretary of State William P. Rogers opposed military escalation. Others believe that the goals of Duck Hook, hitting a target once without the need to return for more bombings, a show of force so extreme it would drive the North to negotiate an end to the war with terms favorable to U.S. in an operation lasting only four days would require using tactical nuclear weapons, so the plan was rejected.

At the same time that President Nixon cancelled Duck Hook, it seems that Nixon embarked on a new strategy to start a series of increased nuclear alert measures designed to convey to the Soviets an increasing readiness by U.S. strategic forces. This became known as the "Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test."


JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF READINESS TEST - DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE & WHITE HOUSE FILES

60 pages of Department of Defense and White House files covering the Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test.

 On October 10, 1969, General Earle Wheeler, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sent a top secret message to American commanders around the world; the order said it had come down from a higher authority to raise their posture to prepare to respond to possible confrontation with the Soviet Union.

In October of 1969 President Richard Nixon ordered the United States Air Force and Navy to engage in exercises to raise their level of nuclear preparedness. This set of maneuvers became known as the Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test. The purpose of this move was to get the Soviet Union's reconnaissance network to notice the moves. Nixon hoped the Soviet Union would then press the North Vietnamese to negotiate an end to the Vietnam War, because of concern the United States was preparing to use nuclear weapons in the conflict.

In his 1978 memoir, Nixon's chief of staff, H.R. Haldeman wrote that President Nixon believed that President Dwight Eisenhower convinced North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union to end the Korean War by issuing a nuclear threat. Haldeman wrote of a conversation with Nixon during the summer of 1968, in which he quotes Nixon as saying, "I call it the Madman Theory, Bob. I want the North Vietnamese to believe that I've reached the point that I might do anything to stop the war. We'll just slip the word to them that 'for God's sake, you know Nixon is obsessed about Communism. We can't restrain him when he is angry, and he has his hand on the nuclear button and Ho Chi Minh himself will be in Paris in two days begging for peace."

In one of the moves taken during the Readiness Test, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) ordered a stand-down of training missions to increase the number of nuclear armed B-52's ready for deployment. On October 27, 1969, SAC ordered eighteen B-52 bombers armed with nuclear weapons to launch from bases in California and the state of Washington, to cross Alaska, were they were refueled in mid-air by KC-135 air tankers, while flying an oval pattern around the polar ice cap toward the Soviet Union and back for eighteen hours.

On October 28, 1969 the order was sent out to end the Readiness Test.

Highlights among the files include:

A transcript of a closed meeting between President Nixon and French President Charles de Gaulle, where Nixon mentions the level of influence Nixon believes the Soviets have with the North Vietnamese.

A  transcript of a closed meeting between President Nixon and Romanian President Nicolae Ceaucescu, where Nixon tells Ceaucescu, who Nixon believed to have some influence with the North Vietnamese, that North Vietnam should not make the grave mistake of not taking his threats seriously. "I don't make idle threats," Nixon told Ceaucescu.

A report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on actions which might jar the North Vietnamese into favorable actions at the Paris peace talks. Included is the option: "A plan for actual or feigned technical escalation of war against the North,” followed in parenthesis’s “Nuclear."

A memorandum from Henry Kissinger to President Richard Nixon dated October 1, 1969, concerning Kissinger's conversation with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin. Kissinger reports telling Dobrynin that there would be no special treatment for the Soviet Union until Vietnam was solved. "The train had just left the station and was heading down the tracks," Kissinger told Ambassador Dobrynin.

A hand-written diary entry by H.R. Haldeman dated Friday October 17. Haldeman wrote that Kissinger told him that he was engaging in signal-type activity around the world to try to jar Soviets and North Vietnam.

 
President Johnson White House Telephone Conversations Recordings

45 minutes of President Johnson's White House telephone recordings. Participants include president Johnson,  Robert McNamara,  McGeorge Bundy,  George Reedy and former president Dwight D. Eisenhower.


Among the subjects of conversations in this collection are Barry Goldwater’s statement on authorization for military commanders to use nuclear weapons during Tonkin Gulf incident, LBJ'S press conference response to Goldwater’s charge that LBJ authorized use of nuclear weapons in Tonkin Gulf incident, procedures for use of nuclear weapons, cable to Eisenhower about use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam and unsuitability of using tactical nuclear weapons in Khe Sanh.

 
President Richard M. Nixon's Madman Theory

213 pages of documents related to Nixon's Madman theory as applied to the Vietnam War and possible use of nuclear weapons. The madman theory is a political theory commonly associated with an aspect of U.S. President Richard Nixon's foreign policy. He and his administration tried to make the leaders of hostile Communist Bloc nations think Nixon was irrational and volatile. Applied to Vietnam War, Nixon wanted the Soviet Union and North Vietnam to believe that he had not taken the use of atomic weapons off the  table. In a 1972  memo Kissinger explains to Defense Department official Gardner Tucker that Nixon's strategy was to make "the other side ... think we might be 'crazy' and might really go much further."

Documents in this section Include:

A March 2, 1969 memorandum from Al Haig to Henry Kissinger, enclosing a memorandum from Secretary of Defense Laird to Kissinger, 21 February 1969.

