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Vietnam War 1955- 1975 White House - CIA - DOD - NSC - State Dept Document Transcripts - Download
Vietnam War 1955- 1975 White House - CIA - DOD - NSC - Dept. of State Document Transcripts
24,090 pages of text transcription of United States Government documents and other historical material dating from 1961 to July 1975, concerning the Vietnam War, transcribed by the Office of the Historian, United States Department of State. Each volume contains a detailed index. A single text search will cover all volumes.
Includes material from the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Administrations, CIA, National Security Council, Department of State, Department of Defense, and more. Collected in 19 volumes are documentation of memorandums, letters, telegrams, minutes of meetings, phone conversations, diplomatic cables, intelligence reports, NSC security reports, and memoirs. Some material was not released to the public until September 2010.
Compiled from volumes of the United States Department of State's "Foreign Relations of the United." The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government, including the reports and intelligence that contributed to the formulation of policies and the documentation of supporting and alternative views to the policy positions ultimately adopted.
A staff of more than 30 historians and editors at the Office of the Historian in the Department of State compiled and prepared the source volumes. Agencies whose documents are included in a volume participated in a declassification review. The historians could appeal the results of these reviews in an effort to release as much material as possible. The Office received guidance from the Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, a group of distinguished scholars from outside the U.S. Government.
Foreign Relations volumes contain documents from Presidential libraries, Departments of State and Defense, National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency, Agency for International Development, and other foreign affairs agencies as well as the private papers of individuals involved in formulating U.S. foreign policy. In general, the editors choose documentation that illuminates policy formulation and major aspects and repercussions of its execution. Volumes published over the past few years have expanded the scope of the series in two important ways: first by including documents from a wider range of government agencies, particularly those involved with intelligence activity and covert actions, and second by including transcripts prepared from Presidential tape recordings.
The most important repositories for records on the formulation of U.S. policy toward Vietnam and the Vietnam War were drawn from presidential libraries. The records of the Department of State, to which the editors had complete access, include a large segment of Presidential and National Security Council documentation, but the Kennedy and Johnson Libraries remain the single most comprehensive sources.
EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION
Vietnam 1955–1957
Major areas of coverage include: Consolidation of the diem government, January–May 1955: United States and French training responsibilities in Vietnam; consideration of replacement of Diem; the sect crisis in Saigon; decision to support Diem; The question of elections in Vietnam, May–November 1955: consideration of U.S. policy on all-Vietnam elections; attempts to promote electoral consultations between north and south Vietnam; U.S. policy in the event of a renewal of hostilities in Vietnam; the Bao Dai–Diem referendum; Long-range planning in South Vietnam, November 1955 to December 1957: internal security in south Vietnam; elections for South Vietnam’s National Assembly; NSC consideration of local aggression in Vietnam; land reform and foreign investment in South Vietnam; Diem’s visit to Washington; U.S. aid to South Vietnam for 1958.
Vietnam 1958–1960
Major areas of coverage include: The role of the temporary equipment recovery mission; the question of the military assistance advisory group ceiling; the civil guard and the development of paramilitary forces; upgrading the republic of Vietnam’s air force; the Can Lao Party, corruption, and the use of U.S. aid; deterioration of internal security and the debate over counterinsurgency policy; increase in the Republic of Vietnam’s armed forces; political opposition to diem and the abortive coup of November 1960.
KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION
January 2, 1961 to December 28, 1961
Topics covered in this volume include: Visit of General Edward G. Lansdale to Vietnam, United States Efforts To Obtain South Vietnamese Acceptance of the Basic Counterinsurgency Plan, Creation of the Presidential Task Force on Vietnam and the Drafting of a Program of Action on Vietnam, Vice President Johnson's Trip to Asia, and the United States and Vietnamese Government Response to Increased Viet Cong Activity.
January 2, 1962 to December 28, 1962
Topics covered in this volume include:
Reorganization of the U.S. Military Command Structure in Vietnam, Further U.S. Efforts To Strengthen the Government of South Vietnam, Final Report of the Vietnam Task Force and the Establishment of the Vietnam Working Group, U.S. Consideration of a Crop Destruction Program for South Vietnam, Press Relations, Defoliation, Strategic Hamlets, and South Vietnam's Relations With Laos.
On the basis of their preliminary research and the review of already-published documentation on the Vietnam War, including the Pentagon Papers of 1971, the editors developed the following five major general areas of focus for the research and selection of documents for inclusion in this volume: 1) Discussion and formulation of policy in Washington; 2) Policy implementation; 3) Reports from the Embassy in Saigon; 4) U.S. military involvement in Vietnam; and 5) Intelligence activities.
Discussion and formulation of policy in Washington: President John F. Kennedy made the basic policy decisions on Vietnam, based on advice from the Washington foreign affairs community, either at meetings or in documents submitted to him. The records of these meetings with the President and advice provided to him in writing are at the center of this volume. The editors are confident that they have had complete access to all the Presidential records bearing on Vietnam policy.
Policy implementation: The editors also selected documentation that covered the implementation of Presidentially established policy and involved a range of lesser policy decisions that did not reach the White House or were resolved at the Department of State or other agencies in the foreign affairs community.
Reports from the Embassy in Saigon: The editors selected a representative portion of telegrams from the Embassy in Saigon that reported on important meetings with Vietnamese leaders and furnished policy-makers in Washington with information on the impact of U.S. policy decisions and programs. The editors also included in this volume some of the more important telegraphic reports from the Embassy in Saigon on the Vietnamese attitude toward the United States and U.S. officials as well as on internal developments in Vietnam.
U.S. military involvement in Vietnam: The editors did not attempt to include in this volume any documentation on the U.S. military involvement in the war in Vietnam. They did, however, seek to include that portion of the official documentation that illustrated the main relationships between military planning and strategy and the conduct of U.S. diplomatic relations with Vietnam and other countries. The Taylor Papers are at the center of the editors' selection of this documentation as are the files of the Secretary of Defense and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs at the Washington National Records Center of the National Archives and Records Administration. The Department of State was not a principal party in the military planning for Vietnam, and its files include no significant record of this part of U.S. involvement in Vietnam.
Intelligence activities: The editors sought to include in this volume a representative selection of major intelligence appraisals and estimates on the basis of which foreign policies were formulated. They did not make any effort to research any alleged covert operations conducted in Vietnam. Most of the intelligence documentation included in this volume was obtained from the files of the Department of State and the Kennedy Library. These documents and those furnished by the Central Intelligence Agency provided a wide range of intelligence-related information on Vietnam. The editors believe that they have satisfactorily documented the more significant aspects of the role of intelligence in the formulation and implementation of U.S. policy toward Vietnam.
In preparing this volume the editors emphasized the political and economic aspects of the formulation of U.S. foreign policy. They did not seek to document the full range of U.S. relations with Vietnam in the military, cultural, or informational spheres. The editors did take careful account of the documentation in the complete Pentagon Papers, both the published and unpublished volumes of documents on diplomatic relations.
January 2, 1963 to August 28, 1963
Topics covered include: Hilsman-Forrestal Report, Wheeler Mission, Mansfield Report, Comprehensive Plan, Thompson Report, Increasing Tensions Between the United States and South Vietnam, Reaction to the Mansfield Report, the "Press Problem," the Number and Role of U.S. Advisers in Vietnam, Differences Over the Joint Counterinsurgency Fund, Beginning of the Buddhist Crisis, Incident in Hue, the Five Buddhist Demands, Use of Tear Gas in Hue, Self-Immolation of Quang Duc, Negotiations in Saigon To Resolve the Crisis, Agreement on the Five Demands, Repudiation of the June 16 Agreement, U.S. Efforts To Promote Conciliation, Press Coverage and International Opinion, July 18 Address by Diem, Renewed Denunciation of the Buddhists by the Nhus, Raids on the Pagodas and a Possible Coup, Martial Law, Lodge's Arrival, Responsibility for the Crackdown on the Buddhists, the Cable of August 24, NSC Subcommittee Meetings on Vietnam, New Assessments From the Field, U.S. Support of the Coup.
The editors developed the following six areas of focus for further research and the selection of documents for inclusion in this volume: 1) Discussion and formulation of policy in Washington; 2) Policy implementation in South Vietnam; 3) The relationship among the United States Government, the Diem government, and dissident elements in South Vietnam; 4) The implications of the Buddhist crisis which developed in May; 5) U.S. intelligence assessments of the situation in Vietnam and the viability of the Diem government and the prospects of a potential coup; and 6) U.S. military involvement in Vietnam.
