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Vietnam War: CIA Report: The Vietnamese Communists Will to Persist (1966)
CIA Report: The Vietnamese Communists Will to Persist (1966)
This 316-page CIA report was not available to the public in its current sanitized form until December 22, 2016. It had to be approved for release by the CIA, Defense intelligence Agency, United States Air Force, Joints Chiefs of Staff, National Security Agency, State Department, U.S. Army and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
This report was previously declassified then released in 2006. The earlier released copy contains significantly fewer redactions. We have included both copies in this collection so you can compare the different released versions, so you can see what in 2006 the CIA believed could be release to the public, but 10 years later decided that the public should not see.
The report provides an analysis of the Vietnamese communists' strengths, capabilities, and will to persist, dated August 26, 1966, produced by the Directorate of Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency.
The report found that Unite States bombing campaigns at the current level, "…is unlikely to diminish North Vietnam’s continued ability to provide materiel support." Though U.S. military strikes were hurting the Viet Cong, "neither internal resource shortages nor allied actions within present political parameters are likely to render the Vietnamese Communists incapable of persisting.” The report found that the North's morale had declined, "but not to a point presently sufficient to force any major revision in basic Communist strategy."
In 2007 an article titled, "Unpopular Pessimism: Why CIA Analysts Were So Doubtful About Vietnam," by Harold P. Ford, a former CIA official, appeared in the CIA's internal secret journal, “Studies in Intelligence.” Ford wrote about contrarian opinions at the Agency during the Vietnam War saying, “It is well documented and well known that for decades CIA analysts were skeptical of official pronouncements about the Vietnam war and consistently fairly pessimistic about the outlook for ‘light at the end of the tunnel.’ ” Ford continued, "CIA analysts widely appreciated the fact that the enemy saw its battle as a long-range conflict and was prepared to go the distance."
Also included with this report is a copy of the article "Unpopular Pessimism Why CIA Analysts Were So Doubtful About Vietnam," by Harold P. Ford.
Page 9 from 2016 Release
Same page, page 9 from 2006 Release
This 316-page CIA report was not available to the public in its current sanitized form until December 22, 2016. It had to be approved for release by the CIA, Defense intelligence Agency, United States Air Force, Joints Chiefs of Staff, National Security Agency, State Department, U.S. Army and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
This report was previously declassified then released in 2006. The earlier released copy contains significantly fewer redactions. We have included both copies in this collection so you can compare the different released versions, so you can see what in 2006 the CIA believed could be release to the public, but 10 years later decided that the public should not see.
The report provides an analysis of the Vietnamese communists' strengths, capabilities, and will to persist, dated August 26, 1966, produced by the Directorate of Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency.
The report found that Unite States bombing campaigns at the current level, "…is unlikely to diminish North Vietnam’s continued ability to provide materiel support." Though U.S. military strikes were hurting the Viet Cong, "neither internal resource shortages nor allied actions within present political parameters are likely to render the Vietnamese Communists incapable of persisting.” The report found that the North's morale had declined, "but not to a point presently sufficient to force any major revision in basic Communist strategy."
In 2007 an article titled, "Unpopular Pessimism: Why CIA Analysts Were So Doubtful About Vietnam," by Harold P. Ford, a former CIA official, appeared in the CIA's internal secret journal, “Studies in Intelligence.” Ford wrote about contrarian opinions at the Agency during the Vietnam War saying, “It is well documented and well known that for decades CIA analysts were skeptical of official pronouncements about the Vietnam war and consistently fairly pessimistic about the outlook for ‘light at the end of the tunnel.’ ” Ford continued, "CIA analysts widely appreciated the fact that the enemy saw its battle as a long-range conflict and was prepared to go the distance."
Also included with this report is a copy of the article "Unpopular Pessimism Why CIA Analysts Were So Doubtful About Vietnam," by Harold P. Ford.
Page 9 from 2016 Release
Same page, page 9 from 2006 Release
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