Laird's memorandum to Kissinger notes that in late January, they had discussed "potential military actions which might jar the North Vietnamese into being more forthcoming at the Paris talks." Laird sent Kissinger a Joint Staff paper that reviewed possible options, including "technical escalation," a plan for the feigned nuclear escalation against North Vietnam. In the reply to Laird, Kissinger asked for actions with a "lower profile" and less risk on the grounds that "actual or feigned military action" might produce "international and domestic turbulence."

A March 1969 memorandum from President Nixon to Kissinger, in which Nixon writes, "we must worry the Soviets about the possibility that we are losing our patience and may get out of control."

The April 1969 Navy's "Duck Hook" plan for  a mining of Vietnamese readiness test designed to create a "state of indecision" among the North Vietnam leadership whether Washington intended to launch mining operations.

A May 1969 statement by Kissinger's to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, in which Kissinger says, Nixon "was prepared to accept any political system in South Vietnam, provided there is a fairly reasonable interval between conclusion of an agreement and [the establishment of] such a system."

A July 16, 1969 memorandum about sending Jean Sainteny on a diplomatic mission to Hanoi, to give the North the message that if a deal is not made by November,  Nixon "regretfully find himself obliged to have recourse to measures of great consequence and force... He will resort to any means necessary."

An August 3, 1969 memorandum of conversation between Romanian President Nicolae Ceaucescu and Richard Nixon. During the meeting Nixon said that "I don't make idle threats" and that the Vietnamese were "making a grave mistake if they think they can wait us out." it is believed that Nixon expected Ceaucescu to pass the message on to North Vietnam.

An October 1, 1969 memo from Kissinger to Nixon, enclosing a memorandum of conversation between Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and Kissinger. In the meeting with Dobrynin Kissinger said the "train had just left the station and was heading down the tracks."

An October 10, 1969 briefing paper prepared for a meeting with President Nixon broadly outlined actions for implementation around the world. "Initial actions have been taken to achieve readiness posture. With selected US forces for the period 12-25 October 1969. "Posture will be discernible to the Soviets but not threatening."

An October 17, 1969 entry in the diaries of  H. R. Haldeman disclosing Nixon's intent in ordering the readiness test, "he has all sorts of signal-type activity going around the world to try to jar Soviets + NVN [North Vietnam]."

A 1972 Kissinger memorandum in which Kissinger explains to Defense Department official Gardner Tucker that Nixon's strategy was to make "the other side ... think we might be 'crazy' and might really go much further.

Excerpts from MACV The Joint Command in the Years of Withdrawal, 1968–1973

31 pages excerpted from Graham A. Cosmas's book, "MACV The Joint Command in the Years of Withdrawal, 1968–1973." These excerpts include coverage of nuclear weapons and Operation Fracture Jaw. Fracture Jaw was a top-secret U.S. military contingency plan in which General William C. Westmoreland sought to ensure that nuclear weapons would be available for use in northern Quang Tri if necessary, to prevent a major defeat.

 
U.S.S. Ozbourn (DD-846)  Possible Nuclear Incident

7 pages of files related to a possible nuclear incident involving the U.S.S. Ozbourn (DD-846) . On March 25, 1967 the U.S.S. Ozbourn was hit by several North Vietnamese mortar shells. Two mortars damaged the Ozbourn’s ASROC [anti-submarine rocket] storage area, igniting rocket motors and forcing the crew to flood the magazine.  ASROCs were nuclear-capable weapons so explosions in a magazine raised the possibility, at a minimum, of radioactive materials scattering about the ship. A heavily redacted memo by the U.S. Navy's National Military Command Center,  indicated the possibility that armed nuclear weapons were on board  the Ozbourn, The subject of the March 25, 1967 report is ""Report of Nuclear Incident." The report was sent to the White House the same day.

 
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME XXXIV, NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY, 1969–1972

This 1,233-page volume, prepared by the U.S. Department of State
Office of the Historian, documents U.S. national security policy in the context of the Vietnam War and the changing Cold War strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. When President Richard Nixon assumed office in January 1969, he was confronted with the fact that the United States no longer held commanding military superiority over its superpower rival.

Includes coverage of the October 1969 Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test, in which Nixon secretly placed on alert portions of the United States military, including its nuclear forces, and Duck Hook.

 
NIXON SECRET PRESIDENTIAL AUDIO RECORDINGS

 A six-hour and six-minute Nixon White House audio tape recorded at the Old Executive Office Building.  Included on this tape is an April 25, 1972 exchange between President Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, in which Nixon breaches the subject of the use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam. Although not considered by Nixon scholars to a serious proposal for the use of nuclear weapons, the exchange shows Nixon's frustration with the Vietnam War days before he launched an escalation of the war.  "I'd rather use the nuclear bomb," President Nixon told Kissinger. "That, I think, would just be too much," National Security Advisor Kissinger replied. Nixon responded, "The nuclear bomb. Does that bother you?"  Later Nixon remarked, “I just want you to think big."

 Other subjects mentioned on this tape recorded between April 20 at 3:09 PM and April 25, 1972 at 3:35 PM include public opinion and the Vietnam War, the strategy of increased bombing of North Vietnam, the progress of the war and U.S./Soviet relations. Other participants on this tape include Alexander M. Haig, H. R. Haldeman, Alexander P. Butterfield and Ronald L. Ziegler.

The files contain an embedded text transcript of all computer  recognizable text, in the graphic image of each page of each document, creating a searchable finding aid.