KENNEDY - JOHNSON ADMINISTRATIONS
August 28, 1963 to December 31, 1963
Topics covered include: Reassessment in Washington and Inaction in Saigon, The Coup Stalls, President Kennedy's Public Statement, Attempts To Negotiate Nhu's Removal and Change South Vietnam's Policies, Assessment of the Progress of the Vietnam War, U.S. Efforts To Reform the Diem Government, the McNamara-Taylor Mission to Vietnam and Report, U.S. Policy on Coup Plotting in Vietnam, The Coup Against the Diem Government, Differing Interpretations of U.S. Policy Toward Coup Plotting, Efforts To Obtain Information on a Potential Coup, Lodge-Diem Discussions, U.S. Assessments of a Coup, The Coup, The Deaths of Nhu and Diem, U.S. Relations With the Provisional Government of Vietnam, U.S. Recognition of the Provisional Government, The Fate of Remaining Ngo Family Members and Tri Quang, U.S. Advice to the New Government, Rejection of a Neutralized South Vietnam, The Special Honolulu Meeting, The Johnson Presidency, November 22-December 31:Lodge-Johnson Meeting on Vietnam, NSAM 273, McNamara Visit, Year-end Observations.
U.S. intelligence estimates of the viability of the Diem government and the potential prospects of coup plotters: The ability of the U.S. Government to estimate the viability of the Diem government and the prospects for potential coup plotters are of central importance during a period in which there was extensive planning for a coup and then a successful overthrow of President Diem. This volume and its companion, documenting the first part of 1963, include communications between the Central Intelligence Agency and its Station in Saigon. In addition to these telegrams, a representative selection of finished intelligence assessments prepared by the U.S. intelligence community is printed.
JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION
January 1, 1964 to December 31, 1964
Topics include: The Khanh coup, U.S. assessment of the Khanh government, The McNamara-Taylor Mission to Vietnam and the McNamara report, The Rusk Mission to Vietnam, April 17-19, and planning for pressures against the North, The second McNamara-Taylor Mission to Vietnam and planning discussions, The second Rusk visit to Saigon; the Honolulu meeting; the de Gaulle-Ball conversation; Seaborn's discussions in Hanoi, Taylor's first month as Ambassador; the increase in U.S. Advisory Forces in Vietnam, U.S. reaction to events in the Gulf of Tonkin, Changes in the government of South Vietnam, August 11-September 5, U.S. efforts to strengthen the Government of South Vietnam, Proceedings of the NSC Working Group on Vietnam, U.S. response to the governmental crisis in South Vietnam.
The editors of this volume developed the following five areas of focus for the research and selection of documents for inclusion in this volume: 1) discussion and formulation of policy in Washington; 2) missions of high-level Johnson administration officials to South Vietnam and their recommendations; 3) planning for military operations against North Vietnam and the actual implementation of U.S. military operations in Vietnam; 4) the relationship among the U.S. Government, the Khanh government, and opposition elements in South Vietnam; 5) the implementation of policy in South Vietnam.
Missions of high-level Johnson administration officials to South Vietnam: Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Maxwell Taylor each made two fact-finding visits to Vietnam in 1964. The recommendations resulting from these missions provided President Johnson with a means of focusing on the problems in Vietnam. They also forced the competing elements in the government in Washington to negotiate their different policy alternatives. The approval of recommendations of these missions by the President and his national security advisers provided guidelines for government-wide policy. Records at the Johnson Library, McNamara's files, Taylor's papers at the National Defense University, and records in the Department of State provided the principal sources for these missions and their results.
U.S. military involvement in Vietnam: The editors sought to include documentation that illustrates the relationship between military planning and strategy and the conduct of relations with the Republic of Vietnam and other countries. The editors have concentrated on policy discussions of the feasibility and desirability of covert or overt action against North Vietnam. Overt military action superseded policy deliberation and planning with the U.S. response to the incidents in the Gulf of Tonkin in August 1964. The documents presented on the Gulf of Tonkin episode do not resolve the question of whether the second North Vietnamese attack actually took place, but they do indicate that the Johnson administration at the time believed that the attack had occurred. Subsequent U.S. military action was based on that presumption.
The relationship among the U.S. Government, the Khanh government, and opposition elements in South Vietnam: In 1964, the United States supported the Republic of Vietnam, but never felt totally at ease with General Nguyen Khanh who took power in late January 1964. The extensive reports of U.S. Embassy relations with the Khanh regime come primarily from the central files of the Department of State. In addition, the editors have included a considerable number of telegraphic reports from the Embassy in Saigon on relations with dissident and opposition Vietnamese. The Central Intelligence Agency records on these contacts were obtained from the Johnson Library and Department of State files.
JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION
January 1, 1965 to June 12, 1965
Topics covered in this volume include: Political instability within South Vietnam; U.S. retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam, Initiation of a program of air strikes against North Vietnam; Introduction of U.S. ground combat forces, Increase in U.S. ground forces in Vietnam and consideration by the U.S. Government of a bombing pause, The bombing pause; Assessment of the bombing program and U.S. troop requirements; Change of government in South Vietnam.
June 13, 1965 to December 31, 1965
Topics covered in this volume include: Assessment of the U.S. role and the decision to expand the U.S. commitment, Discussion on ending the Vietnam War and deployment of additional U.S. forces, The bombing pause and the diplomatic peace initiative.
The State Department historians developed the following six areas of focus for research and the selection of documents for inclusion in this volume: 1) formulation of policy in Washington, with particular emphasis on the decision to commit major ground forces to Vietnam and its consequences for policy makers; 2) the advisory process, including recommendations from key advisers in Washington, intelligence assessments of the situation in Vietnam, and reporting and advice from U.S. officials in Saigon; 3) efforts to negotiate a settlement to the Vietnam conflict, other key diplomatic contacts, and the issue of bombing pauses; 4) military planning and strategy and non-military programs in Vietnam; 5) the relationship between the United States Government and the South Vietnamese Government, including the issue of political instability in South Vietnam; and 6) the implementation of policy in South Vietnam.
January 1, 1966. to December 31, 1966
The editors developed the following thematic areas of focus for research and the selection of documents related the Vietnam War for inclusion in this volume:
1) formulation of policy in Washington by the President and his advisers, the Cabinet, and other responsible officials, with particular emphasis on decisions concerning the air and the ground wars, the pacification program, peace negotiations, and relations with the Government of South Vietnam; 2) the advisory process, including recommendations from key advisers in Washington, intelligence assessments of the situation in Vietnam, and reporting and advice from U.S. officials in Saigon; 3) diplomatic efforts to initiate peace negotiations and other key diplomatic contacts; 4) efforts to make contact with officials of the National Liberation Front; 5) military planning and strategy, including pacification; 6) Executive-Congressional relationships in Washington and opposition to the Johnson administration's conduct of the war; 7) the relationship between the U.S. Government and the South Vietnamese Government, including meetings of political and military leaders and the issues of political instability and constitutional government in South Vietnam; 8) the implementation in South Vietnam of major foreign policy decisions of the President and ancillary policy actions directed by the Secretary of State.
January 1, 1967 to December 31, 1967
Topics covered in this volume include: Debate Over Expansion of the Vietnam War, Political Development in South Vietnam, Policy Decisions and the McNamara and Clifford-Taylor Missions to South Vietnam, Pennsylvania and Overtures to the Enemy, The Wise Men's Meeting of November 1 and Planning To Stay the Course.
The volume covers a broad range of topics and themes, the foremost of which is the U.S. effort to explore a possible negotiated settlement of the Vietnam War. There is in-depth coverage of the major unsuccessful peace initiatives, Sunflower and Pennsylvania to the North Vietnamese and Buttercup to the National Liberation Front, as well as less detailed coverage of other peace initiatives thought at the time by U.S. policymakers to be less promising. Another major theme of thex volume is the military intensification of the war effort to force the enemy to accept a peace settlement. The Presidential decisions to intensify the bombing campaign against North Vietnam and the long debate and final compromise decision by Johnson to augment the level of U.S. forces in Vietnam are part of this theme. The problem of U.S. domestic support for the war is another theme, as the Johnson administration grappled with building anti-war pressure. During the period covered by the volume, the Johnson administration named a new Ambassador to Vietnam, Ellsworth Bunker, put Robert Komer in charge of pacification and rural development, and then engaged in an effort to encourage reorganization and reform of the South Vietnam Government. This campaign, which had mixed results, is another main theme.
Documents in the volume also cover the South Vietnamese presidential elections, especially U.S. concerns about lack of unity between the two military contenders for the presidency. Another focus is the debate within the U.S. intelligence community over the size of the enemy in South Vietnam, the so-called "order of battle" controversy. During 1967 the administration conducted a reassessment of the war, a continuing theme of U.S. Vietnam policy, which resulted in advice to the President to stay the course.
January 1, 1968 to August 31, 1968
Topics covered in this volume includes: The Continuing Search for Peace and Preparations for the Enemy's Winter-Spring Offensive, The Tet Offensive, Westmoreland's Augmentation, Policy Reassessment and the "A to Z" Review, De-esclation and the March 31 Speech, Discussions on the Site for Talks, Opening of the Peace Negotiations and the May Offensive, Soviet Involvement and Possible North Vietnamese Restraint, The Lull in Fighting, the U.S.-South Vietnamese Conference at Honolulu, and the Third Enemy Offensive.
The volume contains a number of major themes. Of primary importance to President Johnson was his and the Department of State's continuing efforts to find a negotiated end to the Vietnam War. The volume covers U.S. diplomatic contacts with Romania, Norway, and the Vatican to explore possible negotiation formulas with Hanoi in the hopes that they would lead to formal peace negotiations. Also covered are continued tentative prisoner of war contacts with the National Liberation Front in the hopes that they might lead to a separate political settlement. These diplomatic efforts were overshadowed by another major theme of the volume, the Tet Offensive and the resulting policy debate in Washington on whether to raise the number of U.S. troops in Vietnam. This debate led to a broader reassessment of U.S. policy in Vietnam, which culminated in the President's order for a partial bombing halt of North Vietnam, his decision not to run for reelection, and an announcement of U.S. willingness to meet anywhere to negotiate peace. The search for a venue for the talks and attempts by advisers to convince the President to institute a full bombing halt comprise the final focus of the volume. Two other themes are evident in the volume, yet they are captured in only a few documents: the growing anti-war movement in the United States and the upcoming presidential elections of 1968. These two events affected discussions within the Johnson administration.
August 1969 to December - The Kissinger-Le Duc Tho Negotiations
This specific volume documents the U.S. negotiations in Paris with the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam from August 1969 to December 1973.
Consisting primarily of the memoranda of conversation between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry A. Kissinger, and North Vietnamese Politburo Member and Special Adviser to the North Vietnamese Delegation, Le Duc Tho (except for a small number of occasions when senior North Vietnamese diplomat Xuan Thuy substituted for Tho), this volume focuses on the negotiations that led to the Paris Peace Accords on January 27, 1973, and on post-Accords meetings in 1973 (February, May, June, and December) between Kissinger and Tho. Except for the Hanoi round of meetings in February 1973, all the meetings took place in Paris.
Presented chronologically, the documents in this volume—memoranda of conversation recording the meetings—show, among other things: 1) the evolution of the U.S. and North Vietnamese positions in the negotiations, 2) how the parties reached agreement on the Accords, also called the agreement or the settlement, and 3) how the Accords failed to lead to a stable cease-fire or to a political settlement of the conflict.
September 1 to January 20, 1969
Topic covered in this volume include: Efforts To Move the Peace Talks Forward; the Ohio Exercise, The Breakthrough in Paris, Negotiating the Understanding, The Bombing Halt, South Vietnamese Abstention From the Expanded Peace Conference; the Anna Chennault Affair, South Vietnamese Participation in the Paris Peace Talks, Resolution of the Procedural Delays and the Opening of the Expanded Peace Talks.
The editors of the volume sought to present documentation that explained and illuminated the major foreign policy decisions and problems on Vietnam faced by the President and his key foreign policy advisers during the last 4 months of his administration. The documents highlight the Johnson administration's slow and agonizing internal deliberations on how to achieve formal four-party peace negotiations on Vietnam in Paris. A good part of this search for peace was carried out during the 1968 Presidential election amid suspicions by the Democratic and Republican candidates, and President Lyndon Johnson himself, that the respective Presidential candidates were using the peace process to influence the election. In addition, both the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) and the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) had their own demands for the procedures and modalities of the formal peace process, all of which had to be reconciled. This volume is the account of how the Johnson administration achieved the opening of formal four-party peace talks in Paris.
President Johnson and his principal foreign policy advisers, Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense Clifford, Assistant to the President Rostow, and other official and unofficial advisers became almost exclusively concerned with the goal of starting the peace negotiations in Paris. The administration was split between hard liners, including the President himself, and so-called doves. The hardliners refused to stop U.S. bombing of North Vietnam without a promise from Hanoi that it would withdraw from the Demilitarized Zone, cease its attack on South Vietnamese cities, and accept South Vietnam representatives at the peace table. The doves, Secretary of Defense Clifford and Chief Paris negotiator Averell Harriman, favored stopping the bombing in the hopes of moving the peace process forward. A main theme of the volume is how the doves eventually convinced the President that North Vietnam, under heavy pressure from the Soviet Union, would agree to his demands.
A second major theme of the volume is the interaction between the peace negotiations and the Presidential election. Vietnam was a major campaign issue debated strenuously by Republican candidate Richard Nixon, Democratic candidate Vice President Hubert Humphrey, and Independent candidate Governor George Wallace. The prospect of imminent peace talks had the potential to influence the elections. This theme is developed principally through the extensive use of transcripts of Johnson's phone calls as the President sought to convince the three candidates to support his conditions for a bombing halt and for opening the formal peace talks.
The volume's third major theme is how the Johnson administration had to persuade, cajole, and coerce the Republic of Vietnam and President Thieu to accept the deal that the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, with the help of the Soviet Union, essentially worked out at the end of October 1968. Much to Johnson's dismay, South Vietnam refused to agree to terms before the Presidential election. Not until January 16, 1969, did all four parties agree to the modalities of the talks--size of the table, use of flags or nameplates, and speaking order. On January 18, 1969, just 2 days before the Johnson administration left office, the peace talks officially began.
Anna Chennault Affair - Nixon Conspiracy:
Documents show that President Johnson and his advisers believed there was a conspiracy to derail the negotiations to help the Republicans in the election offten called the Chennault Affair. Anna Chennault, an associate of Republican Presidential candidate Richard Nixon and co-chair of Women for Nixon, had been in contact with Bui Diem, South Vietnamese Ambassador to the United States. "There is no hard evidence that Mr. Nixon himself is involved," Rostow reported in an October 29 memorandum to the President. "Exactly what the Republicans have been saying to Bui Diem is not wholly clear as opposed to the conclusions that Bui Diem is drawing from what they have said." During the regular Tuesday luncheon with his foreign policy advisers, Johnson expressed dismay at Banker's reports on his unsuccessful efforts to arrange a meeting with Thieu. Thieu's uncharacteristic unavailability seemed to confirm Johnson's belief in a conspiracy between the Republicans and the South Vietnamese. Presidential Consultant Maxwell Taylor suggested that "it may be sinister, or it may be ineptitude," while Johnson prophesied that "Nixon will double-cross them (the South Vietnamese) after November 5," election day. Later that day South Vietnamese Foreign Minister Thanh informed Bunker that the dispatch of a delegation to Paris would require approval from his country's National Assembly. Bunker assessed that the GVN would not be ready to go ahead at the current time. Concerned about proceeding to Paris without the GVN aboard, Johnson agreed to a further postponement of 2 days in order to give Bunker more time.
On November 2 Thieu publicly stated that he would not send a delegation to the expanded talks in Paris, effectively preventing the convening of the four-party meetings. In turn, the North Vietnamese refused to accept further meetings solely between U.S. and DRV representatives. Late in the evening of November 2 Johnson discussed with Senator Dirksen, his old colleague and an intimate of both Nixon and Chennault, the connection between the Republicans and the South Vietnamese. The President described the actions of Nixon's supporters as "treason" and instructed Dirksen to transmit a warning to Nixon that he must act to prevent any adverse impact upon the Paris talks. On November 3 Johnson called Senator George Smathers (D-Florida), who had been in contact with Nixon. Smathers stated that Nixon denied any knowledge of the affair, and the President countered that he had documented proof of a Republican connection to the GVN. Apparently at the urging of both Dirksen and Smathers, Nixon made a telephone call to Johnson that afternoon to disclaim personally any involvement with the entire affair. In light of Nixon's denials and Johnson's own reticence about revealing the full range of government surveillance and wiretapping of Chennault and Diem, the decision was made not to make public the information gathered regarding the Republican-South Vietnamese connection. In a close vote, Nixon won the 1968 Presidential election.
NIXON ADMINISTRATION
Vietnam, January 1969–July 1970
State Department historians broaden the scope of coverage of the conflict with the compilation of this group of documents. Previously U.S. policy towards Vietnam and policy towards Laos and Cambodia were in separate volumes. With the Nixon administration's decision to take the war to the opposition in Cambodia and integrate more fully the secret war in Laos into its strategy for Vietnam, starting with this volume, Vietnam was covered in the context of the larger war that included the conflicts in Laos and Cambodia, and in the case of the former, also the role of Thailand in Laos. Consequently, the editors had to make choices about what to cover. When Vietnam was the main concern of President Nixon and his principal advisers, primarily Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger and his NSC Staff; Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker in Saigon; Commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, General Creighton Abrams; and Chief Paris Peace Talks negotiator, Henry Cabot Lodge—the focus is on Vietnam strategy, planning and operations. The focus of the volume later shifts to the issue of the deterioration of the secret war in Laos in March 1970. In March and April 1970, after the overthrow of Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia and his replacement by pro-American General Lon Nol, the volume moves its focus to Cambodia, culminating with the U.S.-South Vietnamese invasion of that country in an effort to attack the North Vietnamese troops in their sanctuaries. The volume concludes with the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Cambodia.
Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972
Major of area of coverage include: The Aftermath of the Cambodian Incursion, July 21–October 7, 1970, Planning and Decisions for Operations in Cambodia and Laos, October 9, 1970–February 7, 1971, Operation Lam Son 719, February 8–April 7, 1971, The Consequences of Operation Lam Son 719 and the Search for a Settlement, April 8–October 6, 1971, Military and Diplomatic Stalemate, October 11, 1971–January 26, 1972 .
During the period covered by this volume, July 1970–January 1972, the Nixon administration expanded the Vietnam war into Cambodia and Laos as part of its strategy. This volume covers South Vietnam in the context of this larger war in Southeast Asia; therefore, the volume begins in July 1970 in the aftermath of the Cambodian incursion.
At the time, a variety of topics dominated the policy discussions of President Nixon and his principal advisers. Among these topics were U.S. troop withdrawals, Vietnamization, negotiations in Paris (both the public plenary sessions and the secret talks between Kissinger and North Vietnamese Politburo member Le Duc Tho), and possible South Vietnamese operations in Cambodia, Laos, and North Vietnam. Throughout the rest of 1970 these themes moved forward on separate paths that occasionally intersected with one another. South Vietnamese operations, first in Cambodia and then in Laos, were seen in policy terms as providing South Vietnam additional time to develop a more effective military, to generate economic growth, and to achieve some degree of political stability. The operations were also to demonstrate the success of Vietnamization and justify the continuing withdrawal of U.S. troops.
In late 1970 and early 1971, the focus shifted to decision making regarding plans to implement a major South Vietnamese out-of-country operation called Lam Son 719, launched in early February 1971. The strategic purpose of the operation was to halt or slow the flow of military supplies to Communist forces in South Vietnam via the panhandle of Laos. At the same time, it would demonstrate the growing military prowess of the South Vietnamese Army. On the negotiating front, Kissinger continued in 1970 and throughout 1971 to meet periodically in Paris with Le Duc Tho and other senior Vietnamese Communist functionaries but made no progress. At the same time, representatives of both sides also met publicly in the plenary meetings. Each side used the public Paris meetings to exchange carefully calibrated propaganda, making the meetings, if possible, less productive than the secret talks. The volume focuses on the Kissinger–Le Duc Tho talks with only occasional documentary coverage of the public talks.
This volume also documents President Nixon’s penchant for secret operations and covert warfare: his continued support for secret bombing campaigns in Cambodia and Laos and his approval of the November 1971 Son Tay raid into North Vietnam to rescue American prisoners of war. Nixon also signed off on new and continuing information gathering initiatives and propaganda that supported intelligence operations against Communist forces, organizations, and governments in South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Additionally, he approved clandestine support for South Vietnamese political entities friendly to the United States. These operations are documented in some detail to demonstrate the role of covert actions in support of overt political and military operations.
In the waning months of the period covered by this volume, deadlock had set in. Neither side appeared able to win militarily, or even to weaken his adversary sufficiently to make him negotiate in good faith. There were signs, however, that Hanoi might be preparing to mount a major military effort in 1972. Its purpose would be to break through this impasse without having to travel a diplomatic path. The volume concludes at this point.
Vietnam, January–October 1972
Major areas of coverage include: Before the Easter Offensive, January 20–March 29, 1972, The Easter Offensive, March 30–May 7, 1972, The North Vietnamese Offensive Falters, Negotiations Resume, May 8–July 18, 1972, The Parties Move Toward Agreement, July 19–October 7, 1972
The Easter Offensive, and its ramifications, represents the most significant event in Indochina for U.S. policy in this period, and documentary coverage of the event dominates the volume, concentrating mainly on what happened in North and South Vietnam, policy formulation and decision making in Washington, and the negotiations in Paris. Only a very small number of documents relate to events and policy in Laos and Cambodia, and then only as they relate to events and policy in Vietnam.
Documents in this volume examine the link between force and diplomacy in U.S. national security policy toward the Vietnam war. In the period the volume covers, force drove diplomacy. Only by recognizing this can the process by which America’s Vietnam war policy was formulated and implemented be fully understood. Controlling the process was a small circle of men, led by President Richard M. Nixon, and which included the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry A. Kissinger; the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs, Major General Alexander M. Haig; and a few National Security Council officials trusted by Kissinger.
Sources for this volume include messages and memoranda that illuminate the decision-making process in a bureaucracy. That can be found in Nixon’s papers, in Kissinger’s papers, in military and diplomatic records in the National Archives, and in other repositories. Transcripts of Nixon’s taped conversations with senior policy advisers, as well as a collection of transcripts of Kissinger’s telephone conversations, provide an additional level of detail. A third collection, less well known than the other two but almost as significant, is that of Admiral Thomas Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and includes diary excerpts and telephone conversations. This volume, therefore, documents the implementation of U.S. policy toward Vietnam during the Easter Offensive more thoroughly than ever before.
Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973
Major areas of coverage include: Breakthrough in Paris Blocked in Saigon, October 8–23, 1972, Paris Negotiations Collapse, October 24–December 13, 1972, The Christmas Bombings, December 14–29, 1972, America Leaves the War, December 30, 1972–January 27, 1973
The most significant events for U.S. Vietnam war policy in this period were policy formation and decision making in Washington; the negotiations in Paris and reactions in Washington, Hanoi, and Saigon to the negotiations; and the December/Christmas Bombing as well as other events in South Vietnam and North Vietnam. Therefore, documentary coverage in this volume is limited mainly to these topics. Only a very small number of documents relate to events and policy in Laos and Cambodia, and then only as they, in turn, relate to events and policy in Vietnam.
Believing that time was on their side, North Vietnam’s leaders refused to negotiate seriously with the United States and South Vietnam. Indeed, in March 1972, they attempted to bypass negotiations altogether with a full-scale invasion of South Vietnam. Called the Easter Offensive by the United States, the invasion at first appeared to overwhelm the South. By mid-summer, however, Nixon’s May decision to mine North Vietnam harbors and dramatically intensify the application of American air power to infrastructure and other strategic targets in the North and to operational targets in the South, and the tenacious defense of South Vietnam by its own armed forces, had blunted the offensive.
At this point, the North Vietnamese agreed to resume negotiations and did so in meetings with President Nixon’s National Security Adviser, Henry A. Kissinger, in Paris on July 19, August 1, August 14, September 15, and September 26–27. By the September talks, the North Vietnamese delegation, led by Le Duc Tho, seemed prepared to make what Kissinger considered a break-through concession: namely, that North Vietnam no longer linked its readiness to negotiate a U.S. withdrawal with a demand that the United States support and actively participate in the dismantling of President Nguyen Van Thieu’s government in Saigon.
In early October, Kissinger and Le Duc Tho met again in Paris. During a marathon four-day session (October 8–11), the two negotiated a peace agreement.
NIXON - FORD ADMINISTRATIONS
Vietnam, January 1973–July 1975
Major areas of coverage include: Neither War nor Peace, January 27–June 15, 1973, Congressional Restrictions, General Warfare, June 19, 1973–February 25, 1975, Collapse and Evacuation, February 26–July 22, 1975 , The SS Mayaguez Incident, May 12–15, 1975
This volume addresses the ending of the Vietnam war; a story central to the U.S. experience in the 20th century. Similar to other Foreign Relations volumes, this collection of documents emphasizes the formation of policy over day-to-day diplomacy. Several themes dominated U.S. policy and policy objectives in Indochina during this period: the relationship between force and diplomacy, the struggle between the President and Congress in the formation and implementation of U.S. policy, U.S. credibility in the world, and the limits of American power.
These themes dictated the selection of documents in this volume. Soon after the fall of Saigon in April 1975, American officials in several agencies began looking back at U.S. policy toward and political and military actions in Vietnam in an effort to understand and learn from the American experience in Indochina beginning in the early 1960s. This volume places those analyses within the broader documentary context.
This volume concludes with documentation covering the May 1975 seizure by Cambodia of the SS Mayaguez and the successful recovery by U.S. forces of the ship and its crew. The documents cover the crisis deliberations in Washington among civilian and military officials that led to President Ford’s decision to use military force to recover the ship.
Source: Office of the Historian, United States Department of State
24,090 pages of text transcription of United States Government documents and other historical material dating from 1961 to July 1975, concerning the Vietnam War, transcribed by the Office of the Historian, United States Department of State. Each volume contains a detailed index. A single text search will cover all volumes.
Includes material from the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Administrations, CIA, National Security Council, Department of State, Department of Defense, and more. Collected in 19 volumes are documentation of memorandums, letters, telegrams, minutes of meetings, phone conversations, diplomatic cables, intelligence reports, NSC security reports, and memoirs. Some material was not released to the public until September 2010.
Compiled from volumes of the United States Department of State's "Foreign Relations of the United." The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government, including the reports and intelligence that contributed to the formulation of policies and the documentation of supporting and alternative views to the policy positions ultimately adopted.
A staff of more than 30 historians and editors at the Office of the Historian in the Department of State compiled and prepared the source volumes. Agencies whose documents are included in a volume participated in a declassification review. The historians could appeal the results of these reviews in an effort to release as much material as possible. The Office received guidance from the Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, a group of distinguished scholars from outside the U.S. Government.
Foreign Relations volumes contain documents from Presidential libraries, Departments of State and Defense, National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency, Agency for International Development, and other foreign affairs agencies as well as the private papers of individuals involved in formulating U.S. foreign policy. In general, the editors choose documentation that illuminates policy formulation and major aspects and repercussions of its execution. Volumes published over the past few years have expanded the scope of the series in two important ways: first by including documents from a wider range of government agencies, particularly those involved with intelligence activity and covert actions, and second by including transcripts prepared from Presidential tape recordings.
The most important repositories for records on the formulation of U.S. policy toward Vietnam and the Vietnam War were drawn from presidential libraries. The records of the Department of State, to which the editors had complete access, include a large segment of Presidential and National Security Council documentation, but the Kennedy and Johnson Libraries remain the single most comprehensive sources.
EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION
Vietnam 1955–1957
Major areas of coverage include: Consolidation of the diem government, January–May 1955: United States and French training responsibilities in Vietnam; consideration of replacement of Diem; the sect crisis in Saigon; decision to support Diem; The question of elections in Vietnam, May–November 1955: consideration of U.S. policy on all-Vietnam elections; attempts to promote electoral consultations between north and south Vietnam; U.S. policy in the event of a renewal of hostilities in Vietnam; the Bao Dai–Diem referendum; Long-range planning in South Vietnam, November 1955 to December 1957: internal security in south Vietnam; elections for South Vietnam’s National Assembly; NSC consideration of local aggression in Vietnam; land reform and foreign investment in South Vietnam; Diem’s visit to Washington; U.S. aid to South Vietnam for 1958.
Vietnam 1958–1960
Major areas of coverage include: The role of the temporary equipment recovery mission; the question of the military assistance advisory group ceiling; the civil guard and the development of paramilitary forces; upgrading the republic of Vietnam’s air force; the Can Lao Party, corruption, and the use of U.S. aid; deterioration of internal security and the debate over counterinsurgency policy; increase in the Republic of Vietnam’s armed forces; political opposition to diem and the abortive coup of November 1960.
KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION
January 2, 1961 to December 28, 1961
Topics covered in this volume include: Visit of General Edward G. Lansdale to Vietnam, United States Efforts To Obtain South Vietnamese Acceptance of the Basic Counterinsurgency Plan, Creation of the Presidential Task Force on Vietnam and the Drafting of a Program of Action on Vietnam, Vice President Johnson's Trip to Asia, and the United States and Vietnamese Government Response to Increased Viet Cong Activity.
January 2, 1962 to December 28, 1962
Topics covered in this volume include:
Reorganization of the U.S. Military Command Structure in Vietnam, Further U.S. Efforts To Strengthen the Government of South Vietnam, Final Report of the Vietnam Task Force and the Establishment of the Vietnam Working Group, U.S. Consideration of a Crop Destruction Program for South Vietnam, Press Relations, Defoliation, Strategic Hamlets, and South Vietnam's Relations With Laos.
On the basis of their preliminary research and the review of already-published documentation on the Vietnam War, including the Pentagon Papers of 1971, the editors developed the following five major general areas of focus for the research and selection of documents for inclusion in this volume: 1) Discussion and formulation of policy in Washington; 2) Policy implementation; 3) Reports from the Embassy in Saigon; 4) U.S. military involvement in Vietnam; and 5) Intelligence activities.
Discussion and formulation of policy in Washington: President John F. Kennedy made the basic policy decisions on Vietnam, based on advice from the Washington foreign affairs community, either at meetings or in documents submitted to him. The records of these meetings with the President and advice provided to him in writing are at the center of this volume. The editors are confident that they have had complete access to all the Presidential records bearing on Vietnam policy.
Policy implementation: The editors also selected documentation that covered the implementation of Presidentially established policy and involved a range of lesser policy decisions that did not reach the White House or were resolved at the Department of State or other agencies in the foreign affairs community.
Reports from the Embassy in Saigon: The editors selected a representative portion of telegrams from the Embassy in Saigon that reported on important meetings with Vietnamese leaders and furnished policy-makers in Washington with information on the impact of U.S. policy decisions and programs. The editors also included in this volume some of the more important telegraphic reports from the Embassy in Saigon on the Vietnamese attitude toward the United States and U.S. officials as well as on internal developments in Vietnam.
U.S. military involvement in Vietnam: The editors did not attempt to include in this volume any documentation on the U.S. military involvement in the war in Vietnam. They did, however, seek to include that portion of the official documentation that illustrated the main relationships between military planning and strategy and the conduct of U.S. diplomatic relations with Vietnam and other countries. The Taylor Papers are at the center of the editors' selection of this documentation as are the files of the Secretary of Defense and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs at the Washington National Records Center of the National Archives and Records Administration. The Department of State was not a principal party in the military planning for Vietnam, and its files include no significant record of this part of U.S. involvement in Vietnam.
Intelligence activities: The editors sought to include in this volume a representative selection of major intelligence appraisals and estimates on the basis of which foreign policies were formulated. They did not make any effort to research any alleged covert operations conducted in Vietnam. Most of the intelligence documentation included in this volume was obtained from the files of the Department of State and the Kennedy Library. These documents and those furnished by the Central Intelligence Agency provided a wide range of intelligence-related information on Vietnam. The editors believe that they have satisfactorily documented the more significant aspects of the role of intelligence in the formulation and implementation of U.S. policy toward Vietnam.
In preparing this volume the editors emphasized the political and economic aspects of the formulation of U.S. foreign policy. They did not seek to document the full range of U.S. relations with Vietnam in the military, cultural, or informational spheres. The editors did take careful account of the documentation in the complete Pentagon Papers, both the published and unpublished volumes of documents on diplomatic relations.
January 2, 1963 to August 28, 1963
Topics covered include: Hilsman-Forrestal Report, Wheeler Mission, Mansfield Report, Comprehensive Plan, Thompson Report, Increasing Tensions Between the United States and South Vietnam, Reaction to the Mansfield Report, the "Press Problem," the Number and Role of U.S. Advisers in Vietnam, Differences Over the Joint Counterinsurgency Fund, Beginning of the Buddhist Crisis, Incident in Hue, the Five Buddhist Demands, Use of Tear Gas in Hue, Self-Immolation of Quang Duc, Negotiations in Saigon To Resolve the Crisis, Agreement on the Five Demands, Repudiation of the June 16 Agreement, U.S. Efforts To Promote Conciliation, Press Coverage and International Opinion, July 18 Address by Diem, Renewed Denunciation of the Buddhists by the Nhus, Raids on the Pagodas and a Possible Coup, Martial Law, Lodge's Arrival, Responsibility for the Crackdown on the Buddhists, the Cable of August 24, NSC Subcommittee Meetings on Vietnam, New Assessments From the Field, U.S. Support of the Coup.
The editors developed the following six areas of focus for further research and the selection of documents for inclusion in this volume: 1) Discussion and formulation of policy in Washington; 2) Policy implementation in South Vietnam; 3) The relationship among the United States Government, the Diem government, and dissident elements in South Vietnam; 4) The implications of the Buddhist crisis which developed in May; 5) U.S. intelligence assessments of the situation in Vietnam and the viability of the Diem government and the prospects of a potential coup; and 6) U.S. military involvement in Vietnam.
KENNEDY - JOHNSON ADMINISTRATIONS
August 28, 1963 to December 31, 1963
Topics covered include: Reassessment in Washington and Inaction in Saigon, The Coup Stalls, President Kennedy's Public Statement, Attempts To Negotiate Nhu's Removal and Change South Vietnam's Policies, Assessment of the Progress of the Vietnam War, U.S. Efforts To Reform the Diem Government, the McNamara-Taylor Mission to Vietnam and Report, U.S. Policy on Coup Plotting in Vietnam, The Coup Against the Diem Government, Differing Interpretations of U.S. Policy Toward Coup Plotting, Efforts To Obtain Information on a Potential Coup, Lodge-Diem Discussions, U.S. Assessments of a Coup, The Coup, The Deaths of Nhu and Diem, U.S. Relations With the Provisional Government of Vietnam, U.S. Recognition of the Provisional Government, The Fate of Remaining Ngo Family Members and Tri Quang, U.S. Advice to the New Government, Rejection of a Neutralized South Vietnam, The Special Honolulu Meeting, The Johnson Presidency, November 22-December 31:Lodge-Johnson Meeting on Vietnam, NSAM 273, McNamara Visit, Year-end Observations.
U.S. intelligence estimates of the viability of the Diem government and the potential prospects of coup plotters: The ability of the U.S. Government to estimate the viability of the Diem government and the prospects for potential coup plotters are of central importance during a period in which there was extensive planning for a coup and then a successful overthrow of President Diem. This volume and its companion, documenting the first part of 1963, include communications between the Central Intelligence Agency and its Station in Saigon. In addition to these telegrams, a representative selection of finished intelligence assessments prepared by the U.S. intelligence community is printed.
JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION
January 1, 1964 to December 31, 1964
Topics include: The Khanh coup, U.S. assessment of the Khanh government, The McNamara-Taylor Mission to Vietnam and the McNamara report, The Rusk Mission to Vietnam, April 17-19, and planning for pressures against the North, The second McNamara-Taylor Mission to Vietnam and planning discussions, The second Rusk visit to Saigon; the Honolulu meeting; the de Gaulle-Ball conversation; Seaborn's discussions in Hanoi, Taylor's first month as Ambassador; the increase in U.S. Advisory Forces in Vietnam, U.S. reaction to events in the Gulf of Tonkin, Changes in the government of South Vietnam, August 11-September 5, U.S. efforts to strengthen the Government of South Vietnam, Proceedings of the NSC Working Group on Vietnam, U.S. response to the governmental crisis in South Vietnam.
The editors of this volume developed the following five areas of focus for the research and selection of documents for inclusion in this volume: 1) discussion and formulation of policy in Washington; 2) missions of high-level Johnson administration officials to South Vietnam and their recommendations; 3) planning for military operations against North Vietnam and the actual implementation of U.S. military operations in Vietnam; 4) the relationship among the U.S. Government, the Khanh government, and opposition elements in South Vietnam; 5) the implementation of policy in South Vietnam.
Missions of high-level Johnson administration officials to South Vietnam: Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Maxwell Taylor each made two fact-finding visits to Vietnam in 1964. The recommendations resulting from these missions provided President Johnson with a means of focusing on the problems in Vietnam. They also forced the competing elements in the government in Washington to negotiate their different policy alternatives. The approval of recommendations of these missions by the President and his national security advisers provided guidelines for government-wide policy. Records at the Johnson Library, McNamara's files, Taylor's papers at the National Defense University, and records in the Department of State provided the principal sources for these missions and their results.
U.S. military involvement in Vietnam: The editors sought to include documentation that illustrates the relationship between military planning and strategy and the conduct of relations with the Republic of Vietnam and other countries. The editors have concentrated on policy discussions of the feasibility and desirability of covert or overt action against North Vietnam. Overt military action superseded policy deliberation and planning with the U.S. response to the incidents in the Gulf of Tonkin in August 1964. The documents presented on the Gulf of Tonkin episode do not resolve the question of whether the second North Vietnamese attack actually took place, but they do indicate that the Johnson administration at the time believed that the attack had occurred. Subsequent U.S. military action was based on that presumption.
The relationship among the U.S. Government, the Khanh government, and opposition elements in South Vietnam: In 1964, the United States supported the Republic of Vietnam, but never felt totally at ease with General Nguyen Khanh who took power in late January 1964. The extensive reports of U.S. Embassy relations with the Khanh regime come primarily from the central files of the Department of State. In addition, the editors have included a considerable number of telegraphic reports from the Embassy in Saigon on relations with dissident and opposition Vietnamese. The Central Intelligence Agency records on these contacts were obtained from the Johnson Library and Department of State files.
JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION
January 1, 1965 to June 12, 1965
Topics covered in this volume include: Political instability within South Vietnam; U.S. retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam, Initiation of a program of air strikes against North Vietnam; Introduction of U.S. ground combat forces, Increase in U.S. ground forces in Vietnam and consideration by the U.S. Government of a bombing pause, The bombing pause; Assessment of the bombing program and U.S. troop requirements; Change of government in South Vietnam.
June 13, 1965 to December 31, 1965
Topics covered in this volume include: Assessment of the U.S. role and the decision to expand the U.S. commitment, Discussion on ending the Vietnam War and deployment of additional U.S. forces, The bombing pause and the diplomatic peace initiative.
The State Department historians developed the following six areas of focus for research and the selection of documents for inclusion in this volume: 1) formulation of policy in Washington, with particular emphasis on the decision to commit major ground forces to Vietnam and its consequences for policy makers; 2) the advisory process, including recommendations from key advisers in Washington, intelligence assessments of the situation in Vietnam, and reporting and advice from U.S. officials in Saigon; 3) efforts to negotiate a settlement to the Vietnam conflict, other key diplomatic contacts, and the issue of bombing pauses; 4) military planning and strategy and non-military programs in Vietnam; 5) the relationship between the United States Government and the South Vietnamese Government, including the issue of political instability in South Vietnam; and 6) the implementation of policy in South Vietnam.
January 1, 1966. to December 31, 1966
The editors developed the following thematic areas of focus for research and the selection of documents related the Vietnam War for inclusion in this volume:
1) formulation of policy in Washington by the President and his advisers, the Cabinet, and other responsible officials, with particular emphasis on decisions concerning the air and the ground wars, the pacification program, peace negotiations, and relations with the Government of South Vietnam; 2) the advisory process, including recommendations from key advisers in Washington, intelligence assessments of the situation in Vietnam, and reporting and advice from U.S. officials in Saigon; 3) diplomatic efforts to initiate peace negotiations and other key diplomatic contacts; 4) efforts to make contact with officials of the National Liberation Front; 5) military planning and strategy, including pacification; 6) Executive-Congressional relationships in Washington and opposition to the Johnson administration's conduct of the war; 7) the relationship between the U.S. Government and the South Vietnamese Government, including meetings of political and military leaders and the issues of political instability and constitutional government in South Vietnam; 8) the implementation in South Vietnam of major foreign policy decisions of the President and ancillary policy actions directed by the Secretary of State.
January 1, 1967 to December 31, 1967
Topics covered in this volume include: Debate Over Expansion of the Vietnam War, Political Development in South Vietnam, Policy Decisions and the McNamara and Clifford-Taylor Missions to South Vietnam, Pennsylvania and Overtures to the Enemy, The Wise Men's Meeting of November 1 and Planning To Stay the Course.
The volume covers a broad range of topics and themes, the foremost of which is the U.S. effort to explore a possible negotiated settlement of the Vietnam War. There is in-depth coverage of the major unsuccessful peace initiatives, Sunflower and Pennsylvania to the North Vietnamese and Buttercup to the National Liberation Front, as well as less detailed coverage of other peace initiatives thought at the time by U.S. policymakers to be less promising. Another major theme of thex volume is the military intensification of the war effort to force the enemy to accept a peace settlement. The Presidential decisions to intensify the bombing campaign against North Vietnam and the long debate and final compromise decision by Johnson to augment the level of U.S. forces in Vietnam are part of this theme. The problem of U.S. domestic support for the war is another theme, as the Johnson administration grappled with building anti-war pressure. During the period covered by the volume, the Johnson administration named a new Ambassador to Vietnam, Ellsworth Bunker, put Robert Komer in charge of pacification and rural development, and then engaged in an effort to encourage reorganization and reform of the South Vietnam Government. This campaign, which had mixed results, is another main theme.
Documents in the volume also cover the South Vietnamese presidential elections, especially U.S. concerns about lack of unity between the two military contenders for the presidency. Another focus is the debate within the U.S. intelligence community over the size of the enemy in South Vietnam, the so-called "order of battle" controversy. During 1967 the administration conducted a reassessment of the war, a continuing theme of U.S. Vietnam policy, which resulted in advice to the President to stay the course.
January 1, 1968 to August 31, 1968
Topics covered in this volume includes: The Continuing Search for Peace and Preparations for the Enemy's Winter-Spring Offensive, The Tet Offensive, Westmoreland's Augmentation, Policy Reassessment and the "A to Z" Review, De-esclation and the March 31 Speech, Discussions on the Site for Talks, Opening of the Peace Negotiations and the May Offensive, Soviet Involvement and Possible North Vietnamese Restraint, The Lull in Fighting, the U.S.-South Vietnamese Conference at Honolulu, and the Third Enemy Offensive.
The volume contains a number of major themes. Of primary importance to President Johnson was his and the Department of State's continuing efforts to find a negotiated end to the Vietnam War. The volume covers U.S. diplomatic contacts with Romania, Norway, and the Vatican to explore possible negotiation formulas with Hanoi in the hopes that they would lead to formal peace negotiations. Also covered are continued tentative prisoner of war contacts with the National Liberation Front in the hopes that they might lead to a separate political settlement. These diplomatic efforts were overshadowed by another major theme of the volume, the Tet Offensive and the resulting policy debate in Washington on whether to raise the number of U.S. troops in Vietnam. This debate led to a broader reassessment of U.S. policy in Vietnam, which culminated in the President's order for a partial bombing halt of North Vietnam, his decision not to run for reelection, and an announcement of U.S. willingness to meet anywhere to negotiate peace. The search for a venue for the talks and attempts by advisers to convince the President to institute a full bombing halt comprise the final focus of the volume. Two other themes are evident in the volume, yet they are captured in only a few documents: the growing anti-war movement in the United States and the upcoming presidential elections of 1968. These two events affected discussions within the Johnson administration.
August 1969 to December - The Kissinger-Le Duc Tho Negotiations
This specific volume documents the U.S. negotiations in Paris with the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam from August 1969 to December 1973.
Consisting primarily of the memoranda of conversation between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry A. Kissinger, and North Vietnamese Politburo Member and Special Adviser to the North Vietnamese Delegation, Le Duc Tho (except for a small number of occasions when senior North Vietnamese diplomat Xuan Thuy substituted for Tho), this volume focuses on the negotiations that led to the Paris Peace Accords on January 27, 1973, and on post-Accords meetings in 1973 (February, May, June, and December) between Kissinger and Tho. Except for the Hanoi round of meetings in February 1973, all the meetings took place in Paris.
Presented chronologically, the documents in this volume—memoranda of conversation recording the meetings—show, among other things: 1) the evolution of the U.S. and North Vietnamese positions in the negotiations, 2) how the parties reached agreement on the Accords, also called the agreement or the settlement, and 3) how the Accords failed to lead to a stable cease-fire or to a political settlement of the conflict.
September 1 to January 20, 1969
Topic covered in this volume include: Efforts To Move the Peace Talks Forward; the Ohio Exercise, The Breakthrough in Paris, Negotiating the Understanding, The Bombing Halt, South Vietnamese Abstention From the Expanded Peace Conference; the Anna Chennault Affair, South Vietnamese Participation in the Paris Peace Talks, Resolution of the Procedural Delays and the Opening of the Expanded Peace Talks.
The editors of the volume sought to present documentation that explained and illuminated the major foreign policy decisions and problems on Vietnam faced by the President and his key foreign policy advisers during the last 4 months of his administration. The documents highlight the Johnson administration's slow and agonizing internal deliberations on how to achieve formal four-party peace negotiations on Vietnam in Paris. A good part of this search for peace was carried out during the 1968 Presidential election amid suspicions by the Democratic and Republican candidates, and President Lyndon Johnson himself, that the respective Presidential candidates were using the peace process to influence the election. In addition, both the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) and the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) had their own demands for the procedures and modalities of the formal peace process, all of which had to be reconciled. This volume is the account of how the Johnson administration achieved the opening of formal four-party peace talks in Paris.
President Johnson and his principal foreign policy advisers, Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense Clifford, Assistant to the President Rostow, and other official and unofficial advisers became almost exclusively concerned with the goal of starting the peace negotiations in Paris. The administration was split between hard liners, including the President himself, and so-called doves. The hardliners refused to stop U.S. bombing of North Vietnam without a promise from Hanoi that it would withdraw from the Demilitarized Zone, cease its attack on South Vietnamese cities, and accept South Vietnam representatives at the peace table. The doves, Secretary of Defense Clifford and Chief Paris negotiator Averell Harriman, favored stopping the bombing in the hopes of moving the peace process forward. A main theme of the volume is how the doves eventually convinced the President that North Vietnam, under heavy pressure from the Soviet Union, would agree to his demands.
A second major theme of the volume is the interaction between the peace negotiations and the Presidential election. Vietnam was a major campaign issue debated strenuously by Republican candidate Richard Nixon, Democratic candidate Vice President Hubert Humphrey, and Independent candidate Governor George Wallace. The prospect of imminent peace talks had the potential to influence the elections. This theme is developed principally through the extensive use of transcripts of Johnson's phone calls as the President sought to convince the three candidates to support his conditions for a bombing halt and for opening the formal peace talks.
The volume's third major theme is how the Johnson administration had to persuade, cajole, and coerce the Republic of Vietnam and President Thieu to accept the deal that the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, with the help of the Soviet Union, essentially worked out at the end of October 1968. Much to Johnson's dismay, South Vietnam refused to agree to terms before the Presidential election. Not until January 16, 1969, did all four parties agree to the modalities of the talks--size of the table, use of flags or nameplates, and speaking order. On January 18, 1969, just 2 days before the Johnson administration left office, the peace talks officially began.
Anna Chennault Affair - Nixon Conspiracy:
Documents show that President Johnson and his advisers believed there was a conspiracy to derail the negotiations to help the Republicans in the election offten called the Chennault Affair. Anna Chennault, an associate of Republican Presidential candidate Richard Nixon and co-chair of Women for Nixon, had been in contact with Bui Diem, South Vietnamese Ambassador to the United States. "There is no hard evidence that Mr. Nixon himself is involved," Rostow reported in an October 29 memorandum to the President. "Exactly what the Republicans have been saying to Bui Diem is not wholly clear as opposed to the conclusions that Bui Diem is drawing from what they have said." During the regular Tuesday luncheon with his foreign policy advisers, Johnson expressed dismay at Banker's reports on his unsuccessful efforts to arrange a meeting with Thieu. Thieu's uncharacteristic unavailability seemed to confirm Johnson's belief in a conspiracy between the Republicans and the South Vietnamese. Presidential Consultant Maxwell Taylor suggested that "it may be sinister, or it may be ineptitude," while Johnson prophesied that "Nixon will double-cross them (the South Vietnamese) after November 5," election day. Later that day South Vietnamese Foreign Minister Thanh informed Bunker that the dispatch of a delegation to Paris would require approval from his country's National Assembly. Bunker assessed that the GVN would not be ready to go ahead at the current time. Concerned about proceeding to Paris without the GVN aboard, Johnson agreed to a further postponement of 2 days in order to give Bunker more time.
On November 2 Thieu publicly stated that he would not send a delegation to the expanded talks in Paris, effectively preventing the convening of the four-party meetings. In turn, the North Vietnamese refused to accept further meetings solely between U.S. and DRV representatives. Late in the evening of November 2 Johnson discussed with Senator Dirksen, his old colleague and an intimate of both Nixon and Chennault, the connection between the Republicans and the South Vietnamese. The President described the actions of Nixon's supporters as "treason" and instructed Dirksen to transmit a warning to Nixon that he must act to prevent any adverse impact upon the Paris talks. On November 3 Johnson called Senator George Smathers (D-Florida), who had been in contact with Nixon. Smathers stated that Nixon denied any knowledge of the affair, and the President countered that he had documented proof of a Republican connection to the GVN. Apparently at the urging of both Dirksen and Smathers, Nixon made a telephone call to Johnson that afternoon to disclaim personally any involvement with the entire affair. In light of Nixon's denials and Johnson's own reticence about revealing the full range of government surveillance and wiretapping of Chennault and Diem, the decision was made not to make public the information gathered regarding the Republican-South Vietnamese connection. In a close vote, Nixon won the 1968 Presidential election.
NIXON ADMINISTRATION
Vietnam, January 1969–July 1970
State Department historians broaden the scope of coverage of the conflict with the compilation of this group of documents. Previously U.S. policy towards Vietnam and policy towards Laos and Cambodia were in separate volumes. With the Nixon administration's decision to take the war to the opposition in Cambodia and integrate more fully the secret war in Laos into its strategy for Vietnam, starting with this volume, Vietnam was covered in the context of the larger war that included the conflicts in Laos and Cambodia, and in the case of the former, also the role of Thailand in Laos. Consequently, the editors had to make choices about what to cover. When Vietnam was the main concern of President Nixon and his principal advisers, primarily Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger and his NSC Staff; Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker in Saigon; Commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, General Creighton Abrams; and Chief Paris Peace Talks negotiator, Henry Cabot Lodge—the focus is on Vietnam strategy, planning and operations. The focus of the volume later shifts to the issue of the deterioration of the secret war in Laos in March 1970. In March and April 1970, after the overthrow of Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia and his replacement by pro-American General Lon Nol, the volume moves its focus to Cambodia, culminating with the U.S.-South Vietnamese invasion of that country in an effort to attack the North Vietnamese troops in their sanctuaries. The volume concludes with the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Cambodia.
Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972
Major of area of coverage include: The Aftermath of the Cambodian Incursion, July 21–October 7, 1970, Planning and Decisions for Operations in Cambodia and Laos, October 9, 1970–February 7, 1971, Operation Lam Son 719, February 8–April 7, 1971, The Consequences of Operation Lam Son 719 and the Search for a Settlement, April 8–October 6, 1971, Military and Diplomatic Stalemate, October 11, 1971–January 26, 1972 .
During the period covered by this volume, July 1970–January 1972, the Nixon administration expanded the Vietnam war into Cambodia and Laos as part of its strategy. This volume covers South Vietnam in the context of this larger war in Southeast Asia; therefore, the volume begins in July 1970 in the aftermath of the Cambodian incursion.
At the time, a variety of topics dominated the policy discussions of President Nixon and his principal advisers. Among these topics were U.S. troop withdrawals, Vietnamization, negotiations in Paris (both the public plenary sessions and the secret talks between Kissinger and North Vietnamese Politburo member Le Duc Tho), and possible South Vietnamese operations in Cambodia, Laos, and North Vietnam. Throughout the rest of 1970 these themes moved forward on separate paths that occasionally intersected with one another. South Vietnamese operations, first in Cambodia and then in Laos, were seen in policy terms as providing South Vietnam additional time to develop a more effective military, to generate economic growth, and to achieve some degree of political stability. The operations were also to demonstrate the success of Vietnamization and justify the continuing withdrawal of U.S. troops.
In late 1970 and early 1971, the focus shifted to decision making regarding plans to implement a major South Vietnamese out-of-country operation called Lam Son 719, launched in early February 1971. The strategic purpose of the operation was to halt or slow the flow of military supplies to Communist forces in South Vietnam via the panhandle of Laos. At the same time, it would demonstrate the growing military prowess of the South Vietnamese Army. On the negotiating front, Kissinger continued in 1970 and throughout 1971 to meet periodically in Paris with Le Duc Tho and other senior Vietnamese Communist functionaries but made no progress. At the same time, representatives of both sides also met publicly in the plenary meetings. Each side used the public Paris meetings to exchange carefully calibrated propaganda, making the meetings, if possible, less productive than the secret talks. The volume focuses on the Kissinger–Le Duc Tho talks with only occasional documentary coverage of the public talks.
This volume also documents President Nixon’s penchant for secret operations and covert warfare: his continued support for secret bombing campaigns in Cambodia and Laos and his approval of the November 1971 Son Tay raid into North Vietnam to rescue American prisoners of war. Nixon also signed off on new and continuing information gathering initiatives and propaganda that supported intelligence operations against Communist forces, organizations, and governments in South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Additionally, he approved clandestine support for South Vietnamese political entities friendly to the United States. These operations are documented in some detail to demonstrate the role of covert actions in support of overt political and military operations.
In the waning months of the period covered by this volume, deadlock had set in. Neither side appeared able to win militarily, or even to weaken his adversary sufficiently to make him negotiate in good faith. There were signs, however, that Hanoi might be preparing to mount a major military effort in 1972. Its purpose would be to break through this impasse without having to travel a diplomatic path. The volume concludes at this point.
Vietnam, January–October 1972
Major areas of coverage include: Before the Easter Offensive, January 20–March 29, 1972, The Easter Offensive, March 30–May 7, 1972, The North Vietnamese Offensive Falters, Negotiations Resume, May 8–July 18, 1972, The Parties Move Toward Agreement, July 19–October 7, 1972
The Easter Offensive, and its ramifications, represents the most significant event in Indochina for U.S. policy in this period, and documentary coverage of the event dominates the volume, concentrating mainly on what happened in North and South Vietnam, policy formulation and decision making in Washington, and the negotiations in Paris. Only a very small number of documents relate to events and policy in Laos and Cambodia, and then only as they relate to events and policy in Vietnam.
Documents in this volume examine the link between force and diplomacy in U.S. national security policy toward the Vietnam war. In the period the volume covers, force drove diplomacy. Only by recognizing this can the process by which America’s Vietnam war policy was formulated and implemented be fully understood. Controlling the process was a small circle of men, led by President Richard M. Nixon, and which included the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry A. Kissinger; the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs, Major General Alexander M. Haig; and a few National Security Council officials trusted by Kissinger.
Sources for this volume include messages and memoranda that illuminate the decision-making process in a bureaucracy. That can be found in Nixon’s papers, in Kissinger’s papers, in military and diplomatic records in the National Archives, and in other repositories. Transcripts of Nixon’s taped conversations with senior policy advisers, as well as a collection of transcripts of Kissinger’s telephone conversations, provide an additional level of detail. A third collection, less well known than the other two but almost as significant, is that of Admiral Thomas Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and includes diary excerpts and telephone conversations. This volume, therefore, documents the implementation of U.S. policy toward Vietnam during the Easter Offensive more thoroughly than ever before.
Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973
Major areas of coverage include: Breakthrough in Paris Blocked in Saigon, October 8–23, 1972, Paris Negotiations Collapse, October 24–December 13, 1972, The Christmas Bombings, December 14–29, 1972, America Leaves the War, December 30, 1972–January 27, 1973
The most significant events for U.S. Vietnam war policy in this period were policy formation and decision making in Washington; the negotiations in Paris and reactions in Washington, Hanoi, and Saigon to the negotiations; and the December/Christmas Bombing as well as other events in South Vietnam and North Vietnam. Therefore, documentary coverage in this volume is limited mainly to these topics. Only a very small number of documents relate to events and policy in Laos and Cambodia, and then only as they, in turn, relate to events and policy in Vietnam.
Believing that time was on their side, North Vietnam’s leaders refused to negotiate seriously with the United States and South Vietnam. Indeed, in March 1972, they attempted to bypass negotiations altogether with a full-scale invasion of South Vietnam. Called the Easter Offensive by the United States, the invasion at first appeared to overwhelm the South. By mid-summer, however, Nixon’s May decision to mine North Vietnam harbors and dramatically intensify the application of American air power to infrastructure and other strategic targets in the North and to operational targets in the South, and the tenacious defense of South Vietnam by its own armed forces, had blunted the offensive.
At this point, the North Vietnamese agreed to resume negotiations and did so in meetings with President Nixon’s National Security Adviser, Henry A. Kissinger, in Paris on July 19, August 1, August 14, September 15, and September 26–27. By the September talks, the North Vietnamese delegation, led by Le Duc Tho, seemed prepared to make what Kissinger considered a break-through concession: namely, that North Vietnam no longer linked its readiness to negotiate a U.S. withdrawal with a demand that the United States support and actively participate in the dismantling of President Nguyen Van Thieu’s government in Saigon.
In early October, Kissinger and Le Duc Tho met again in Paris. During a marathon four-day session (October 8–11), the two negotiated a peace agreement.
NIXON - FORD ADMINISTRATIONS
Vietnam, January 1973–July 1975
Major areas of coverage include: Neither War nor Peace, January 27–June 15, 1973, Congressional Restrictions, General Warfare, June 19, 1973–February 25, 1975, Collapse and Evacuation, February 26–July 22, 1975 , The SS Mayaguez Incident, May 12–15, 1975
This volume addresses the ending of the Vietnam war; a story central to the U.S. experience in the 20th century. Similar to other Foreign Relations volumes, this collection of documents emphasizes the formation of policy over day-to-day diplomacy. Several themes dominated U.S. policy and policy objectives in Indochina during this period: the relationship between force and diplomacy, the struggle between the President and Congress in the formation and implementation of U.S. policy, U.S. credibility in the world, and the limits of American power.
These themes dictated the selection of documents in this volume. Soon after the fall of Saigon in April 1975, American officials in several agencies began looking back at U.S. policy toward and political and military actions in Vietnam in an effort to understand and learn from the American experience in Indochina beginning in the early 1960s. This volume places those analyses within the broader documentary context.
This volume concludes with documentation covering the May 1975 seizure by Cambodia of the SS Mayaguez and the successful recovery by U.S. forces of the ship and its crew. The documents cover the crisis deliberations in Washington among civilian and military officials that led to President Ford’s decision to use military force to recover the ship.
Source: Office of the Historian, United States Department of State
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